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ABSTRACT 
The goal of this dissertation is to describe and analyze one set of efforts to improve 
monitoring, licensing, accountability, and socio-environmental outcomes of industrial-scale 
farming in the Cerrado, located in Brazil’s southern Amazon. These efforts are collectively 
called Lucas do Rio Verde Legal [Lucas Legal], an environmental licensing initiative which 
is the product of a multi-stakeholder partnership. This partnership includes an international 
environmental NGO, national and multi-national industrial agriculture firms, and local 
government agencies. Environmental issues in the Cerrado are frequently framed as 
economic, and, to a lesser extent, policy issues, due to the high profitability of industrial 
agriculture in the region and shortcomings on the part of the state to adequately monitor rural 
activities and enforce environmental laws. Lucas Legal is novel not only for its relative 
successes at improving the effectiveness of environmental licensing of rural properties locally 
and at the state level, but also for its role in increasing the interest of rural producers in 
addressing environmental issues and for calling attention to cultural, historical, institutional, 
and technical factors that contribute to agri-environmental problems in the Amazon.  
A multi-method approach, including archival research, ethnographic research, ongoing 
interviews with key informants, and a semi-structured survey of 20 farmers was used to 
explore the genesis and outcomes of Lucas Legal from many different angles, and to trace the 
history of the project and understand the unique history of the municipality (Lucas do Rio 
Verde) in which the project began. Analysis of the project drew on three distinct literatures – 
the literature on Environmental Governance; the literature on Environmentality, which is 
heavily based on Foucault’s work on Governmentality; and the combined literatures on 
Advocacy and Discourse Coalitions. While none of these literatures was sufficient alone to 
explain the unique history and outcomes of Lucas Legal, the three literatures together offer 
useful insights into the contributions of different government, market, and civil society 
stakeholder groups.  
The grounded, ethnographic approach of this dissertation research helps fill an important gap 
in knowledge on this topic; few other studies of environmental governance in the Amazon 
have been in-depth enough to explore the settlement history of the region, the importance of 
inter-personal relationships and local politics to environmental and developmental outcomes, 
and to link these issues to outcomes of projects of environmental governance or local 
perceptions of environmental conservation. Understanding the diverse motivations of 
agricultural and non-agricultural actors in the Amazon is crucial to ensuring sustainable 
environmental outcomes as well as sustainable economic development. 
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
 
The changes in the southern Amazon since the 1970s have been manifold. Not 
the least of these have been massive transformations of tropical forests and grasslands 
to rangelands and croplands, and the settlement in the region of tens of thousands of 
farmers, ranchers, and other people linked to the agriculture industry. This settlement 
process was highly heterogeneous, as corporate, spontaneous, and government actors 
and institutions variously influenced the process at different times, in different places, 
and at different scales.1 At the scale of the entire region, some of the most important 
outcomes of these processes have been the loss of some 17 percent of the region’s 
native vegetation,2 (likely much more when factoring in the Cerrado biome), and 
population growth of more than 1.5 times the total national population growth rate.3 
More local scale changes have been highly variable in terms of ecological, social, 
economic, and political outcomes. Significant progress has been made in measuring 
these changes,4 explaining the mechanisms that drive them,5 and predicting future 
                                                          
1
 John O. Browder and Brian J. Godfrey, Rainforest Cities: Urbanization, Development, and 
Globalization of the Brazilian Amazon  (Columbia UP: New York, 1997). 91-94. 
2
 Stephen Aldrich et al., "Contentious Land Change in the Amazon's Arc of Deforestation," Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers 102, no. 1 (2012): 103. 
3
 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística [IBGE], "Censo Demográfico," (Brasília, Brazil2010). 
4
 Marcelo Fragomeni Simon and Fernando Luis Gargorry, "The expansion of agriculture in the 
Brazilian Amazon," Environmental Conservation 32, no. 3 (2005); Charles Curt Mueller, "Expansion 
and modernization of agriculture in the Cerrado -- the case of soybeans in Brazil's Center-West," in 
Textos para Discussão (Brasília: Universidade de Brasília - Departamento de Economia, 2003); Robert 
M. Ewers, William F. Laurance, and Carlos M. Souza Jr., "Temporal Fluctuations in Amazonian 
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impacts of these changes.6 In spite of this progress, though, many questions about 
farmer decision-making and rural governance remains unresolved, even as 
deforestation and economic development continue at a rapid clip. 
At the same time, certain mechanisms of governance that can limit and shape 
these rapid social and ecological changes appear to be increasingly influential. For 
example, some thirty years after a combined government-sponsored and spontaneous 
rush of settlers to Mato Grosso, municipalities in this region are sufficiently 
established, or are moving in the direction of being sufficiently established, to provide 
public services and enforce the rule of law where the state- and federal-level presence 
is scarce.7 Additionally, the Amazon’s main economic activities, industrial-scale 
production of soybeans, corn, and other crops, and ranching, are linked to 
international markets. These markets have already been influential forces toward 
improving the environmental and social impacts of agriculture and ranching in Brazil, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
deforestation rates," Environmental Conservation 35, no. 4 (2008); Anna Luiza Ozorio de Almeida, 
The Colonization of the Amazon, Translations from Latin America Series (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1992); David Werth and Roni Avissar, "The local and global effects of Amazon deforestation," 
Journal of Geophysical Research 107, no. D20 (2002). 
5
 Álvaro O. D'Antona, Leah K. VanWey, and Corey M. Hayashi, "Property Size and Land Cover 
Change in the Brazilian Amazon," Popul Environ 27(2006); Peter Deadman et al., "Colonist household 
decisionmaking and land-use change in the Amazon Rainforest: an agent-based simulation " 
Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 31(2004); Ricardo Alexandrino Garcia, Britaldo 
Soares-Filho, and Diana Oya Sawyer, "Socioeconomic dimensions, migration, and deforestation: An 
integrated model of territorial organization for the Brazilian Amazon," Ecological Indicators 7(2007); 
Andrea Cattaneo, "Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: Comparing the Impacts of Macroeconomic 
Shocks, Land Tenure, and Technological Change," Land Economics 77, no. 2 (2001). 
6
 Philip M. Fearnside, "Brazil's Cuiabá-Santarém (BR-163) Highway: The Environmental Cost of 
Paving a Soybean Corridor Through the Amazon," Environ Manage 39(2007); Daniel Nepstad, 
Claudia M. Stickler, and Oriana T. Almeida, "Globalization of the Amazon Soy and Beef Industries: 
Opportunities for Conservation," Conservation Biology 20, no. 6 (2006); Britaldo Soares-Filho et al., 
"Simulating the response of land-cover changes to road paving and governance along a major Amazon 
highway: the Santarém-Cuiabá corridor," Global Change Biology 10(2004). 
7
 Daniel Nepstad et al., "Frontier Governance in Amazonia," Science 295(2002): 630. 
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as evidenced by the Soy Moratorium,8 and new, preferential financing programs for 
farmers who make certain commitments to social and environmental responsibility.9 
Additionally, federal and state governments have made strides toward more effective 
and fairer enforcement of environmental regulations; better monitoring of 
deforestation trends;10 and more sophisticated rural licensing initiatives.  
This dissertation is situated against this background of rapid and complex 
regional change and evolving institutions and processes of environmental governance. 
This study draws on a case study of a rural, southern Amazonian municipality that 
has been the site of a multi-stakeholder initiative to reduce the negative 
environmental and social impacts of the local agriculture industry. The municipality, 
named Lucas do Rio Verde, or Lucas, for short, is located in central Mato Grosso, in 
the southern part of the region legally recognized as the Amazon in Brazil, at the 
boundary between the Amazon Forest and Cerrado, or tropical savannah, biomes. The 
area that is now the municipality was first settled just thirty years ago, and today, 
boasts one of the highest standards of living in Brazil (it is ranked in the top 2 percent 
of Brazilian municipalities out of over 5,000)11 and produces a full 1 percent of the 
total annual soybean crop of Brazil.12  
                                                          
8
 Corrina Steward, "From colonization to "environmental soy": A case study of environmental and 
socio-economic vaulation in the Amazon soy frontier," Agriculture and Human Values 24(2007). 
9
 Claudia M. Stickler and Oriana T. Almeida, "Harnessing International Finance to Manage the 
Amazon Agro-Industrial Explosion? The Case of International Finance Corporation Loans to Grupo 
Maggi," Journal of Sustainable Forestry 27, no. 1-2 (2008). 
10
 Nepstad et al., "Frontier Governance in Amazonia," 630. 
11
 Programa de Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento [PNUD], "Índice de desenvolvimento humano 
- municipal, 1991 e 2000, Todos os municípios do Brasil," (Brasília, Brazil2000). 
12
 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística [IBGE], "Produção Agrícola Municipal," (Brasília, 
Brazil2010). 
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In 2006, local business elites grew concerned about growing market pressure 
on the agricultural sector to reduce its negative environmental impacts, and they were 
growing increasingly dissatisfied with the uneven and inefficient way in which the 
environment was regulated at the state and federal levels. To resolve these issues, 
they forged an alliance among the municipal government, the state attorney’s office, a 
set of local, national, and multi-national agricultural supply companies, and a large 
environmental non-governmental organization (ENGO) to facilitate environmental 
licensing of rural properties and promote environmental and labor best practices on 
local farms. This alliance, I will argue, has been part of an effort by these 
stakeholders to proactively shape the governance of their activities. Their goals were 
grouped under the umbrella of a project called “Lucas do Rio Verde Legal”, or Lucas 
Legal, for short. The outcomes of their efforts have been mixed. The project has 
fallen short of its initial goal of achieving 100 percent licensing of rural properties in 
Lucas by 2012, but has apparently been successful at changing the view and the 
discourse surrounding environmental conservation in the municipality, including 
among farmers by foregrounding the social, economic, and environmental benefits of 
licensing and protection and regeneration of federally-mandated forest set-asides.  
Perhaps the most significant achievement of Lucas Legal has been its 
influence on improving the state-level environmental licensing process and, 
debatably, reducing the transaction costs of complying with environmental 
regulations. Brazil’s forest code requires substantial private reserves, sometimes 
referred to as “set-asides,” on each property, though compliance with this law has 
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historically been weak. Improving compliance with this law has long been recognized 
as crucial for environmental conservation in the Amazon13 and identifying and 
licensing rural properties in the Amazon is an important first step toward greater 
Forest Code compliance. Until recently, landowners in Mato Grosso had to 
essentially turn themselves in for environmental crimes in order to discover what they 
needed to do in order to make their properties compliant and receive a license. As 
deeply flawed as this process may have been, Mato Grosso’s licensing program was 
actually the most advanced in Brazil.14 One of the major innovations of Lucas Legal 
was to greatly improve this process by lowering the legal and symbolic barriers to 
application for a license. Legislation eventually passed based on Lucas Legal broke 
the licensing process into two steps by creating a new, proto-license that generates 
specific compliance instructions, coupled with a type of “temporary amnesty” period 
under which land owners can bring their properties into compliance without facing 
fines or jail time. This institutional innovation appears to having a positive influence 
on licensing rates as land owners now have some legal protection while they 
endeavor to comply with environmental regulations that can be quite costly in terms 
of time and money. 
 In addition to these important institutional changes, Lucas Legal is part of a 
significant, but poorly understood shift in farmer values, self-perception, and decision 
making in the Amazon. Agriculture is both an interesting and an important target for 
                                                          
13
 Nepstad, Stickler, and Almeida, "Globalization of the Amazon Soy and Beef Industries: 
Opportunities for Conservation," 1600. 
14
 Philip M. Fearnside and Reinaldo Imbrozio Barbosa, "Avoided deforestation in Amazonia as a 
global warming mitigation measure: The case of Mato Grosso," World Resource Review 15, no. 3 
(2003). 
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scholarly work on nature and society because agriculture is both an extractive (and 
often destructive) activity and at the same time, is heavily dependent on the stability 
of its natural environs. Until relatively recently, farmers were generally seen as 
nature’s stewards.15 The role of farmers in our collective imagination has shifted, 
though, accompanied by changes in both the technology of farming, particularly 
toward the heavy use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers, and in socially-accepted 
notions of environmentalism or environmental conservation, including, namely, a 
shift toward viewing conservation as best accomplished by isolating wilderness areas 
from human contact. 
One result of this murkiness in terms of the role of agriculture in popular 
perception has been a failure on the part of scholars and environmentalists to 
productively engage with farmers and other agricultural actors, particularly large-
scale farmers who are most likely to use advanced technologies in their activities. 
When included in environmental scholarship, large-scale farmers are frequently only 
incorporated into studies as short-term profit maximizers, which drastically 
oversimplifies the complex reality that farmers actually consider when making land 
management decisions, as well as the mutability of these factors and their relative 
weighting in decision-making as circumstances change and as farmers’ goals and 
values change. On the other hand, a few studies have attempted to better understand 
the farmer’s relationship to the land, and the results of these have suggested that 
farm-level decision making is highly “contagious” (in other words, peer pressure is a 
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factor), though the mechanisms and implications of this have not been fully 
explored.16  On the whole, the way in which individual farmers (land owners or land 
managers) make decisions is poorly understood, particularly in the Amazon, though 
this is hugely important in terms of land use change and socio-economic outcomes at 
all levels of analysis.  
 The Lucas Legal project is unusual in that it rejects the one-dimensional views 
of farmers and their decision making that have led many observers and policy makers 
to assume that farmers will only comply with environmental demands if they receive 
payment for their actions.17 While capitalist sustainability approach will likely be 
crucial to ending deforestation in the Amazon, there is growing recognition of its 
limitations, and, in any case, it will need to be only one in a portfolio of approaches. 
The planners of Lucas Legal were successful in promoting environmental 
sustainability in agriculture locally not because they offered any real material benefits 
to farmers with their programs, but because they confronted licensing issues faced by 
farmers head on, by offering information (about the law, about one’s property), 
political and institutional support, and publicity to as encouragement and rewards for 
farmers’ good behavior, instead of payment for environmental services or some other 
subsidy for farmer participation.  
Additionally, the project is cleverly named, as Legal in Portuguese means 
both “legal” and “cool.” The project has, thus, has also a symbolic and discursive 
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component – promotion of the project implies that environmentally (and socially) 
sound practices on the farm are the right and the popular thing to do.18 As originally 
intended, Lucas Legal was designed to provide minimal material assistance to 
participants in the form of no-cost property mapping, though many farmers report that 
they paid to have their properties re-mapped before applying for the state license 
anyway, rendering this material assistance moot. The other rumored direct material 
benefit for project participation, a “green seal,” or a price differential for soybeans 
and corn from licensed properties, has not materialized and offers little sign that it 
will in the future. In any case, positive reception of the project and its achievements, 
detailed further below, are evidence that farmers are motivated to undertake 
conservationist behaviors such as pursuing environmental licensing by accurate 
information, lowered legal risks, positive reinforcement, community- or peer-
pressure, and the potential for longer-term economic benefits as well as short term 
benefits.  
 Finally, the experience of Lucas and of Lucas Legal lends support to the thesis 
eloquently put forth by Arun Agrawal in his book Environmentality: Technologies of 
Government and the Making of Subjects that taking an active role in the management 
of a certain arena (whether taking on an official authority position or simply being 
compelled to behave in a certain way by a desire to avoid punishment) can lead to 
“subject formation,” or the internalizing of the arena in question and even the desire 
to act in the service of the same goals as those set by the government or another 
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authority.19 In Lucas, this process is evident; the implementation of Lucas Legal and a 
parallel process of decentralization of environmental regulation placed a lot more 
authority in the hands of municipal employees, who were able to use their “intimate 
knowledge” of local situations (to borrow another phrase from Agrawal) to make 
sanctions for infractions productive (resolve the problem) instead of punitive.20 The 
result is that farmers are now beginning to see conservation as an important 
obligation to the future of their community, not as a directive from a distant and often 
resented government; this is evident from interviews and surveys conducted before 
and after the implementation of Lucas Legal. 
 
 
Guiding questions and the organization of the dissertation 
  
The guiding questions of this study are: What are the historical antecedents 
that inform agri-envrionmental governance in the southern Amazon? How can Lucas 
Legal best be characterized in the context of multi-stakeholder environmental 
governance? What factors led to the emergence of Lucas Legal? What have been the 
successes and failures in terms of the project’s objectives and what can be learned 
from these successes and failures to inform better agri-environmental governance in 
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the Amazon? And is there evidence that farmer behavior can be modified to produce 
more sustainable outcomes in the Amazon? 
 This dissertation is presented in eight chapters. This first chapter, the 
introduction, has introduced the study and will explain the characteristics of the study 
site and the methods used in the study.  
Chapter 2 will introduce three theoretical frameworks to guide the analysis. 
These are 1) the literature on governance, which seeks to identify and explain the 
influence of state and non-state actors on institutions and rule making; 2)  
governmentality and environmentality, which draws on the work of Michel Foucault 
on understanding power as a multi-faceted and diffuse force which can both limit and 
constrain human behavior, as well as produce fundamental changes in the values of 
individuals as they internalize the goals of a more powerful, rule-making authority; 
and 3) the literature on advocacy and discourse coalitions, which looks at the 
motivations and processes by which diverse group of actors come together in pursuit 
of a common goal, or in the employment of a common discourse while maintaining 
separate and possibly divergent goals, relatively speaking.  
Chapter 3 describes the settlement history of Mato Grosso and, more 
specifically, of Lucas. The settler experience was extremely formative to most of the 
families involved in agriculture in Lucas and it has had a profound effect on the 
strong sense of pride in their community and the high level of political cohesion in 
Lucas (at least among land owners). This is also important for understanding the roots 
of the resentment among farmers and local elites, most of who settled in Lucas early 
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in its history, toward the state and federal governments. The settlement of Lucas was 
marked by social and physical violence at the hands of government officials and 
considerable material and spiritual hardship. Because settlement was so recent, many 
of the original settlers are still alive and involved in agriculture and local leadership, 
and the families that stuck it out have a commitment to the municipality and the 
community. 
Chapter 4 provides a history of environmental law and policy as pertains to 
the current situation in Lucas and the Amazon more generally. In spite of its 
notoriously weak enforcement, environmental law in Brazil and in Mato Grosso has a 
long and elaborate history. Understanding this history provides important institutional 
context for the emergence of Lucas Legal. The symbolic and political contexts 
(presented in Chapters 3 and 4) in which farmers and business elites in places like 
Lucas operate have real implications for governance arrangements alongside more 
frequently discussed material and economic considerations.  
Chapter 5 explores the development of the industrial agriculture economy in 
Lucas, as well as its importance and characteristics. These are punctuated by a 
description of a series of challenges faced by the agricultural sector and dramatic 
conflicts with the government with regard to these challenges in the years just before 
Lucas Legal was implemented.  I argue that the somewhat apocalyptic sense of 
desperation among farmers around 2004 and 2005 is key to understanding the 
emergence of Lucas Legal immediately afterward; dissatisfaction with the state and 
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federal governments was so high that a corporate-ENGO partnership promising to 
empower farmers and reduce uncertainty was perhaps an unexpectedly easy sell. 
In Chapter 6, the implementation of Lucas Legal is explained, as well as the 
basic objectives of the project and the process in which it was designed to work. 
Lucas Legal was sponsored and designed by stakeholders representing the public 
sphere, the private sphere, and civil society. The material and knowledge resources 
and the legitimacy of the non-state actors involved in the project appear to have been 
key to the positive farmer acceptance of the project, but ultimately, project leaders 
realized that they could not meet their obligations to participating farmers without the 
strong support of the state environmental agency and fairer and more effective state 
legislation.  
Chapter 7 defines and explores the successes and failures of Lucas Legal. 
Analysis of the project suggests four important successes of the project: the discursive 
reframing of environmental issues as farming issues; the mediation of a more positive 
relationship between the government and farmers, including the promotion of 
environmental subject-making among farmers; the pluralizing of environmental 
concern beyond just agriculture in Lucas; and the scaling up of the institutional 
changes first developed in Lucas to the most appropriate scale. In spite of these 
successes, the project has not met its main, original goal which was achieving a 100 
percent licensing rate among rural properties in the municipality, and the actual 
environmental outcomes of all of this remain unknown. Continued, constant, local, 
and long-term monitoring of licensing has also not been improved in spite of the 
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resources expended to map all of the municipality’s properties and to provide GIS 
(Geographic Information Science) software for monitoring. This is attributable to 
poor information-sharing between state and local environmental agencies and 
inadequate training of local staff to use the GIS software. In any case, these successes 
and failure offer important lessons for other multi-stakeholder initiatives of 
environmental governance.  
The dissertation is concluded by Chapter 8, which reviews the information 
presented above in the context of the three frameworks from Chapter 2. All three 
frameworks offer important insights into the case of Lucas Legal, with no one of 
them fully explaining it.  
 
Study site: Lucas do Rio Verde, Mato Grosso 
 
Lucas is located in the center of the state of Mato Grosso, in the southern part 
of the Legal Amazon and in the ecotone between the humid tropical forest biome and 
the Cerrado (Figure 1). Most of the municipality is classified as Cerrado, which 
important because it affects the amount of forest required under federal law to be set 
aside in private reserves. In the forest biome, each property must have 80 percent of 
its area set aside as a forest reserve; in the Cerrado, the amount is only 35 percent. 
Under the Köppen classification system, the climate is Tropical Wet and Dry, with 
the dry season lasting from approximately May through September.  
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Lucas officially gained the status of municipality in 1988, though settlement 
in the region had begun as long as 10 years before that. According to the most recent 
census, in 2010, the population was 45,545 people.21 The total area of the 
municipality is 3,645 km
2
. The municipality is located on the “soy highway,” BR-
163, which is a federal highway connecting the capital of Mato Grosso, Cuiabá, with 
the nearest port city on the Amazon River, Santarém, in the state of Pará. This 
positioning on the highway was influential in the settlement of the municipality and 
has been highly influential in the economic development of the municipality. 
Currently, this highway is the only way in or out of this region, and all of the soy 
grown in the region must travel this highway, heading either north to Santarém or 
south to a port in the state of Paraná.  
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Figure 1.  Lucas do Rio Verde in Mato Grosso state 
 
 
 
The term Cerrado (“closed” in Portuguese) refers to a diverse set of 
ecosystems, mainly throughout central and western Brazil, which includes grasslands, 
gallery forests, scrublands, and sclerophyllous and semi-deciduous forests. The 
climate in the Cerrado is tropical, extending down into the sub-tropics, and is defined 
by a rainy period, which runs from approximately October to March, and a dry 
period, from April to September. The precipitation in the wet season may be as high 
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as 1000 mm or more, while the precipitation in the dry season is close to zero.22 The 
cerrados are fire-dependent; natural and anthropogenic fire regimes have played a key 
role in maintaining the biome since as early as the late Pleistocene.23  
The Cerrado of Brazil is thought to be the most bio-diverse tropical savannah 
in the world, with considerable variation in floral species within the biome as well. 
For example, the Cerrado boasts more than 7,000 species of vascular plants, of which 
44 percent are endemic, and 914 known species of trees, of which 614 have been 
found in only one location within the Cerrado.24 In terms of fauna, 199 known species 
of mammals are largely restricted to forest fragments and gallery forests. More than 
830 species of birds have been identified so far in the Cerrado (49 percent of all birds 
known to Brazil can be found in the Cerrado, but few of these are endemic), and more 
than 1,200 species of fish, or 40 percent of the total known fish population of Brazil.25 
Reptile and amphibian populations are also thought to be high in the Cerrado and 
invertebrate populations are estimated to be as high as 90,000 species.26 Non-endemic 
fauna may also migrate to the humid forest during certain seasons, an important link 
between the Cerrado and the humid forest. Moreover, the Cerrado, and the Cerrado of 
Mato Grosso, in particular, is a starting point for thousands of springs and streams 
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that wind through the Amazon basin, and the deep-rooted, native vegetative cover of 
the Cerrado may be a more important carbon sink than previously realized.27  
Brazil’s recent agricultural development and, consequently, the development 
of some of the country’s most productive and wealthy new municipalities, have taken 
place in the Cerrado biome.28 The Cerrados of Brazil occupy about 207 million 
hectares, or about 24 percent of the national territory, to the south and to the east of 
the Amazon Forest, an area larger than the continental US east of the Mississippi 
River, excluding Florida.29 In the state of Mato Grosso, the cerrado biome covers 
approximately 40 percent of total land area, while forests cover approximately 50 
percent and the wetlands of the Pantanal cover the other 10 percent. Despite the 
biome’s extent, biodiversity, social importance and role as a carbon sink and in water 
resource management, the Cerrado biome and the human activity within the Cerrado 
have received considerably less attention from conservationists and social scientists 
than the humid forest. The results of this “high forest bias” have been a shortage of 
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adequate environmental and social data, 30 a slew of conflicting government policies 
the region, and massive losses of vegetation and biodiversity in the Cerrado.  
Today, the native vegetation of the Cerrado is highly fragmented. Of the 
estimated 2 million km
2
 of the original land area of the Cerrados, approximately 44 
percent (706,000km
2
) remains under native vegetative cover, while 41 percent is now 
classified as planted pasture (658,000 km
2
), 11 percent is classified as monoculture 
(180,000km
2
), and the remaining 4 percent is classified as urban, planted forests, or 
other uses.31  Human transformation of Cerrado ecosystems, particularly for 
agricultural expansion, continues to place pressure on the biome. Economic and 
government incentives have encouraged settlement and development in the Cerrado, 
particularly since the 1970s, and environmentalists and the public have been slow to 
recognize the importance of the Cerrado in the shadow of the more showy tropical 
humid forests of the Amazon. Although the soils that support the Cerrado are highly 
acidic, with the proper application of lime to correct for this acidity, these oxisols and 
ultisols are able to support some of the most productive agriculture systems in the 
world because their physical properties provide for good drainage and root 
penetration. 32 Low land prices, government policies and topography and climate 
conducive to agricultural production have been driving forces behind agricultural 
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development on Brazil’s Cerrado.33 Despite improving technologies and more recent 
calls for intensification instead of expansion, 30 percent of cropland expansion in 
Mato Grosso between 2001 and 2004 was at the expense of Cerrado vegetation.34 
Today, annual deforestation in the Cerrado is two to three times greater than in the 
humid forest, 35 a threat to both the Cerrado and the neighboring forests.  
 
Data collection 
  
Data collection for this dissertation was undertaken over the course of nine 
months in 2011, following up on two, short, preliminary visits to Lucas in mid-2008 
and 2009. The data that inform this work are a combination of ethnographic field 
notes, key informant interviews, semi-structured interviews with producers, and the 
results of archival research. Respondents for semi-structured interviews were selected 
using a snowball sampling method in which I enlisted key informants and other 
respondents to help me identify potential respondents. Emphasis in data collection 
was on quality and becoming, in the words of Bowen, “‘saturated’ with information 
on the topic,”36 instead of collecting a certain number of interviews. The diverse 
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toolbox of field research methods on which I drew, in the end, proved to be the most 
effective method of data collection given the length and nature of the project.  
In some ways, my approach is reminiscent of the “distended case 
study”/”follow the policy” approach advocated by Jamie Peck for studying “fast-
moving”37 policies and the “articulate policy elites” that drive them.38 Indeed, to 
answer the most pressing question of such successful-policy case studies (How is 
success produced?) requires access to policy-shaping elites who often come prepared 
with highly deliberate and prepared responses to questions about those policies or 
projects. As such, the distended case approach works 
 
[in] its use of a judicious combination of observations, documentary 
analysis, and in-depth interviews, as a means of probing, interrogating, 
and triangulating issues…spanning an expansive ‘causal group’ of 
policy actors, advocates, and critics. It would be naïve and unrealistic, 
however, for this to be ‘disruptive’ [as called for in other approaches 
such as the extended case approach] from the get go. The recurrent 
problem of accessing policy elites in particular and maintaining 
network access in general, necessitates a degree of strategic 
circumspection, if not bounded conformity.39 
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In this spirit, I am confident that my multi-method approach was not only appropriate 
but allowed me to generate and collect the best data possible given the realities of my 
situation as an obvious outsider, though one with sufficient prestige as a PhD scholar 
from abroad and Fulbrighter (in other words, with some support from the Brazilian 
government) to get limited access to the “causal group” of policy-making elites in 
Lucas.  
In 2008 I took my first trip to North Mato Grosso and visited four 
municipalities along BR-163, including Lucas, with a field agent of the soy 
producers’ cooperative Aprosoja as my guide. It was on this first trip that I became 
familiar with the Lucas Legal project and met some of the individuals involved with 
the management of the project who would later become key informants. In 2009, I 
returned to Lucas, this time without a guide, and spent about a week in the 
municipality interviewing key individuals about the Lucas Legal project and about 
the settlement history of the municipality. The information gathered from these first 
interviews served as important background information to help me plan my project 
and my longer field period.  
These two preliminary trips were also important for building trust with 
persons associated with local political and business leadership, as researching the 
Lucas Legal project would require that I have access to local opinion–shapers. North 
Mato Grosso along the BR-163 corridor is a place where Americans inquiring about 
environmental issues could be misunderstood (in spite of generally favorable reviews 
of The Nature Conservancy (TNC) sponsorship of this Lucas Legal), so it was 
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important for me to establish good rapport with some powerful local people before I 
proceeded with my project. Additionally, since Lucas Legal was conceived of and 
carried out by local elites, I knew that their cooperation would be essential to the 
success of my research. Because I made repeated trips to Lucas, emphasized my 
position as a student, and was able to communicate in Portuguese (although my 
language skills were still developing), I was successful in gaining the support of the 
municipal Secretary of Agriculture and the Environment (Secretaria de Agricultura e 
Meio Ambiente/SAMA) to carry out my project.  
 In 2011, I returned to Lucas to stay for nine months and found that the former 
Secretary had resigned to work for TNC full time on regional spin-offs of Lucas 
Legal. Fortunately, the new Secretary welcomed me and was extremely supportive of 
my work, and even offered me the SAMA conference room to do my work. The room 
where I did my work also served as the sometimes-office of the project’s two 
permanent TNC employees for the rare occasions that they were not working at other 
project sites throughout the state. Though my original proposed research relied 
heavily on interview data, I quickly realized that I had an opportunity to do an 
ethnographic study of Lucas Legal and the other work of the SAMA staff in addition 
to interviews. This turned out to be an improvement on my original research plan for 
several reasons.  
First, though I had read as much as I could about the region and I had visited 
twice, the reality is, upon my arrival in Lucas, I still had a lot to learn to understand 
the basic workings of environmental and agricultural management at a local scale in a 
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major commercial agriculture region. At this point, there have simply been very few 
studies of local environmental governance in Brazil, of elite farmer decision-making 
in this regard, and of local government involvement in multi-stakeholder schemes 
more generally. The studies that have been done have been mostly unpublished, or 
else published only in Brazil. I was able to find some of these studies in situ as part of 
my archival work in Lucas, but watching and listening as producers and other local 
stakeholders came into the SAMA on a daily basis was the quickest way for me to 
identify the most common, quotidian issues. By showing up to “work” every day at 
the SAMA, I was able to develop relationships not only with the Secretary, but also 
the various field agents and “fiscais” (enforcement agents) that work in the SAMA, 
and ask them to clarify issues for me when I had doubts. I was also able to 
accompany the SAMA staff occasionally when their work took them out to the field. 
This provided me constant opportunities for verification and triangulation of 
information from other sources.  
A second, important benefit to my ethnographic approach was that I became a 
known entity among producers, municipal employees, and other individuals who 
passed through the SAMA on a regular basis, and to some degree I became associated 
with the SAMA. This was helpful not only for the progression of my ethnographic 
observations, but also for the interviews I conducted toward the end of my stay. I was 
certainly not the first American to visit Lucas, but my husband and I were the first to 
live there. This gave us a sort-of celebrity status that worked both to my favor and to 
my detriment at various times during my stay. As I already mentioned, Americans 
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can be received with a bit of suspicion in this region, and farmers, in particular, can 
be hesitant about outsiders asking them questions. By simply sitting in the SAMA 
office, a semi-public space, every day, I became a familiar presence, both less exotic 
and less threatening. I also became associated with a respected, familiar local agency 
and respected, familiar individuals at that agency, an association that eventually 
helped me get one-on-one interviews with farmers.  
A third benefit to the ethnographic approach was that I became, to some 
extent, a member of the team and I was able to contribute a little bit back to my hosts 
at the SAMA. This was important to me because I know that taking on the role of 
hosting me was costly in terms of time, money, and perhaps even social capital for 
the employees of the SAMA and especially the Secretary, although I did the best I 
could to make this not so. Because Americans can be viewed rather ambiguously in 
this region, I am sure, and I sometimes specifically got the sense that the Secretary 
had to assure people or smooth over my presence in the office when certain 
individuals came to conduct business in the SAMA. Additionally, the Secretary and 
other staff personally hosted parties for me, included me in family and business 
outings, and drove me to meet farmers and local elites for interviews.  I did not have a 
car and the Secretary often insisted on personally introducing me and explaining my 
project to his friends, colleagues and acquaintances. In many cases, I am aware I 
would not have been able to conduct interviews without him personally vouching for 
me with my subjects.  
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At the same time, I tried to help out in any way I could. When the SAMA was 
staffing a community event, I went with them and did my best to be helpful, though in 
many cases the best I could contribute was my company due to my still-developing 
Portuguese-language skills and my lack of familiarity with local customs for 
community events. Sometimes I was able to help load coolers of water or take 
pictures. The presence of my husband and me at events with the SAMA staff 
sometimes seemed to increase the prestige of the event. For example, with my 
presence, a 10K race I ran in shortly after my arrival became “international.” I gave 
interviews to local media at the request of the SAMA and in them, made sure to 
highlight my gratitude to the Secretary and the SAMA for hosting me. I also 
translated emails that came in from English to Portuguese and helped the SAMA 
receive groups of American farmers and other interested parties who stopped through 
Lucas to learn about local farming practices and Lucas Legal. Toward the end of my 
stay, I provided GIS training to an employee charged with compiling data about the 
success of the Lucas Legal program; the end result of my work with him was a 
geodatabase of licensed properties discussed in Chapter 7.   
A fourth benefit of the ethnographic approach I took is the main purpose, I 
suppose, of an ethnographic approach: unscripted (though not unlimited) access I 
gained from being present in the SAMA office nearly every day for nine months. 
Though my original research questions centered on farmer participation in the project, 
I quickly realized upon arriving in Lucas that focusing exclusively or even primarily 
on farmer “participation” in the project was a something of a red herring. As I explain 
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in greater detail later in this dissertation, far from actively seeking out participation or 
enrollment in Lucas Legal, farmers were enrolled in the project by virtue of having 
farmland within the municipal boundaries of Lucas. Moreover, the working goals of 
the project are much more measured and less explicit than its widely publicized goals. 
These factors, in addition to a lack of baseline data available for the purposes of 
quantifying the results of the project (more on this in Chapters 6 and 7), makes it 
difficult indeed to measure definitively the outcome of implementing Lucas Legal.40 
Yet, in spite of the difficulties in gauging its “success” or lack-there-of, because of 
the considerable scope of influence of Lucas Legal, understanding the context and 
process of its conceptualization and implementation offers insights into the on-the-
ground possibilities and challenges for environmental conservation, licensing, and 
monitoring in a region heavily dependent on industrial agriculture.   
I was not present for the planning and implementation of the Lucas Legal 
project in around 2005 and 2006. Even if I had been in Lucas at the time, there is very 
little chance I would have been invited to participate in the planning process. The 
Lucas Legal project, like most things in Lucas, is the work of a small group of 
privileged elites. This is not meant to be a criticism of the project per se; I would 
argue, for reasons I will leave to political scientists to explain, that small groups of 
well-connected elites often make good decisions for good reasons, especially in small 
                                                          
40
 Active participation by farmers is required for the state licensing program inspired by Lucas Legal, 
MT Legal. The creation MT Legal by state officials is, in and of itself, an example of the considerable 
and far-reaching institutional influence of Lucas Legal, in spite of its relative ‘weakness’ in terms of 
results…. It is also a potential signal of how eager political elites in Mato Grosso are to find a 
resolution to the conflict between continually increasing agricultural production and mounting pressure 
to address and minimize the environmental costs of this production. 
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towns with economies highly dependent on one sector.41 The involvement of an 
international ENGO, national and multi-national companies, and the state government 
in the project only underscores the elite nature of the local project leadership. In any 
case, this all makes the project very much a political (and possibly business) move on 
the part of participants, and it is highly unlikely a student, especially a foreign one, 
would have been granted access to the planning process.  
Because local project leaders are political and business elites, they are well-
practiced in presenting rehearsed performances regarding their projects to their 
national and international partners, and the case of Lucas Legal is not an exception. 
Some of these elites were gracious enough to grant me interviews, and I believe they 
spoke somewhat frankly with me about the project. Their story-lines, though, were 
clearly well-rehearsed and rarely differed from the glossy printed materials that they 
provided to me (and other visitors, and members of the press) about the project. I 
suspect that they have recited these narratives so much that they believe them to be 
the whole truth. I do not believe anyone tried to deceive me; to the contrary, I believe 
that they were unsure how to handle my interest in the details of the project given that 
the tangible results of the project locally are frankly so thin. My academic training, 
though, has taught me to approach well-rehearsed and privileged storylines critically 
and with caution. Indeed, Peck has also noted that  
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 This is poorly documented and wanting of further research, but for some evidence of close-knit 
communities making decisions collectively, see Dan van der Horst, "Incentive Based Environmental 
Policies and Collective Response Trends; Spatio-Temporal Patterns of Land Managers' Adoption of 
Agri-Environmental Measures," in Handbook of Environmental Policy, ed. Johannes Meijer and Arjan 
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conversations with demonstrably powerful policy actors may often 
yield exaggerated accounts of foresight, rationality, or relative 
entrepreneurialism – what might be called ‘agent inflation’. On the 
other hand, interviews should not always be relegated to the status of 
ethnography’s poor relation for they have distinctive strengths and can 
serve particular purposes, not least when attempting to speak to 
power.42 
 
Throughout my field work, I also found this to be true.  
Questions I grappled with in conducting this research include: Why would 
people getting rich off of industrial agriculture take an interest in environmental 
conservation efforts, however minimal? How do I know this is not simply another 
example of greenwashing? And if it is simply greenwashing, what is the value in 
studying this project? By studying the Lucas Legal project with an ethnographic 
approach, I was able to see past the public presentation of the project. I am not sure I 
have come away from this research with definitive answers to these questions, but my 
time in the SAMA, far from exposing dishonesty on the part of local elites and 
managers, gave me a stronger and more nuanced appreciation for this project, the 
context in which it must be understood, and the broader goals of different local actors 
associated with it.  
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I was unable to get interviews with individuals at all, or even at most of the 
sponsor organizations of the project. These organizations are highly selective about 
granting interviews, and in any case, have elaborate structures in place though which 
information about their projects is filtered. I had connections at the local Syngenta 
office, for example, but even with careful explanation of the objectives of my study 
and the promise of anonymity to the potential interviewee, a local manager, I was not 
granted an interview due to a corporate policy that frowns on such things. Instead, I 
was given the web address and some glossy printed literature describing corporate 
efforts to give back to or participate in socio-environmental initiatives in locations 
where Syngenta does business. After considerable prodding on my part, I was finally 
given the chance to submit my questions via email for review by the corporate office 
in São Paulo, but received back only a PDF of the company’s 2010 Sustainability 
Report, which mentions Lucas Legal in passing twice.  
Projects like Lucas Legal are important reputation-bolstering products that 
large companies like Syngenta invest in, and as with their commercial products like 
seeds and crop-treatments, the output concerning projects like Lucas Legal must be 
carefully controlled to ensure good returns. I did not have access to decision-makers 
at the corporate headquarters in Switzerland, nor at the Brazilian headquarters in São 
Paulo, only to local management in Lucas.  
In the end, I understand that local employees are committed to maintaining 
and improving the reputation of their company and their position within the company, 
and are unlikely to go against orders from higher up to grant an interview to a student. 
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After all, I stayed in Lucas for nine months to conduct research for my dissertation, 
and then I was leaving. People I wanted to interview in Lucas lived and made a living 
there and were not leaving any time soon, and I respected their decisions to grant me 
interviews or not, and tried to be aware of the contexts in which they were making 
their decisions. Moreover, I got the sense from off-the-record conversations with 
Syngenta employees and other informants in Lucas that there was little to be said 
about corporate participation in Lucas Legal. The main role of corporate participation 
in this project was to contribute funding and to vouch for the project, and the main 
return to corporations for their investment was the potential for reputation-bolstering. 
Which manager made the request to cooperate headquarters for participation in Lucas 
Legal at a given corporation was not seen as important by my contacts there, if 
anyone even remembered, because of the purely administrative nature of the 
company’s participation. The money they contributed was not a major percentage of 
their operating budgets. 
Besides, the real work of engaging with farmers and addressing environmental 
issues takes place at the SAMA and the broader knock-on effects of the Lucas Legal 
project on state and federal environmental governance do not have corporate 
sponsors. By observing the daily goings-on at the SAMA, where the work of 
administering Lucas Legal and environmental management more generally went on, I 
gained a much more thorough understanding of this work than a complete set of 
stakeholder interviews alone would have given me.  
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My ethnographic methodology was guided by the recommendations provided 
by Jon and Lyn Lofland in their 1995 text Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to 
Qualitative Observation and Analysis, 3
rd
 ed. Like the majority of fieldwork 
described by Lofland and Lofland, I adopted a stance in my research that was 
characterized by “trust combined with a heady dose of skepticism; suspicion mixed in 
with large portions of faith” in my informants.43 In essence, I believe that my 
informants were forthcoming with me, and indeed, over the course of nine months in 
their living and workspaces it would have been quite a feat for them to maintain a 
charade, yet I am aware that at times and particularly at the beginning and concerning 
certain issues, informants were certainly putting their best foot forward with me, so to 
speak. I also am aware that, due to cultural and language differences, I might not have 
always been aware of these guises, though I have enough faith in my own social and 
cultural perceptiveness to believe that times I was totally unaware were few.  
For my part, I did my best to be forthcoming with people who became my 
informants as well as anyone who expressed curiosity about my work. As I mentioned 
above, in my pursuit for total transparency, I appeared in the local media to explain 
the objectives of my work and I gave out my permanent and local contact information 
to anyone who asked. Of course, knowing and understanding are not always the same 
thing; as Lofland and Lofland note, “all research is secret to some degree because the 
people under study do not always believe and/or remember that the researcher is a 
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 John Lofland and Lyn H. Lofland, Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation 
and Analysis, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995). 55. 
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researcher.”44 Furthermore, I suspect that my research goals of understanding the 
genesis and implications of the Lucas Legal project came across as somewhat 
esoteric, even to the main champions of the project; I often felt them thinking, what 
more is there to know besides what we printed in the promotional materials? 
Field notes for my observations were recorded frequently – approximately 
every 3 days or less when I was in the SAMA. Some weeks I worked on archival 
materials or travelled and during those weeks I did not record as frequently. I often 
recorded my notes in the evening when I got home, but other times I recorded right in 
the office, because I worked on my computer during the day as things happened 
around me and between “events” in the office. Field notes also increased in frequency 
as my confidence in the ethnographic approach increased over time and as my 
understanding of Portuguese and the issues manifesting in the SAMA each day began 
to make more sense to me. I recorded observations about individuals who came to the 
SAMA, the topics of conversations that went on around me, details about how 
environmental issues were addressed by staff. Any time Lucas Legal was specifically 
addressed, I took notes, though this was admittedly less frequent than I originally 
expected it to be.  
The SAMA office during my stay had an open format; most employees sat in 
one, large room. The Secretary had his own office with a door, and the conference 
room I occupied also had a door, but the walls to these rooms did not go all the way 
to the ceiling, so nearly everything that was said in the building was audible to 
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everyone else, if the air conditioners were not running. One room was fully walled 
and could be closed off; sometimes I used that room, but usually one or two 
employees of SAMA used that room to meet with local citizens about various 
licensing issues. These conversations were the only kind that took place frequently at 
the SAMA that I did not hear much of.  
For all official informants and interviewees, I had an information statement in 
Portuguese for them to review and take with them regarding the goals and expected 
risks (none) and outcomes of the research, as required by the Human Subjects 
Committee at the University of Kansas. Of course, I could not present these slips to 
every individual with whom I came in contact, and though individuals who did not 
give me express permission to interview and quote them are not quoted here, I could 
not help but learn something by overhearing conversations and observing interactions 
between SAMA staff and visitors every time someone came into the SAMA, as well 
as in countless conversations I had with friends and their acquaintances during my 
“down time.”  My status as the “American student” or, as I was sometimes described, 
“intern,” generally seemed to be perceived as non-threatening; internships are 
common in both businesses and public organizations in Brazil.  
In fact, I found that my official informants greeted my information statements 
with more curiosity than they did my research goals. As is common in American 
research, the statement promised informants complete anonymity and assured them 
that they could back out of the study at any time simply by contacting me. Local 
historians and other, mostly Brazilian students have worked in Lucas on the 
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settlement history and, to some extent, agricultural practices. In Brazil, as I learned, 
or at least in this part of Brazil, granting an interview apparently involves quite a 
different set of expectations than in the United States; after the interview, the 
Brazilian interviewer transcribes or types up the interview for the interviewee to 
review; if the interviewee accepts the write-up as correct, he or she signs and dates 
the interview. Interviews that have not been reviewed and signed are not considered 
valid. This is somewhat consistent with the oral history approach in the United States. 
In fact, due to a breakdown in training, a trove of interviews in the municipal archive 
about the settlement history of Lucas that I would have liked to have used were not 
available to me because they had not been appropriately verified by their subjects. 
Thus, my obligation to maintain interviewees’ anonymity possibly created more, not 
less, suspicion of my objectives in Lucas.  
I was able to conduct 20 semi-structured interviews with producers in Lucas 
(Interview instrument in Appendix A). I also interviewed persons associated with the 
municipal government, the local corporate sponsor of the project (Fiagril), TNC, and 
the Rio Verde Foundation, an environmental engineer, and the head of the municipal 
archive. In most cases interviews were recorded and I took written notes as I 
conducted the interview; interviews were transcribed at a later date. Only one 
informant declined my request to record the interview. Not all conversations with key 
informants were recorded because these were frequent and sometimes impromptu.  
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CHAPTER II – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
Lucas Legal is a multi-stakeholder environmental licensing initiative that 
incorporates satellite- and GPS-determined property mapping and set-aside 
delineation with outreach, to orient farmers as they endeavor to increase set-asides to 
comply with federally mandated requirements.45 The emergence of this project, as 
well as its achievements and failures, as detailed in subsequent chapters, complicates 
conventional understandings of the nature of agriculture and conservation in the 
Amazon. It also provides insight into the future of food production, conservation, and 
land management in the region, as agricultural actors begin to take seriously calls for 
change to business as usual in the Amazon. The Lucas Legal project (and its spin-off 
projects) raise important questions about motivating factors driving decision making 
at the property level, the role of technology and surveillance in the production of 
knowledge about the environment and activities that take place in relation to it (its 
management or lack-of-management), and the legitimacy of different sources of 
knowledge to different stakeholder groups. These issues have important implications 
for social and environmental outcomes of policy decisions and activities in the private 
sectors. Moreover, the collaboration in Lucas Legal of stakeholders from 
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environmental, industrial agriculture, and governmental organizations is quite novel 
and complicates conventional understandings environment and development.  
The influence of such multi-stakeholder initiatives, or multi-partner 
governance, as Lucas Legal, at the interface of development and vulnerable natural 
areas appears to be increasing. The effectiveness and fairness of these partnerships 
between state, market and civil society actors remains an open question. Scholars 
have raised legitimate questions about the ability of such partnerships to 
accommodate truly open participation, 46  as well as about their potential for 
contributing to the “commodification of nature,” as they clear the way for private 
actors to gain greater control over natural resources by virtue of their power, purse, 
scientific knowledge, or other such factors.47 The reasons for the increasing popularity 
of such arrangements are also unresolved, but appear to be linked to the globalization 
of commerce; the improvement of communication and cheapening of international 
travel, allowing for better network formation among groups from diverse places;48 
and changes to the nature of the state and its ability or desire to respond fluidly to all 
of the needs of society.49 
Among the sponsors of Lucas Legal are elements of the local/sub-national 
state (the mayor’s office of Lucas and the Mato Grosso state attorney’s office), but as 
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 Maria Carmen Lemos and J. Timmons Roberts, "Environmental policy-making networks and the 
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 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics  (Ithica, NY: Cornell UP, 1998). 14-15. 
49
 W. Neil Adger and Andrew Jordan, "Sustainability: Exploring the processes and outcomes of 
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explained in Chapter 7, other state elements have been (at times) dismissive or even 
hostile to the program. Thus, the “state”, insofar as it’s a useful concept in 
understanding Lucas Legal, has had an evolving and uneven position with regard to 
the project. Other major sponsors include local, national, and multi-national 
corporations involved in one or more links in industrial agriculture commodity chains 
and an international ENGO. In terms of straightforward neoliberal advancement, the 
project could serve as an agricultural example of such ecological economics as 
described by James McCarthy, in which the ‘environmental Kuznet’s curve’ 
hypothesis comes true. In this view, Lucas and its agricultural sector, like the rest of 
the region, developed rapidly, deforesting everything and showing no regard for the 
forest/environment. Now the economy there is strong and land ownership is no longer 
tenuous, so people can now turn to other priorities, like the environment.50  
In an attempt to resolve these and other issues, the main questions guiding this 
project are 1) How can Lucas Legal be best characterized in terms of its goals and its 
structure? 2) How does the project work in terms of meeting its goals? 3) What are 
the environmental, institutional, and other outcomes of the project? and 4) What 
lessons from Lucas Legal can be used to improve agri-environmental outcomes 
elsewhere or at a larger scale in the Amazon-Cerrado? 
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 James McCarthy, "Privatizing conditions of production: trade agreements as neoliberal 
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Table 1. Key literatures and their main ideas 
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The following sections will describe three literatures that I propose can offer 
insight into Lucas Legal as an example of multi-stakeholder governance (Table 1). 
All three literatures have in common an acceptance of the notion that a purely state-
centered view of development and conservation in the Amazon is incomplete. All 
three literatures also provide space to question conventional dichotomizing such as 
agriculture/the environment and development/conservation; questioning of these 
dualities is, indeed, a key concept at the heart of the Lucas Legal project.  
 
(Neoliberal) environmental governance 
 
Governance is a concept that has evolved to describe the patterns of “societal 
steering,”51 including institutions, behavioral norms, and actors, both state and non-
state, that have either emerged or been brought into analytical focus over time as the 
concept of the state, as an omnipotent force, has waned.52  Some of the processes 
identified as driving the turn to governance include privatization, the reduction of the 
size of the state due to fiscal concerns, and the increased participation of civil 
society.53 The concept of governance is by all accounts a loose and flexible term 
                                                          
51
 Adger and Jordan, "Sustainability: Exploring the processes and outcomes of governance," 11. 
52
 Matthew Himley, "Geographies of Environmental Governance; The Nexus and Nature of 
Neoliberalism," Geography Compass 2, no. 2 (2008): 434-35.; Brannstrom et al., "Compliance and 
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Maria Carmen Lemos and Arun Agrawal, "Environmental Governance," Annu. Rv. Environ. Resour. 
31(2006): 298.; Diana Liverman, "Who Governs, at What Scale and at What Price? Geography, 
Environmental Governance, and the Commodification of Nature," Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 94, no. 4 (2004): 735. 
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 Himley, "Geographies of Environmental Governance; The Nexus and Nature of Neoliberalism," 
442. 
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employed by scholars to describe many different scenarios, utilizing it to describe 
many different geographic and temporal locales, at all scales or even across scales, 
and with different angles to their analysis.  
For example, W. Neil Adger and Andrew Jordan have identified three 
different discourses of governance throughout the literature – an empirical discourse, 
that seeks mainly to identify and describe situations in which the state is not the only 
or even the dominant creator and implementer of policy or rules; a theoretical 
discourse, in which patterns of governance are examined as new patterns of power 
and control; and a normative discourse, in which the diversification of actors in social 
steering is viewed as “good” due to its supposed democratizing effects,54 though an 
alternate normative discourse surrounding governance is that it can be the opposite of 
democratizing if it involves handing over of power from governments, which are 
accountable to citizens, to international bodies, NGOs (Non-Governmental 
Organizations), corporations, or other groups which are not easily held accountable. 55   
This study will focus on the first two discursive understandings of 
governance, seeking to explain a specific example of policy creation and 
implementation that was heavily influenced by non-state actors and drawing on this 
example to contribute to work toward describing and typifying the project in a way 
that will allow it to be compared with other examples in future work.  
                                                          
54
 Adger and Jordan, "Sustainability: Exploring the processes and outcomes of governance," 11-14. 
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 Andrew Garner, "Uncivil society: Local stakeholders and environmental protection in Jamaica," in 
Virtualism, Governance and Practice, ed. James G. Carrier and Paige West (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2009), 136. 
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While governing may yield to governance somewhat spontaneously or 
accidentally, as corporations or civic groups simply find themselves filling the gaps 
left behind by a rolling back or shrinking state,56 frequently, these groups see in the 
gaps an opportunity and either independently or in strategically formed partnerships 
seek to influence or take charge of social steering, norm-setting, and even regulation. 
These partnerships can take various forms and go by various names, including 
voluntary agreements, market-based instruments, multi-stakeholder initiatives, 
public-private partnerships, and multi-partner governance, to name a few. Lucas 
Legal is an example of these partnerships, as it includes state, market, and civil 
society partners working toward shared, if evolving, goals. Important questions about 
Lucas Legal as environmental governance include – What factors led to the creation 
of Lucas Legal? How does this project function? What are the outcomes of the 
project?  How does the set of stakeholders involved in the project influence its 
process and its outcomes?  
Governance is not always about the environment, of course; studies of 
decision making about the environment and of resource control more generally are 
typically referred to as environmental governance regardless of the valuation of 
nature in a given scenario. Studies have pointed to a shift toward governance (and, so, 
away from governing) associated with processes of decentralization57 and the 
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neoliberal reform-driven restructuring of or weakening of the state.58 Previously, 
governments had more tightly controlled access to resources and defined which areas 
or elements should be conserved and in what way. But the question remains open as 
to whether environmental governance in the age of neoliberalism is a move toward 
more inclusive governance or just a shift from one kind of exclusive control (by the 
government) to another (by the “market” or by elites). Much critical research on 
environmental governance highlights the negative impacts of neoliberal reforms on 
access to resources by the poor59 and negative ecological outcomes of privatization of 
nature and natural resources,60 though, certainly, scholars are far from agreeing on 
this and studies have also highlighted the positive outcomes of neoliberalism.61 
As noted above, the flexibility of the term “governance” makes it challenging 
as well as important to make meaningful comparisons to draw out patterns among 
governance scenarios, particularly for those studies moving toward a normative 
approach to the topic. How can we say what  “good governance” is, as the World 
Bank would like to,62 for example, if we do not better understand the scope of patterns 
that define governance, good or bad?  In one attempt at theorizing governance, Lemos 
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and Agrawal have identified three “social mechanisms” (the state, as well as 
community and the market) that encapsulate the various ways in which actors 
endeavor to access or control nature and environmental resources (Figure 2).63 To this 
I have added a fourth social mechanism, the NGO, as these are frequently assumed to 
be on the side of the community but in fact, may be operating as much on the side of 
the State or the Market, or their own independent objectives. The typology in Figure 2 
is too general to be used in evaluating the outcomes of a project, partnership, or other 
scenario of governance, but it provides at least a starting point for identifying the 
types of stakeholders that may be involved. 
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Figure 2. Types of environmental governance and their operational social mechanisms, adapted from 
Lemos and Agrawal, 2006, pg. 310 
 
 
 
If the issue of why and how governance comes to supplant government in 
terms of social steering is of utmost concern in terms of historical changes to the size 
and nature of the state, so too are the effects of governance processes on the present 
and future of the state. Andrew Jordan has identified two different positions on this 
issue, which he refers to as “state centric” and “society centric” views.64  In the state 
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centric view, the “state may have weakened in the sense that it delivers fewer services 
than it did (say) in the 1960s and 1970s, [but] it remains a critical actor, and a key site 
of political accountability and public legitimacy.”65 In this camp, for example, Ian 
Hodge has drawn on the experience of liberalization of agricultural management, and 
more specifically the decoupling of agricultural support payments from production in 
the United Kingdom, to call attention to the important role of governments in 
supporting and organizing the various local groups involved in making land 
management and land resource decisions. The society-centric view, on the other hand, 
is associated with many works citing Jessop’s notion of the hollowed-out state in the 
wake of neoliberal extension.66 Though Jessop himself has not given up entirely on 
the utility of the state in neoliberal governance,67 his work is often employed to 
capture the way in which neoliberalism has weakened the influence of the state, or at 
least created space for the influence of non-state actors, in the process of policy 
steering.68  
There is also a temporal element to the study of governance, which 
underscores the temporal shift from strong, hierarchical governing and control of 
resources (typified by the Brazilian military dictatorship’s activities to settle and 
develop the Amazon in the 1960s and 1970s, for example) to a form of state 
governing that is more responsive to macro-level processes and networks such as 
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globalization and markets, as well as to demands for more specific local policies from 
local and regional actors.69  
 
Environmental governance in Brazil 
  
Important work has already been done on environmental governance models 
and predicted outcomes of these models on Brazil’s rapidly changing “neoliberal 
frontiers” in the Amazon, and more specifically in the Amazon-Cerrado, or the 
agricultural areas of the southern Amazon.70 The environmental governance scenario 
described by Daniel Nepstad highlights the (unexpected) role of a newly and 
differently empowered Brazilian state and pressures from global consumers of 
Amazon agricultural products in furthering environmental protection and, 
specifically, reduced deforestation rates in the Amazon.71 For Nepstad and his 
colleagues, the fiscal and political empowerment of municipal governments in 
planning and in regulation has been positive for the environment.72 Coupled with 
consumer demands, or market pressures, this process has led to the emergence of 
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state-society partnerships such as certification efforts and market-exclusion efforts for 
soybeans and beef, and other agricultural products, like cotton.73  
Christian Brannstrom has drawn heavily on the works of Hecht, Nepstad, and 
Jordan to work toward the construction of typologies for understanding emerging 
“efforts to reconcile agricultural and environmental demands” at various sub-national 
levels.74 For Brannstrom, important differences between different governance 
processes are at least partially dependent on the role of the state actors or of the 
importance of state policies as a means of achieving the objectives of the particular 
policy.75 Drawing heavily on Jordan’s definition of “governance as an empirical 
phenomenon,”76 the general conclusions drawn by Brannstrom across his work 
suggest that state environmental policies and laws are important tools used by both 
conservationist and productivist actors in pursuit of their own, respective missions; 
indeed, the means by which these policies are/will be implemented is the true site of 
debate and potential conflict among various stakeholder groups operating in the 
Amazon and the Cerrado.77  
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Lesley K. McAlister has also compared various environmental governance 
schemes across the Amazon and also finds compliance with state environmental 
policies to be a key component of both effective and non-effective governance 
regimes; for her, effectiveness at achieving this compliance in producers ultimately 
depends more on the influence of the non-state actors in the regime than the state 
agents.78 For example, the moratorium in the soy industry on purchasing soy grown 
on lands deforested after July 2006 is effective because the technology provided by 
wealthy and technologically advanced actors like Cargill and The Nature 
Conservancy allowed domestic purchasers to effectively verify the providence of 
soy.79  Also, siting the enforcement with domestic purchasers, compared with end 
consumers in foreign markets whose interests may change or who may be less willing 
to pay price premiums for products like soy, the moratorium was able to work more 
as an embargo against irresponsible soy than as a certification scheme because “[t]he 
economic power that industry purchasers have over suppliers is a very powerful 
mechanism for influencing the suppliers’ behavior.”80 
 
Governmentality and environmentality 
  
The concept of governance/environmental governance is a lens through which 
one can view the emergence of Lucas Legal and similar multi-stakeholder 
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environmental projects as dependent on interplay among groups with different 
sources of power (the sovereign power of the government, the market-based power of 
private industry, and the (less-clear-cut) civil society based power of the NGO). 
Governmentality and its nature-oriented counterpart, environmentality, on the other 
hand do not focus so much on the role of the “power holders,” but instead are a prism 
that bends and refracts apparent structures of power and legitimacies of knowledges 
and technologies so that hidden properties and sources of this power, knowledge, and 
technologies of government are revealed.  
The concept of governmentality comes from the work of Michel Foucault, 
who was ultimately concerned with problematizing the concept of power, and thus, 
that of the relationship between the government and society. Foucault had little to say 
specifically about the environment and nature,81 but since the publication of his 
writings on governmentality, or the technologies of government, at the end of his 
career in the late 1970s and early 1980s, important work has begun to apply 
Foucault’s critiques of conventional understandings of power, technology and 
knowledge, including science and social science disciplines, to processes and 
outcomes of resource governance and environmental conservation programs. 
 In his work, Foucault took what he called an “archeological” approach to 
understanding how power operates in society, rejecting attempts to find the ultimate 
source of power as irrelevant and impossible, and instead tracing the evolution of the 
use and outcomes of power through time, including in the formation of subjects who 
                                                          
81
 Éric Darier, "Foucault and the Environment: An Introduction," in Discourses of the Environment, ed. 
Éric Darier (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 6. 
50 
 
willingly self-govern in certain ways.82 He sought to critique the conventional, more 
structural, view of power as insufficient and antiquated. In this conventional view of 
power, the sovereign, who is the bodily representation and ultimate source of power,83 
forces society and members of society, individually, to conform to his or her wishes, 
based on his or her claim to limitless power and the supposed capacity (which was 
not, in fact, limitless, but quite constrained in reality) to inflict physical harm on 
anyone who would rebel. Sovereign power, epitomized by the monarchy and 
essentially ubiquitous until the nineteenth century, is the convergence of power 
represented in the body of one individual (the king).84 A breach of these power 
relations was, then, equivalent to a figurative attack on the physical body of the king.  
Under this type of power relations, the main goal of exercising power is to 
maintain the power of the sovereign, not to improve the lives of individuals or 
society. For Derek Hook, 
 
This is a highly violent and demonstrative form of power, a type of 
physical retribution acted out on the body of the criminal and staged 
for the benefit of the public at large. In this early era of power, a 
breach of the sovereign’s law was tantamount to an act of war. Such an 
infringement was to be understood as an act of aggression committed 
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against the person of the king, whose body had (figuratively) been 
attacked in the action of the crime. Accordingly, the body of the 
criminal had to be attacked, tortured, often dismembered or mutilated, 
in a symbolic display of the sovereign’s power.85 
 
It turned out, though, that this type of power relations was highly inefficient, as lesser 
crimes inevitably went unpunished due to the hassle and expense of publicly 
administered corporal punishment, and the tendency of selective but dramatic 
displays of power to further threaten the sovereign by invoking the sympathies of the 
masses with the punished.86  
 Eventually, by the start of the 19
th
 century, or even earlier,87 new types of 
power relations had emerged based on increasing dependence of sovereigns on more 
efficient, effective, and productive, techniques/technologies of power that were based 
on shaping the lives of people.88 These processes, which Foucault referred to as 
“capillary” power relations, emerged from the myriad and often quite mundane ways 
in which individuals interact and came to be avenues by which desired goods such as 
knowledge, health, and wealth were produced.89 Foucault was obscure about from 
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where the power in power relations originally emerged,90 perhaps intentionally so,91 
but the point was that soon it came to be, or else came to be apparent, that the 
sovereign leader was not the sole possessor of power in a given scenario. Two new, 
and closely related and mutually constitutive, forms of power (relations) emerged, 
then, which are known as disciplinary power and biopower, and which are the main 
ways in which most societies are organized today. The sovereign and rule by threat of 
bodily harm or constraint, for its part, still remains a relevant concept, but not without 
the consideration of these other types of power as well. 
 Over time, as technologies advanced and populations grew, the importance of 
disciplinary power, or controlling mechanisms that govern the intimate, everyday 
activities of people, also grew and were epitomized in the development of (proto-) 
modern prisons, asylums, hospitals, and schools.92  Any individual deemed deficient 
in some way found themselves under constant surveillance in one of these institutions 
as technologies of government developed that reinforced power relations in favor of 
the sovereign. Now, techniques of reform were no longer public spectacles, but 
shrouded in secrecy within the literal or figurative walls of these institutions, but it 
turned out that these newer technologies were much more consistently effective and 
efficient than the old methods. 
This diffusion of regulatory agency away from, say, the court or the gallows, 
to these multiple institutional sites of discipline also had the effect of shifting the 
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sentiment behind the exercise of power; whereas under the public execution model, 
control was conflated with revenge for a wrong perceived to have been committed 
against the sovereign, the exercise of disciplinary power was much more about 
reform, at once less and more personal. An individual out of sync with the goals of 
society, or not yet aware of them in the case of children, could now be reformed, 
educated, or healed by prisons, schools, and hospitals, respectively, and (once again) 
become productive and good members of society.  
Related to the issue of disciplinary power is the notion of biopower, or the 
measurement and management of the populations and of the environment, from 
which “norms” could be created, against which individuals could be measured and 
assessed.93 True, the technologies developed for measuring people (and the 
environment) were obscured, either purposefully by the sovereign or more 
incidentally, by the increasing level of specialization or privileged personal relations 
needed to access them. As much as these placed limits on individuals’ lives, (i.e., 
certain behaviors are prohibited and will land you in an asylum, hospital, or prison for 
correction), though, they were also productive and created clear pathways for 
(acceptable) human behavior and ideals to which individuals could aspire.94 It is from 
biopower that the norms to which individuals are held or shaped come, which are, 
themselves, heavily influenced by the disciplines and technologies given authority by 
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the government and other influential organizations such as universities, NGOs, and 
corporations that can act as proxies for the sovereign.  
Essentially, governments learned to use and also created, or supported the 
creation of, the fields of statistics, geography, demography, economics and other 
social sciences to measure, quantify, and define the population and produce optimal 
standards against which to measure subjects and toward which to pressure them, 
using disciplinary power if necessary.95 In fact, as Foucault reminds us, the very fields 
and lenses through which we study and understand the world are highly historical, 
contested, dynamic, and political. The field of statistics is a prominent example: 
sovereigns (governments) needed to measure populations in order to determine norms 
and changes in those norms, against which to intervene on an individual level when 
there was some deviation.96 For Michael Watts, this creation, accumulation, and 
administration of quantified data about our lives; the teasing out of norms about all 
manner of aspects of our lives; and the presentation of these norms as value-free are 
key methods in which modern governments “conduct our conduct.”97 In other words, 
if through disciplinary power we learn to conform to behavioral norms because we 
have come to expect that someone might be watching, it is through biopower that we 
come to understand what the behavioral norms are and how we measure up to them.  
Bringing these ideas together, for Foucault, a modern government is one that 
has  
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a plurality of specific aims: for instance, the government will have to 
ensure that the greatest possible quantity of wealth is produced, that 
the people are provided with sufficient means of subsistence, that the 
population is enabled to multiply, etc. There is a whole series of 
specific finalities, then, which become the objective of government as 
such. In order to achieve these various finalities, things must be 
disposed…with government it is a question not of imposing law on 
men, but of disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather 
than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics – to arrange 
things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and 
such ends may be achieved.98 
 
This recognition of the contingency of all knowledge and expertise has 
important implications for assessing programs and policies, even those based on 
careful consideration of the most current, applicable science. For Joseph Rouse:  
 
To understand scientific knowledge in this way, however, as an ideal, 
ahistorical content that a knower grasps or possesses is to overlook the 
complex practical achievements though which scientific domains 
become accessible. Only within such a complex practical field, shaped 
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by the availability of functional and reliable equipment and a variety 
of subtle technical and theoretical skills, do electrons, viruses, tectonic 
plates, or quasars become possible objects of knowledge or 
discourse…I think it is useful to understand these gradual 
transformations, reproductions, extensions, and mutual alignments of 
local knowledges as strategic. Out of a confusing array of interacting 
projects, practices, and capabilities, there gradually emerges an overall 
pattern or direction (or, rather, a plurality of them). Not, however, 
because this pattern was what was intended, however dimly, all along, 
but because some practices turn out to reinforce and strengthen one 
another and are taken up, extended, and reproduced in various new 
contexts, while others remain isolated from or in conflict with these 
emergent strategies and gradually become forgotten or isolated 
curiosities.99 
 
In other words, control is maintained by the governing of things within a 
certain territory, and individuals are subjugated by this control over the material and 
symbolic aspects of their lives. These material and symbolic aspects are in many 
ways defined and understood, if not created, by governments and other fields of 
authority Because of this intertwining of knowledge and power, Foucault frequently 
referred to the two concepts as though they were one – knowledge/power.  
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This sounds dire for whoever occupies the inferior position in power 
relationships, but for Foucault, it did not have to be this way. Ultimately, through his 
historical investigations of power and knowledge, Foucault sought to revise 
conventional understandings of power and governing, which in his view, had not 
moved sufficiently past the concept of the sovereign to accompany the actual shift 
away from all power emanating from the sovereign. Foucault was critical of the 
concept that power was a substantive thing that certain individuals or groups of 
individuals could hold; instead, he conceived of power as a rather multi-faceted set of 
power relations that are diffuse, complex, and circulating.100 For Foucault: 
 
Power is not a substance. Neither is it a mysterious property whose 
origin must be delved into. Power is only a certain type of relation 
between individuals. Such relations are specific, that is, they have 
nothing to do with exchange, production, communication, even though 
they combine with them. The characteristic feature of power is that 
some men can more or less entirely determine other men’s conduct – 
but never exhaustively or coercively. A man who is chained up and 
beaten is subject to force being exerted over him. Not power. But if he 
can be induced to speak, when his ultimate recourse could have been 
to hold his tongue, preferring death, then he has been caused to behave 
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in a certain way. He has been subjected to power. He has been 
submitted to government.101 
 
In other words, power is (no longer simply) the harm or the threat of harm to the 
physical body, but instead, is made up of a whole host of mechanisms – technologies 
and discourses about truth, for example – that compel a person to act in accordance 
with what others, including, but not exclusively the government, expect of him or her.  
Yet, for all the progress he made in designing a new conceptualization of 
power and knowledge, the theory has certain holes. One of the more glaring ones is 
his more or less linear description of the move away from a sovereign-bound world to 
one with multi-directional power channels. As a poststructuralist, Foucault was not 
interested in putting forth a unified or even consistent theory of power or government; 
instead, he was interested in providing tools with which existing power relations and 
truth regimes could be historicized and problematized,102 a position which seems to 
have been influenced by his disappointment in the corruption of Marxism by 
totalitarianism.  
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Though he refused to provide a theory of power, Foucault nevertheless 
insisted that power was productive and extended to the creation of subjects who 
accepted its influence on them.103  Foucault:  
 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in 
negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it 
‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact, power produces: it produces; it produces 
reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The 
individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this 
production.104 
 
This brings us to an important aspect of Foucault’s treatment of power as 
pertains to governmentality: the formation of subjects. The formation of subjects is a 
process both individualizing and also homogenizing, as the government has to group 
citizens together and then divide them into categories based, not on any essential 
characteristic about them but based on characteristics that “science” or some other 
authoritative discipline has created. Once these categories have been determined, each 
individual must be brought into alignment with these categories and with ideals that 
further the project and power of the “government”/governing bodies/legitimate 
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knowledge.105 In other words, good governing tactics are those that are convenient for 
managing each of the things that are to be governed106 and that compel subjects to 
utilize their personal liberty to act in prescribed ways, limiting the effort that must be 
put forth by the sovereign. The things that are to be governed are the things that 
scientists, statisticians and other authorities have determined should be governed to 
reach certain ends. When individuals are ‘self-disciplined’ due to access to 
legitimatized knowledge and prescribed behaviors, they take often it upon themselves 
to act appropriately and in accordance with this knowledge; this is subject-formation 
and the basis of Foucault’s concept of governmentality.  
 
Green governmentality/environmentality 
 
Studies of green governmentality (sometimes called environmentality) explore 
the relations between people and natural resources by applying Foucault’s 
historicized understanding of power/knowledge, questioning uncritical acceptance of 
certain knowledges and discourses about the environment and natural resources, and 
exploring the technologies employed by the sovereign(s) to advance environmental 
subject making. These studies do not purport to measure how well governments have 
identified some truth about the environment and are proceeding to manage it, but 
instead, ask how knowledge about the environment and environmental actors and 
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their expertise or lack of is formed and legitimated. 107 In this way, an 
environmentality approach unveils the historicized power relations hidden in 
endeavors or actors and their agendas that are often presented as apolitical, innocent, 
and above reproach (or conversely, devious and deserving of reproach).108 
For example, environmental monitoring is typically framed as apolitical. 
Conservationists often argue that we can only protect the environment if we track 
changes to and that scientific methods of monitoring are value-free and objective. The 
science and techniques used in monitoring, though, are actually the result of highly 
politicized processes, which in turn affect the form and function of the knowledge(s) 
being produced by this monitoring, not to mention the way in which the knowledge is 
then used. However, because of the established legitimacy of science (of all kinds) 
over time as an authoritative voice on such matters, data and conclusions about the 
environment produced by scientists at non-governmental organizations are easily 
accepted by the populace, sometimes even more so than when they are produced by 
(scientists that are part of) the government, and especially when the results confirm or 
are only incrementally different than what we already know.  
There are at least two important aspects of this situation that can be examined 
using a governmentality framework: first, the capillary power relations described by 
Foucault that extend beyond those between government and individuals also exist 
between these groups and non-state entities like NGOs and even corporations; and 
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second, that these power relations are at least as productive as they are repressive.109 
Environmental monitoring produces detailed knowledges about the environment, 
produces discourses and new avenues for political and personal agendas, and further 
legitimacy for the NGOs, scientists, and other actors involved in knowledge 
productions. Governmentality/environmentality studies are concerned with 
understanding how these knowledges are produced and contested not just by 
authorities but also individuals on whom authorities seek to act, and how this process 
changes individuals (or not). 
The most thorough exploration of socio-environmental issues through the lens 
of governmentality is Arun Agrawal’s book Environmentality: Technologies of 
Government and the Making of Subjects, in which Agrawal details the transformation 
of the Kumaoni Indians from deliberate destroyers of forests in reaction to attempts 
by the British to regulate them, to active participants in the conservation of forests 70 
years later. Agrawal found that conventional, punitive efforts to enforce protection of 
forests were overall ineffective in the face of entrenched Kumaoni resistence, but that, 
over time, a process of quantifying and defining forests coupled with the devolution 
of enforcement authority to local leaders has been both effective in improving forest 
conservation and in changing the way the Kumaon view forest conservation and the 
limits on their activities in the forest that this entails. The more advanced technologies 
of government – including increased surveillance and accountability for forest 
activities from having locals involved in governance and norms against which forests 
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and forest activities are measured created an avenue in which some activities of forest 
protection became acceptable or even definitive for some people.  Agrawal found that 
in the case of the Kumaon, 
 
[n]ew technologies of government dispersed centers of environmental 
regulation and ecological decision making…and redefined the political 
relationships between what might broadly be called the state and the 
local.110 
 
In other words, the crucial element with regard to how(some of) the Kumaon came to 
regard the environment differently than before was the dispersal of power to local 
governments, which created opportunities for individuals to follow the paths of 
acceptable behavior with regard to the forests cut out by these government 
technologies.  This subject formation was possible then, because, like Foucault 
insisted, power is not “simply the ability of a person to make another do 
something,”111 Instead, subjects are individuals who act in the service of a goal 
defined explicitly or implicitly, often by the government, without being subjected to 
brute force. 112 Under a framework of governmentality (environmentality), the 
relentless persuasiveness of technologies of government in the lives of individuals 
can and does lead to changes in individual behavior and intent.  
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Discourse and advocacy coalition frameworks 
  
Discourse and advocacy coalition approaches emphasize the power of diverse 
actors collaborating in efforts to achieve a shared goal, which is often some 
combination of symbolic, economic, and material in medium. Discourse and 
advocacy coalitions are particularly suited to the analysis of environmental issues 
because understandings of discourse and advocacy coalitions have grown, in part, out 
of the analysis of environmental issues and the notion of ‘sustainable development.’ 
Discourse Coalition Framework (DCF) and Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
may offer a particularly relevant perspective on the Lucas Legal project because of 
the importance of sustainable development, the accumulation and distribution of 
symbolic and non-material or indirectly material resources, and the inclusion of 
differentially-empowered actors to the project.  
DCF and ACF can be explained using the example of the evolution of 
discourse on environmental sustainability. During the late 1980s and the 1990s, a 
series of high-profile conferences and summits of state and transnational groups led to 
global recognition of the unsustainable way in which development had been 
progressing until that point. Problems with the newly emerging consensus on 
sustainable development soon became apparent, though. These included the failure of 
many state and transnational organizations based in the global North to acknowledge 
and address their privileged positions and often condescending prescriptions; the 
failure in many ways of the change in discourse to produce meaningful changes in 
65 
 
practice; and the discursive conscription of sustainable development to be more 
palatable to neoliberal capitalists.113 Indeed, discourse about sustainable development 
had become highly accepted among diverse groups, including champions of 
neoliberal capitalism, precisely because of these features of the discourse. It has been 
frequently argued, though, that this improving of the palatability of discourse about 
sustainability for greater acceptance represents for more hard line environmental 
groups a coopting of environmental ideas by powerful corporations and other 
neoliberal agents.114  
In their work on environmental discourses, though, Hajer (the main architect 
of DCF) and Fischer call into question the presumption that sustainable development 
and related environmentalist discourses were ever resistance-oriented at all. For them, 
“sustainable development was always a reform-oriented inclusionary discourse [that] 
has sought to facilitate a non-adversarial approach to environmental politics.”115 That 
is, most discourse about sustainable development does not advocate revolution or a 
restructuring of the system or a dismantling of capitalism on the merits of its 
ecological and social tendencies toward crisis and never did.116 Indeed, Michael 
Thompson has argued, the main problem with sustainability discourses – that they 
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simply promise a “harmonious Never Never Land” without requiring us to think 
critically about the complexity of the socio-environmental issues we face or the 
profound changes that would be required to address them – has been there all 
along.117 
 Many scholars are interested in the way in which heterogeneous sets of actors 
modify discourse about the environment to define environmental problems or 
situations in ways that make their preferred solutions to these problems convenient or 
acceptable. Environmental discourses fill different roles for different actors.  They 
may be sincere narratives put forth by grassroots environmental activists or they may 
be coopted by more powerful organizations, like corporations, NGOs, and 
governments.118  In fact, the difficulty, if not impossibility, of determining the 
intentions behind normative discourses about sustainable development has led 
scholars to call into question the presumption that local and grassroots concerns, 
organization, and policies are inherently more desirable than those at other scales.119 
As concern for what is happening to the environment has become (mostly) 
universally accepted, the attention of discourse-setters (both the powerful and the 
marginalized) has turned to interpretation and framing of the environment and crises 
surrounding it, or struggles to control and define discourses about the environment. 
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Frequently, one actor does not have the power to singlehandedly modify a discourse 
about a given issue, but in cooperation with other actors or groups of actors (such as a 
discourse coalition), discourses can be changed, thereby influencing decision-making, 
policy-setting, and other concrete actions related to the issue the discourse treats. 
 Discourse coalitions are distinct from other coalitions (such as advocacy 
coalitions) in that members of a discourse coalition need not take any action together 
or even agree with one another on other, fundamental levels.120 Instead, they are 
bound together either purposefully or incidentally by their adherence to the same or 
similar story-lines or discourses that share a “common political project.”121 Because 
discourse coalitions do not require that members share a belief system, it is broad, 
simplified, compelling and actionable story-lines that define a discourse coalition.122 
The storyline can also persist in the absence of fact-based evidence supporting the 
narrative, again, because the point of the coalition is not to describe reality but to 
shape it. The greater the variety among actors that promote the narrative, the more 
authentic it looks, and the more likely it is to come true.  
As evidence of this phenomenon, Hajer offers the example of ecological 
modernization, the story-line in which by removing inefficiencies, technology can 
diminish pollution and allow humans to live, consume and grow (in other words, 
‘develop’ in the unidirectional sense of the word) while maintaining balance in 
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nature. This concept is not without some evidential support, but, Hajer argues, it is 
more based on an appealing story line or narrative of hope that we, as humans, are 
clever enough to somehow head off an impending environmental crisis of our own 
making.123 Another way of looking at ecological modernization that might make 
Hajer’s point clearer is to consider that we have no way to know if technological 
advances will indeed tend to improve efficiencies and lead to improved 
environmental outcomes, even if there are isolated examples of this happening. 
Indeed, there is likely much more evidence that modernization increases resource use 
as technology gives people new and easier ways to access resources. And yet, the 
storyline is compelling for individuals interested in continued consumption and 
economic development as well as individuals interested in environmental 
conservation but who might feel that the culture of capitalist consumption is much too 
strong to be stopped, among others.  
In a way, the entire concept is tautological; fundamental to ecological 
modernization theory are assumptions that modernization always leads to improved 
outcomes, and that we are able to fully or at least adequately figure our effects of the 
environment. Reject these assumptions and the concept is meaningless. Accepting 
these assumptions, though, is appealing, and, its advocates hope, self-fulfilling. Under 
these assumptions, resource consumption can continue unabated and if it appears that 
modernization is not leading to improved environmental outcomes, then the answer is 
more modernization! This broad, appealing and convenient story-line contained in the 
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concept of ecological modernization “took away many of the objections governments 
[and capitalist enterprises] might have had to a new approach of environmental 
regulation” and united diverse actors and agencies from various scales who adopted 
similar discursive frameworks for their projects.  
The outcome for those who opted out of this coalition by refusing or failing to 
frame environmental problems as being due to a shortage of technologies has been 
that these actors and groups have been discursively marginalized. After all, before 
ecological modernization, environmentalism (in the US/global North) was precisely a 
cultural critique of the “technocratic institutional arrangements” now featured by 
ecological modernization and contemporary, mainstream environmental discourse 
more broadly.124 The broadly attractive discourse of ecological modernization, 
though, did not feature such fundamental critiques of development, modern western 
cultural values, or neoliberal capitalism, for example, making it more easily adopted 
by agents aligned with these concepts. As ecological modernization was more widely 
adopted through the 1980s and 1990s, its dominance only increased, which limited 
the possibility for members of the coalition (be they scientists, policy makers or 
NGOs) to critique the discourse without leaving or being viewed as leaving the 
coalition.  
Hence, the weakness of the discourse coalition in practice for less powerful 
actors; a weak actor, in the end, has little to gain by joining a discourse coalition 
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because the coalition is based on a shared discourse alone, and may include diverse 
actors pursuing possibly very different or contradictory objectives in concert based on 
their common subscription to the same discursive framing of an issue like “the 
environment,” the coalitions are, for Hathaway, “tenuous and fleeting, and can be 
quickly dissolved when one side or another changes its orientation.”125 But because of 
the close relationship of discourse to power relations,126 because the coalition is 
bound only by shared discourse, and because power is asymmetrically distributed 
among actors for various reasons,127 criticism of the discourse is akin to withdrawal 
from the coalition. More powerful members may be able to exercise their influence to 
reform the discourse.128 Weaker actors will not influence the discourse sufficiently to 
account for the risk of having their reputations with their base tarnished by 
association with powerful actors who may be repeating the story line but not acting in 
accordance with it. As a theoretical tool, the DCF can help make sense of actors 
unlikely to cooperate on an issue due to their historical positions on the issue, who are 
suddenly appearing publicly to collaborate, or are separately proclaiming 
unexpectedly similar views on an issue.  
Many authors, including the inventor of the DCF, Maarten Hajer, have 
compared the DCF to the ACF. ACF coalitions are tighter than DCF coalitions, based 
not only, or not even, around a shared storyline among members but around true and 
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meaningful cooperation toward a shared goal.129 Thus, while DCF coalitions are 
fragile, shifting, and may even be unintentional, ACF coalitions are purposeful and 
may be resilient to fundamental differences that arise among coalition members, and 
the narrative or the direction of the coalition may even be altered to accommodate 
resolutions to these differences.  
A prime example of an ACF analysis of multi-actor cooperation is the work of 
Keck and Sikkink on international environmental networks.  They have shown how a 
multi-scale advocacy coalition focused on diminishing deforestation in the Brazilian 
Amazon readjusted their discourse about the issue when a group of rubber-tappers 
and their allies made a public case for the inclusion of social relations in discussions 
of tropical deforestation.130 Previously, the coalition had been organized solely around 
ecological issues and scientific data that excluded diverse groups of Amazonian forest 
dwellers from the discussion. Because the coalition included many pro-nature groups 
who had historically conceived of effective conservation in terms of enclosure and 
exclusion of human activity, the coalition might have disbanded with the introduction 
of this new discursive challenge. Instead, though, a mutually beneficial relationship 
developed among banks and development agencies and the rubber tappers, which 
resulted in exchanges of information and contributed to building a true common 
understanding within which activists with very different backgrounds could work 
together.131 
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As is the case in discourse coalitions, power relations are often asymmetrical 
in advocacy coalitions. They have shown how a network of environmentalists 
concerned about the destruction of the Amazon by road and settlement projects 
funded by multi-national banks was strengthened in terms of its ability to affect pro-
environmental changes in the governance of the region when a group of rubber 
tappers joined their coalition and shifted the focus of the campaign from defining and 
enclosing supposedly pristine nature to protecting existing socio-environmental 
systems in new “extractive reserves.”132 The rubber tappers were transformative to the 
work of the coalition because they brought an essential human perspective, concrete 
demands for protection of their livelihoods, and a direct link between environmental 
destruction and international development to the growing global awareness of 
environmental issues in the Amazon, which was highly influential in Washington.133 
The rubber tappers alone likely could not have achieved the amount of domestic and 
international attention to their cause that they did achieve without allying themselves 
with the national and international environmental movement and with powerful 
financial and development agencies.   
Environmental networking in Brazil was transformed by the rubber tappers 
because their participation in the coalition made the work more personal.134 Yet, 
although the rubber tappers had been making their case for land rights for years, the 
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influence of the rubber tapper movement was considerably strengthened around 1988 
as the result of its strengthening international and public ties with environmentalists, 
especially international environmentalists, as well as the very public events of that 
year of widespread and widely photographed burning in the Amazon and the death of 
Chico Mendes.135 The rubber tappers, then, were crucial partners in the Amazon 
environmental advocacy coalition and played a key role in making the overall 
message of the coalition more compelling, but they were not as empowered to 
generate tangible outcomes as many other members of the coalition. Hochstetler and 
Keck described attempts among rubber tappers and other forest peoples (e.g. 
indigenous groups and small farmers) to build alliances as “not always frictionless,” 
as many of the groups were traditionally at odds.136 Moreover, truly addressing their 
shared issues, which were all at some level related to land access and tenure, required 
coordinated action with the federal government at the very least. In the end, the 
hallmark achievement of these groups, the recognition of extractive reserves as a 
form of conservation unit, required the involvement of national and international 
environmental and development groups who made political and public claims for “the 
link between conservation and sustainable livelihoods that had in principle been part 
of the ‘sustainable development’ mantra from the beginning.”137 
Finally, the importance of personal relationships in ACF should be noted here. 
Because advocacy networks are deliberate and involve true consensus building 
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among policy actors,138 close personal and professional relationships among 
individuals associated with groups in the coalition are key to coalition stability. 
Hochstetler and Keck have described several individuals, typically scientific and 
policy professionals but sometimes not, as in the case of the rubber tappers, who were 
able to navigate potential challenges to the coalition based on personal knowledge of 
issues; broad sets of connections to various agencies and well-positioned individuals 
due to past and current policy and scientific work; and mutual trust from working 
together over time.139 Hajer has also emphasized the importance of the individual 
beliefs and relationships among individuals associated with various groups in an 
advocacy coalition.140 On the other hand, Elgert has deemphasized the role of 
personal relationships in advocacy coalitions, instead claiming that it is very solid and 
well-tested scientific-empirical evidence that forms the backbone of stable advocacy 
coalitions.141 
The ACF, then, is a useful starting point for examining the ways in which 
actors (typically limited to non-governmental actors) cooperate to leverage their 
power in influencing a situation or process. Sharing a goal and working together 
toward its achievement, even at the sacrifice of other positions held by individual 
members of the coalition, is intuitive and presents an optimistic view of problem-
solving among diverse actors. For Hajer, though, the ACF is flawed in important 
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ways. For instance, one main idea held by ACF is that individuals must be the unit of 
analysis because studying institutions and agencies is much too complex. For Hajer, 
lowering the unit of analysis to the individual does not remove the complexity. He 
notes,  
 
A person might be a perfect father in the context of his family 
practices but a tough businessman in the board-room, or even a serial 
killer after he has put the children to bed…Looking at the beliefs of 
individuals as variables to explain policy change fails to consider the 
importance for the process of change of the varied nature of the 
contributions made by specific individuals in different argumentative 
exchanges. For instance, the fact that actors utter contradictory 
statements implies that their activity may help sustain different 
coalitions. Taking over the new story-lines of a rival coalition (even if 
this is only to criticize that position) acknowledges the existence of the 
alternative perspective and may thereby facilitate the reproduction of 
that coalition.142 
 
In other words, the “cement” of advocacy coalitions is supposed to be a shared belief 
system among individuals, but an individual may hold conflicting beliefs at any given 
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time and many change beliefs over time; indeed, he or she is likely to.143 The fluidity 
of DCF accounts for this, simply requires the recognition of some common ground in 
a certain storyline, regardless of shifting or conflictive interests or beliefs of 
individuals who make up the coalition.  
 Because members of a discourse coalition are committed to promoting broad 
storylines as the “meaning of physical and social phenomena,”144 existing or emerging 
conflicting or contradictory ideas among coalition members or from outside may be 
incorporated or coopted by the fluid and broad discourse which embodies the power 
relations of its promoters.145 For Hajer, this is another key difference between DCF 
and ACF; in DCF, change can, and perhaps, must come from the outside. The 
strength and resilience , such that it is, of a discourse coalition is that it is able to 
respond to challenges to the discourse from the outside, because members do not 
view the discourse as reflective of their core beliefs and, so are more open to its 
mutability in pursuit of their common objectives. According to Hajer, this is not true 
of ACF, which seems to require “membership” in the coalition before changes can be 
made, as individual members are supposed to be much more fundamentally bound to 
it.  
The incorporation of the rubber tappers into the Amazonian environmental 
movement in the late 1980s, though, calls into question this supposed difference 
between the two frameworks. The Amazonian environmental movement was an 
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association of national and international individuals and their organizations bound 
together by personal ties as well as shared goals, and was by most accounts an 
example of an advocacy coalition. Keck and Sikkink, and later Hochstetler and Keck, 
have shown that this advocacy coalition reacted in a very fluid way to a fundamental 
challenge that emerged to their authority over the issue – the emergence on the public 
radar of the rubber tappers movement. 146 The resulting reframing of the coalition’s 
discourse and approach to its policy objectives was not free of conflict but ended up 
being a positive development for the coalition’s effectiveness.  
Finally, compared to ACF, DCF is a more cynical view of collaboration 
among disparate groups. In assuming that a coalition is in a coalition in word only (as 
opposed to in action), it lowers the threshold for success for the coalition. How can e 
objectively know if a discourse has truly been changed? And how can we know if it 
was due to the efforts of the coalition? A discourse coalition requires no action on the 
part of the members except for repeating the storyline. Thus, DCF may easily serve as 
a convenient explanation for convergences in storylines when, in fact, there is 
another, more insightful explanation to be found. It is easy to assume that a similar 
message on a broad topic like improving the environment, even when coming from 
unlikely allies, is a cynical attempt to distract the public from actions that run 
contrary to this message or to coopt the framing of the issue. DCF does not have a 
ready answer to these charges. Thus, there is more work to be done with DCF as a 
solid framework on which to assess apparent coalitions.  
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Conclusion 
  
The project Lucas Legal is part of an upsurge in multi-stakeholder efforts to 
address concerns about agriculture and environmental degradation in the Amazon. 
The complex nature of the project, its focus on licensing of private properties, its 
incorporation of existing laws, its multi-scalar nature, and its diverse stakeholder 
group problematize conventional understandings of agriculture in the Amazon, which 
have presumed farmers to be the enemies of forests and have positioned the Brazilian 
state as a monolith that bows to the whims of foreign and international opinion.  
 Here, three frameworks have been proposed to guide a more nuanced analysis 
of changing landscapes in the southern Amazon. These include the literature on 
environmental governance, often closely associated with the rolling back of the state.  
The increased importance of environmental governance over environmental 
governing by just the state is thought by many scholars to have contributed to more 
diverse actors determining policies on the environment and otherwise,147 though 
others have pointed to the potential for decreased transparency as non-democratic 
actors become more involved in resource management and environmental monitoring. 
The governmenatlity literature, on the other hand, views the involvement of these 
non-state actors as evidence of the effectiveness of government; so pervasive have 
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become the ‘tactics’ of achieving certain goals that ensure the continued legitimacy of 
the government,148 that the government need not constantly act on behalf of itself to 
ensure the discipline of the populace in pursuit of these goals. Decentralization of 
government to local scales and passing off of the tasks of surveillance and discipline 
of the population in accordance with set norms is, then, not the weakening of the 
government, but an advanced stage of governmentality in which self-governance is 
internalized and individuals become self-disciplined subjects.149 In the third 
framework presented, discourse and advocacy coalitions (DCF/ACF) frameworks, 
relative power among partners is more contextual than in the other two frameworks. 
The association is, by definition, cooperative in nature, and power and authority do 
not necessarily belong only to actors empowered by the market or the state.  
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CHAPTER III – THE SETTLEMENT OF MATO GROSSO AND LUCAS DO 
RIO VERDE 
 
Consolidation of technologically-advanced, highly-productive industrial 
agriculture is a key feature of the present-day southern Amazon .This consolidation is 
the outcome of more than eighty years of public and private investments, the creation 
of new territorial boundaries and teleconnections, processes of environmental change, 
and the innovations of diverse cultural and social groups. The changes in the Amazon 
have been complex and precipitated by multiple drivers, of which only one has been 
the state and its policies. And yet, the state is often depicted as the dominant, driving 
force behind changes in the region because the physical outcomes of state policies, 
such as roads, bridges, and ports, as well as the institutional legacy of state planning, 
including bureaucratic agencies and governing insitutions such as laws are highly 
visible throughout the region. The influence of global markets also tends to be 
exagerated to the exclusion of other forces, as markets and government policies are 
closely linked in traditional political econmic approaches.  
For example, in a classic political-economic work, Anthony Soskin is 
unambiguous about his view of the reasons for the successful development of 
soybeans in Brazil (a process that was significant, but not exclusive, to the Amazon):  
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The expansion of soybean production in Brazil has been an 
amazing achievement, but it was facilitated by three overriding and 
interdependent factors: a favorable world market and the 
consequent price incentives, a readily available technology, and a 
favorable policy environment.150  
 
In this view, successful implantation of commercial-scale soybeans seems as though 
it was inevitable and conflict-free once the government, markets, and agronomists 
determined that it should be so.  
The conventional emphasis on the political-economics approach to the 
development of the Amazon frontier is curious because the state was actually terribly 
ineffective there, given the force and financial backing it had available to its efforts 
under two periods of authoritarian governments. Massive infrastructure projects 
including roads were begun, and abandoned, or if completed, were poorly made. 
Agencies were formed but did not install permanent offices or sufficient staff in the 
regions there were meant to be managing. As this chapter will show, individuals, 
social groups, and private industry were the main drivers of effective settlement on the 
frontier in northern Mato Grosso. 
Indeed, the conventional, political-economic view of the frontier has been 
subject to much criticism. Scholars writing more recently have called attention to the 
inadequacies of focusing too much on the state and global markets to explain changes 
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on Brazil’s Amazon frontiers. Examples of these shortcomings in the political 
economy view of the frontier include not adequately explaining the heterogeneity of 
actors and experiences on the frontier,151 over-simplifying the process by which state 
subsidies, credits and other incentives were transferred to actors on the frontier;152 and 
discounting of the importance of the asymmetry of information available to different 
groups.153 The political-economic frontier theory, in other words, undersells the 
importance of the local agency of individual people and of institutions, instead 
emphasizing the role of the global economy and demand for frontier products on 
world markets in creating neoliberal frontiers.154  
With an aim of better the documenting the large roster of actors and processes 
that have contributed to changes on the Amazon frontier in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries, 
this chapter will trace the history of the settlement of Mato Grosso, as an important 
part of the frontier as a whole, and of Lucas do Rio Verde. The history presented here 
will show clearly the unevenness of the reach of markets, government agencies, and 
their technologies on the frontier; the social and physical conflict and hardship 
experienced by settlers related to this unevennes; and the importance of local 
agencies, individual actors, and institutional arrangements in steering settlement 
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processes and guaranteeing as well as challenging the objectives of markets and the 
federal government.  
 
Early settlement of Mato Grosso 
 
Proponants of development and environmentalists alike have portrayed the 
Cerrado of the southern Amazon, and of present-day Mato Grosso, as ‘empty’,155 but 
in fact, the region has supported “large, densely settled, and integrated” populations 
for at least the past 1000 years.156  Brazilians of European decent have lived in the 
region since colonial times, but these settlements were mostly restricted military posts 
along navigable rivers in the southern part of present-day Mato Grosso.157 There was 
also some gold prospecting- and mining-related migration through the region after the 
discovery of gold in Cuiabá in 1719.158   
After the Paraguayan War (1864-1870), Mato Grosso experienced a small 
surge in immigration of resource-poor ranchers who squatted in the region, tipped off 
to the abundant lands and “feral cattle for the taking” by soldiers who had fought in 
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the war.159  At this point, the Cerrado was still difficult for European Brazilians to 
access and settlement was mostly limited to the Pantanal region and the campo limpo 
(clean pastures) of the southern and the western parts of the state.160 A few families, 
who would go on to form the state’s first oligarchic class, amassed legal holdings of 
large tracts of land in these regions.161  
The onset of World War I quickly drew Mato Grosso into the national 
economy as an important livestock producing region. Brazil was heavily involved in 
the war effort on the side of the Allies. The country completed a long-promised 
railroad from São Paulo to the Bolivian border, traversing Mato Grosso, in order to 
respond to the high European demand for beef and leather.162 This railroad was the 
first significant transportation route connecting Mato Grosso to the coast, though 
much of the state still remained isolated by travel times of several days on horseback. 
 High demand for cattle, the vastness of the Cerrado, and the isolation of the 
region led to the emergence of a regime of highly extensive ranching in Mato Grosso.  
So extensive were these operations, in fact, that ranches with between five hundred 
and one thousand head of cattle on up to five thousand hectares operated merely as 
“subsistence” ranches; only larger ranches, of up to 50,000 hectares, generated any 
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significant wealth.163 Beef production continued to be an important industry and 
export for Mato Grosso and Brazil even after the end of the war.164 Rubber and erva 
mate (used for a drink similar to tea) were also important export products from Mato 
Grosso during the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, though these were much less 
significant than cattle and beef. 
Thus, Mato Grosso has a long history of interconnectedness with world 
markets and dependence on revenues from raw material extraction typical of frontier 
economies, 165 but also of self-sufficiency. Early nationalistic forays into Mato Grosso 
were complementary, not deterministic, of activities that began spontaneously there. 
This pattern of spontaneous activity complemented by subsequent state policies and 
projects would continue throughout the 20
th
 century and into the 21
st
. 
 
The March to the West 
 
The relative isolation and indepencence of Mato Grosso and the rest of 
Brazil’s West started to wane after World War I. In 1938, President Getulio Vargas 
announced a new project to be called the “A Marcha para o Oeste” or the “March to 
the West.” The official objectives of the March included incorporating the supposedly 
empty lands in the West into the national project and alleviating social pressures in 
the northeast, the southeast, and the south by redistributing people from these more 
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crowded areas to the relatively more sparsely populated lands of the West.166 The 
March was part of a broader geo-political strategy on the part of the military 
government to establish over-land access to rubber plantations in the northern part of 
the Amazon biome, as well as an ideological tool for asserting the government’s 
power.167 This was easier said than done. Due to the un-empty nature of the so-called 
empty lands it was trying to occupy, the state constantly had to negotiate the terms of 
its power with the parties already there.168   
As a result, the legacy of the March to the West is mixed at best. The 
government developed an ambiguous reputation among residents of the West due to 
the inconsistency in action and policy and the distance of the governors from the 
goverened that marked the project.  Inspiring rhetoric of land reform, progressive 
measures such as the limiting of immigrations from foreign countries, and the 
creation of impressive-sounding agencies, including the Superintendência do Plano 
de Valorizaçao da Amazônia (Superintendency of the Valorization Plan of the 
Amazon, SPVA); and the Fundação Brasil Central (Central Foundation of Brazil, 
FBC) charged with organizing and executing the settlement of “inhabitants of 
impoverished areas” in the Center-West and the Amazon,169 were simply not enough 
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to supplant effective and legitimate governance onto the frontier. For example, the 
most important accomplishment of the SPVEA appears to have been the drafting of 
Mato Grosso, Goiás and Maranhão into the Legal Amazon region, a move, or 
“bureaucratic coup,” in the words of Hecht and Cockburn, which made SPVEA the 
planning authority for a full 60 percent of national territory.170 This surely gained 
considerable funding for the SPVEA, but the funds did not translate into public works 
in the Amazon. In the case of the FBC, the agency coordinated expeditions into the 
Cerrados and the forests of the West. It was responsible for some of the first 
collections of cultural and geographic knowledge about the Center-West and the 
Amazon by the Brazilian government, and was also responsible for endowing the 
region with a reputation of being place of “adventure and excitement” as the agency 
published adventurous accounts of expeditions in the hopes of stirring up interest and 
participants for future expeditions.171  Overall, under Vargas’ March, a handful of 
colonies for the poor were established in the West, but discourse remained a much 
more prominent feature of the March than action.172 
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Mato Grosso for sale! 
 
The 1930s and 1940s had featured the first concentrated, if ineffective, 
centralized effort to fold the West into the national project. The death of Vargas 
precipitated a weakening of federal power, and western states jumped on what they 
saw as an opportunity to raise funds without federal intervention – selling off or, in 
some cases, giving away public lands, ostensibly with the purpose of encouraging 
colonization of the vast expanses of their territories. State officials and politically 
connected elites in Mato Grosso made the most of the situation, and what ensued 
basically amounted to a free-for-all land grab by politically connected elites, who 
were attempting to seize new avenues for consolidating their wealth and power. 
Officially, lands were offered up for sale for settlement and development, though 
state officials did little to assure that buyers invested in improving their lands, or even 
ever saw them in person. Two things suggest that a settled, agrarian frontier was 
never really the goal of Mato Grossense officials during the 1940s: the amount of 
fraud surrounding the sale of land, even at high levels of state government, and the 
lack of organization surrounding some attempts to encourage the migration of settlers 
to the frontiers of Mato Grosso. Instead, state policy and actions tended to spur 
speculative land-grabbing. 
Mato Grosso state officials set about auctioning off state lands by classifying 
vast areas of public lands as suitable for pasture, farming or extractivism, pricing 
them accordingly, and offering them up for sale at prices that undercut land prices in 
89 
 
neighboring states. It was during this time that the institution of the private 
colonization firm was formally introduced into to the settlement regime of the state. 
Colonization firms bought up large swaths of land, but few colonies were ever 
actually established. Meanwhile, the government of Mato Grosso embarked on a 
campaign to promote the burgeoning interconnectedness of the state brought on by 
the opening of roads by inviting farmers to come check out the lands for themselves. 
The campaigns advertised state roads providing access in and out of the state, as well 
as the establishment of newly established legal pathways to acquiring the land.173 
These pathways, though, were frequently paved by well-connected private 
colonization companies, which drastically marked up the land on the resale to the 
settlers, supposedly to cover the cost of their efforts to process the titles.174  
Advertisements for buying land from Mato Grosso during this period 
sometimes took a patriotic slant to goad Brazilians into buying land in the West. One 
such advertisement announced that “Estão vendendo Mato Grosso!” (They are selling 
Mato Grosso!) and urged Brazilian moços (young men) to buy up the lands of Mato 
Grosso before local officials resorted to selling it off to foreigners.175 State officials 
actively promoted the view of their state as “empty” so that perspective buyers would 
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not worry about competing land claims and conflicts.176 Of course, Mato Grosso, vast 
as it was, was not actually empty, as there had long been scattered populations of 
indigenous peoples and posseiros throughout the state. State officials created 
indigenous reserves and colonies to isolate these groups in cases where these extant 
populations became “obstacles” to their land deals.177  There was plenty of self-
interested behavior to go around, though; land speculation and fraud on the part of 
settlers and colonization companies, as well as government officials, was rampant. 
The speculation was further facilitated by the inability of a poorly-funded state to 
adequately maintain a register of its expansive territory.178  
Fraud reached all levels of the government, and would continue to do so for 
decades. 179 For example, the governor from 1950-1954, Correa da Costa, personally 
transferred lands in northern Mato Grosso to private colonization companies from 
São Paulo and Paraná, over 4 million hectares in all, claiming this to be a massive 
development project, though no colonization projects materialized on this land.180  A 
1964 federal investigation into political leaders in Mato Grosso found blatant 
admissions of fraud and corruption in land titling by various state officials,181 which 
served to further fuel speculation. Stories abounded of people who earned quick 
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profits of 1000 percent, selling the land at 10 times what they had bought it for only a 
short time before, many times sight unseen.182  
Taken together, these speculative practices and the rampant fraud at various 
levels of government, including ‘donations’ of land by leaders to political allies and 
friends, quickly lead to land concentration into the hands of a few as a key outcome 
of state policy in Mato Grosso in the 1950s through the early1960s.183 Because of this 
long history of diversion of resources toward speculative land-acquisition and away 
from public works, non-politically-connected settlers in Mato Grosso, who hoped to 
live off of the supported-subsistence farming promoted to them by the government in 
its official rhetoric, quickly achieved self-sufficiency or were  quickly forced to return 
home.184 These notions - the virtue of self-sufficieny  and the awareness of the 
benefits that come with political capital - continue to inform Mato Grossense culture 
and politics today.  
 
Operation Amazonia : A mixed private and public endeavor 
 
Promotion of ranching in Mato Grosso at the turn of the 20
th
 century was tied 
to spontaneous international demand, but the expansion of the beef and agricultural 
commodities markets in Mato Grosso since World War II has been more closely 
related to policies promoting industrialization and domestic economic growth fueled 
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by exports of key commodities in sectors targeted by the government for 
development.185 A military takeover in 1964 ushered in twenty one years of 
authoritarian rule in Brazil, which endured at least in part due to rapid economic 
growth precipitated by ambitious policies, which were themselves enabled by the 
authoritarian control of the government. Many of the sectors originally selected by 
the military government continue to be key players in Brazil’s economy as the result 
of these early investments. One of these sectors is agriculture, specifically soy and 
wheat crops.  
The 1960s saw a rapid modernization of Brazil’s agricultural sector under the 
direction of the federal government – for example, in 1960, only 9,908 tractors were 
produced in the entire country; by 1972, this number had increased to 34,000.186 State 
policies for modernization of the economy during this time were multi-pronged: the 
traditional agricultural areas of the south had to be modernized and made more 
productive, while the supposedly empty and unproductive lands of the Amazon and 
of the Cerrado were to be finally made productive and integrated with national and 
international markets. Fiscal and financial subsidies, including rural credit programs 
for machinery and other expenses, and minimum price supports stimulated industrial 
agricultural export products like soybeans, sugar and frozen orange juice.187 These 
stimuli encouraged private investors to buy and improve farmlands, and for who 
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could afford it, land was seen as a desirable investment after decades of inflation had 
made more liquid stores of wealth less desirable.188 
While development of the agricultural sector greatly benefited the country’s 
traditional agricultural regions, including the South, this initiative ws also closely 
related to the government’s plan for developing the Legal Amazon, known as 
Operation Amazônia. Operation Amazônia’s slogan -“integrar para não entregar,” or 
“integrate [into the rest of the country] so as to not hand over,” or in in other words, 
“use it or lose it,” -was famous, though Barrozo points out, it should have been the 
other way –“integrar para entegrar” (integrate to hand over) – as these settlement-
oriented projects frequently ended up working hand in hand with extractivist multi-
national endeavors (mining and agriculture) in the region.189 These companies needed 
workers in areas with little population, and the colonization projects needed 
infrastructure, jobs/money, and products, so the colonization projects, far from 
becoming the instruments of land reform there were supposed to be, simply became 
“pepineiras de mão-de-obra” (labor camps).190 
Under the umbrella of Operation Amazonia, the government created a whole 
host of new agencies under the auspices of managing the enormous project of settling 
and developing the Amazon, inlcuding the agriculture sector. In 1966, the SUDAM 
(Superintendência do Desenvolvimento da Amazônia/Superintendent for the 
Development of the Amazon)  replaced the Vargas-era SPVEA. Because SUDAM 
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was a creation of the military government, the agency’s powers were broadened even 
beyond what they had been when the agency had been SPVEA, its resources grew 
even further, and its power, concentrated in Brasilia by the generals, was “almost 
absolute.”191  
Other agencies formed during the 1960s and 1970s that operated in Mato 
Grosso include BASA (Banco da Amazônia S/A/Bank of the Amazon, a recreation of 
the Vargas-era  Banco de Crédito da Borracha or Credit Bank for Rubber), INCRA 
(Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária / Brazilian Colonization and 
Land Reform Agency), POLOCENTRO (Programa para o Desenvolvimento dos 
Cerrados/Cerrado Development Program), SUDECO (Superintendência de 
Desenvolvimento do Centro-Oeste/Superintendent of Center-West Development), and 
EMBRAPA (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária/ Brazilian Enterprise for 
Agricultural Research).192 SUDECO replaced the inefficient FBC, and was charged 
with planning the occupation of the state of Mato Grosso with the objective of 
integrating the productive processes with those in the South and Southeast of 
Brazil.193 The objective of SUDECO was to create the means to occupy areas of the 
Cerrado which had previously been considered uncultivable. A specific program, 
POLOCENTRO was created in 1975 (decree no. 75.320/75) to oversee the 
construction of silos, the exploration of lime deposits, which are crucial for correcting 
the acidity of Cerrado soils for agriculture, and the development of modern 
                                                          
191 “quase absolute,” 
ibid., 18.
 
192 
Ibid., 19.
 
193 
Alves Jr., "O Planejamento Governamental e seus Reflexos na Estrutura Fundiária de Mato Grosso," 
18.
 
95 
 
agricultural practices in the Cerrado, including the states of Goiás, Mato Grosso, and 
Minas Gerais.194 In Mato Grosso, two areas were selected – Parecis (including the 
municipality of Diamantino of which Projeto Especial de Assentamento/Special 
Settlement Project, PEA-Lucas do Verde, was still a part) and Xavantina, in the 
eastern part of the state.195 SUDAM and BASA offered very favorable financial 
incentives for businesses to take advantage of vast and cheap lands and abundant and 
cheap credit to do business in Amazônia.196 The objective of EMBRAPA was to 
research and develop agricultural technologies, though they would not extend their 
research into the cerrados for several decades, leaving private initiative and the efforts 
of SUDECO/POLOCENTRO to develop the most important early advances in 
cerrado agriculture. INCRA was in charge of developing and carrying out 
colonization projects related to land reform.  
The military government during this time was notoriously worred about the 
security of the national borders and the instability of the extractivist nature of what 
economy had existed in the Amazon up until that time.197 It was for this reason that 
the generals went to such great lengths, and established so many agencies, to plan and 
transform the region. Thus, their goals for the Amazon were: to form a stable 
population (of non-indigenous) Brazilians throughout the region; to create conditions 
for self-sufficiency of these populations; to create a policy of encouraging 
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immigration to the region, which included taking advantage of existing populations 
and selected external populations;  and the adoption of stimulus policies including 
fiscal stimulus and favorable credit.  Essentially, private initiative would be given 
fiscal incentives, access to cheap and abundant lands, and favorable credit from 
BASA and Banco do Brasil, and in the end, they would end up with the resources to 
engage in rent-generating activities (agriculture, ranching, and mining), while the 
federal government would provide the basic development and the necessary 
infrastructure.198  
As part of this project, in the early 1970s, the federal government began the 
construction of three highways – BR-158 connecting Barra do Garças in with the 
southern border of Pará; BR-364 connecting Cuiabá with Porto Velho; and BR-163 
connecting Cuiabá-Porto Velho, under the Plano de Integração Nacional (National 
Integration Plan, or PIN) (Figure 3). Yet in such an isolated landscapes, even 
highways were not sufficient to guarantee settlement. One way the government 
facilitated colonization along these highways was by passing Decree/Law 1.164/71 
which designated 100km on either side of federal highways in Amazônia Legal as 
subject to appropriation for agrarian reform.199 The areas around the highways, as a 
consequence, were sold and rapidly increased in value as various private colonization 
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projects were installed; along BR-163 this included projects which eventually became 
the towns of Nova Mutum, Sorriso and Sinop.200   
 
 
Figure 3. Major highways in and around Mato Grosso 
 
 
 
As with the Vargas-era projects, the legacies of these millitary government-
era agencies and their projects have been mixed.  The generals took a greater interest 
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than Vargas did in promoting “structural transformations” that would facilitate the 
entry of national and trans-national industry in the Amazon and generate capital than 
they were in promoting agrarian reform.201 They claimed to promote agrarian reform 
and more equitable land distribution as a part of this process, even passing a 
progressive land-reform law that allowed for massive redistribution of land (known as 
The Land Statute) the first year they were in power, but in reality, they simply used 
agrarian reform as a vehicle for facilitating the entrance of large firms and the 
consolidation of capital on the frontier. Corruption was another area in which strong 
government control did not bring improvements. Fraud in state agencies was rampant 
during this era just as it had been in previous eras. For example, Mato Grossense 
historian Fiorelo Picoli has found that from 1966 to 2001, SUDAM distributed over 
10 billion reals (R$) for projects in the nine states of Legal Amazon, but very little of 
that money found its way to the people of Legal Amazon because much of it was 
embezzled; alas, the principal objective of SUDAM appears to have not been the true 
development of the Amazon but simply the subsidization of “capitalist project” of 
extractive resource exploitation in Brazil.202 
 
Agricultural modernization in the South: the “push” of settlers to the 
Amazon/Cerrado  
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Government policies in the 1960s and 1970s promoting agricultural 
“development” and mechanization in the South, and throughout Brazil more 
generally, also had profound effects, both intended and unintended, in the Amazon. 
Policies promoting mechanization in the South came at the expense of subsistence 
and small-scale farming. This only worsened the problems for the region’s rural poor, 
who were already plagued by a set of complex problems, including soil-exhaustion 
and insecure land tenure.203 Government-established criteria for mechanization called 
for minimum areas of at least 36 hectares for mechanization.204 Many farmers did not 
meet or barely met the criteria for cost-effective mechanization; thirty-six percent of 
farmers in soy- and wheat-producing Rio Grande do Sul had properties of less than 
100 hectares in 1970.205 What this meant for these small-holder farmers was that 
turning a profit would become ever more difficult as government support for their 
livelihoods waned. Similarly, falling prices and freezes plagued the coffee crop of 
Paraná in the early 1970s, leading the government to eventually order the eradication 
of millions of hectares of coffee plantations there.206 On the whole, these policies 
pushed familes whose livlihoods and identities were thoroughly agricultural off the 
lands in the South. 
For the government – still a dictatorship, the solution to these problems was to 
resettle small farmers and the landless in newly opened frontier areas of the southern 
Amazon, including Mato Grosso, where land was abundant and settlement assistance 
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was promised. INCRA was formed in 1970 to plan and execute colonization projects 
to settle landless and land-insecure families from various parts of Brazil in the 
Amazon. These new official settlements were to serve as “escape valves” for the 
unrest in the South and, at the same time, transfer what the generals surely saw as an 
adept population of farmers from the South to the agricultural frontier of the southern 
Amazon.207 Yet, other people also saw an opportunity and migrated north to the 
Amazon frontier for the vast expanses of cheaper land they had been hearing about 
since the 1940s; based on the promises of the government and new colonization 
programs; and based on a determination to maintain the agricultural lifestyles that 
were traditional in their families. The state of Mato Grosso, though, had already been 
allowing private colonization schemes and speculation to take place in the northern 
part of the state the 1940s.208  Thus these resettlements simply transferred the conflict 
over land and unrest from the South (and to a lesser exent, other regions) to the 
frontier, as competing claims for the same properties emerged with greater frequency.  
In other words, starting in the 1960s and increasingly in the 1970s and 1980s, 
multiple streams of migrants responded to a combination of government incentives 
and personal ambition and headed north and west to the new frontiers of the Amazon. 
The best-known type of colonization in the Amazon is the official colonization 
project, coordinated by INCRA, though this was neither the most common nor the 
most effective means of settlement. This was either because the agency’s programs 
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were never intended to successfully resettle the poor and help them toward self-
sufficient farming in frontier regions, or else because even an agency empowered by 
an authoritarian regime could not establish the permanent resettlement of four million 
poor in unfamiliar frontier environments.209 Official colonization was complex, 
because, on the one hand, the rural poor and landless agitated for colonization 
projects as a solution to their problems; on the other hand those who managed to be 
included in official colonization projects found that the government officials and 
agencies who coordinated the projects were unhelpful or downright hostile to them 
upon their arrival to the frontier, which was, itself, a challenging place to make a 
living.  
Official colonization projects, bolstered by the progressive ideas put forward 
by the military government’s own 1964 Land Statue, had the potential to be 
transformative. The Land Statute equated the productive use of land and the “social 
functions” of land, and called for the redistribution of lands that did not meet these 
conditions. In practice, though, the Statute turned out to be a “dead letter,” and was 
enforced only as a “last recourse,” when agrarian reform activists managed to force 
the hand of the dictatorship.210 Latifundiários, or large, unproductive land-holdings, 
had been common in Brazil since colonial times. Fiscal policies enacted by the 
military government promoted further land concentration by favoring the mechanized 
production of grain crops in demand on global markets.  
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In passing the progressive Land Statute but failing to enforce it, or indeed, in 
promoting policies that directly contradicted the Statute, the legitimacy of the 
authoritarian rule could be called into question. Authoitarian rule is based on absolute 
power concentrated in the hands of the soverign(s), or at least the appearance of 
this;211 contradictory policies eminating from the soverign undermined the 
absoluteness of soverign power by highlighting inconsistencies in the government’s 
mission. In the case of the Amazon frontier in the 1960s and 1970s, either the 
priorities of the authoritarian government had changed over time or the agrarian 
reform ideals featured in the Land Statute had proven to be disingenuous or 
unpalatable to enact on the part of military leaders. An opening was created, in other 
words, for hope for progressive policies where before there had not been any, and it 
was in this context of unrest and uncertainty that social forces (in this case, peasants 
demanding agrarian reform) challenged the legitimacy of the authoritarian 
government by demanding that it enforce laws it had established. The relative 
weakness of the dictatorship in Brazil was progressively exposed over time, as, 
especially from 1970 on, various sectors of civil society began to organize and agitate 
for “political openness” and effective solutions to social and economic problems, 
including agrarian reform.212  
In spite of high hopes for land reform during the dictatorship, only about 7 
percent of the rural poor in Brazil were resettled by INCRA between 1970 and 2000, 
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and the administration of the settlements was plagued by problems of poor 
management, corruption, inefficiencies and favoritism.213 In cases where peasants 
achieved action on the part of the government as a response to their complaints about 
unjust land distribution, the government’s solution was the creation of an official 
agrarian reform colony in the Legal Amazon. To the settlers, these settlements, 
though administered by the agents of the authoritarian government, were both 
practical and ideological endeavors on the part of the peasants who entered into them. 
They were practical in that they meant finally receiving access to the means to meet 
their physical and material needs in the land; they were ideological in that they 
represented overcoming in some small way the exclusionary nature of the process of 
accumulation of capital by the dominant classes and the authorities. 
Shortly after the creation of INCRA, the federal government also began to 
allow private colonization projects to “complement” INCRA’s work in the 
Amazon.214 In 1971, Decree/Law 1.179 established PROTERRA (Programa de 
Redistribuição de Terras e de Estímulo à Agroindústria do Norte e do Nordeste 
/Program for Redistribution of Land and Stimulation of Indistrial Agriculture in the 
North and Northeast), which would ostensibly promote private colonization by 
providing credit for the purchace of small- and medium-sized landholdings, though 
PROTERRA mainly provided subsidized credit to large ranches. As mentioned 
above, the state of Mato Grosso had apparently already been allowing private 
colonization schemes, most of which were fraudulent, in the northern part of the state 
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for years.215  The result of many different settlement regimes in Mato Grosso was a 
hodgepodge of often competing claims and a lack of effective effective authority that 
continues to characterize many rural areas today. 
For Barrozo, PROTERRA’s legacy was “the destruction of opportunities for 
the preproduction of the small family farmer and establishing on the struggle for land 
the historical role of peasant resistance against capitalist development.”216 Yet, despite 
such diversions of funds, thousands of Brazilians moved to new agricultural frontiers 
with the help of private colonization firms. The work of Wendy Jepson on the 
settlement history of eastern Mato Grosso has shown that private colonization 
organizations were responsible for the settlement of 3.9 million hectares of land in 
Mato Grosso between 1970 and 1990, which is equivalent to 39 percent of all the land 
settled in the Amazon during those two decades.217 State-led colonization in Mato 
Grosso, on the other hand, totalled only 550,000 ha during the same time period. 
Looking at the Amazon as a whole, official colonization projects settled slightly more 
land area than private colonization (about 5,431,000 ha compared to 4,716,000 ha).218 
These colonization firms were so productive because they reduced the costs of the 
process of moving people to the frontier for the government, and, for would-be 
colonists with the resources to buy into a project, private colonization firms reduced 
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some of the bureaucracy and risks (transaction costs) associated with moving to the 
frontier.  
Settlement initiatives and subsidies created for the Amazonian frontier in the 
1969s and 1970s generated opportunities for farmers with at least some capital to 
obtain cheap land and a certain amount of government support, but the risks 
associated with setting up a new farm in an unfamiliar area were high. These private 
organizations were a transformative force on the frontier and facilitated the 
acquisition of land by farmers by negotiating with state agencies on behalf of farmers, 
providing “organizational structure” to farmers, such as access to markets, and 
generally mitigating the risks faced by farmers in remote locales.219  
Spontaneous colonization by farmers and ranchers not associated with public 
or private colonization projects also played a role in transforming the frontier. These 
spontaneous settlers, known as posseiros in Brazil, challenged the power of the state’s 
project in the far reaches of the frontier. These settlers, who had enough capital to 
provide for their own basic needs in the absence of state- or private-assistance, but 
who lacked the capital to accompany the agricultural modernization processes taking 
place in the traditional agricultural heartland in the South, represented an alternate 
path that was not reliant on federal support and, frequently, was extralegal. They are 
frequently referred to in English as “squatters” because they sometimes claimed 
public or privately owned lands without purchasing them, but this terminology belies 
the heterogeneity of the posseiro experience and the transformative role they played 
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on the advancing frontier. Sometimes posseiros simply claimed a parcel of land and 
set to work, but in many other cases, they purchased the land in good faith from a 
previous owner or someone who claimed they were a previous owner.  
The posseiros, in Martins’s view, are the true protagonists of frontier 
expansion in Brazil  – they occupied the lands to work them, investing their own 
time, money and resources in altering the land to meet their productive needs.220  
Sometimes they continued to follow the frontier as it advanced, but many times, they 
planned to apply for title to the lands they claimed after several years of working to 
“improve” it; a title was required to apply for financing for further improvement 
projects.221  As a result, these settlers offered resistance to official projects like roads 
and planned settlements, calling into question the legitimacy of the authoritarian state 
in the distant reaches of the frontiers of the Amazon and the Cerrado. And yet, as 
Leite notes, the resistance offered by the posseiros was not ideological in nature. 
Instead, he says,  
 
it was, above all, a struggle to guarantee the reproduction of a form of 
life and work that these social actors longed for and that, they figured, 
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brought them that dreamed-of independence. In this sense, it was 
essentially a practical struggle.222  
 
This practical nature of the posseiro experience set it apart from the experience of the 
colonist associated with official settlements, and to a certain extent, the colonist 
associated with private or cooperative settelements, for whom, at least at the 
organizational level if not at the individual level, there was an important element of 
ideology.  
Creating bureaucratic agencies and channeling money toward individuals and 
groups for agricultural endeavors was not enough for the government to generate the 
development of an agricultural sector capable of generating exports. To coordinate 
the mosaic of inter-related agencies and strategies being pursued with relation to the 
advancement of the frontier in the Amazon and the modernization of the agriculture 
sector, and the geographical redistribution of the population tied to these goals, the 
military government created a series of National Integration Plans, or PINs.  
At the same time, the generals were pursuing strategies to modernize the 
agricultural system in the more traditional agricultural regions of the country, 
including Rio Grande do Sul, where mobilization of landless peasants was beginning 
and fragmentation of properties and low soil fertility stood in the way of 
mechanization of agriculture, specifically soy and wheat production.223 These goals 
                                                          
222 
José Carlos Leite, "Posse e conflito pela terra em Jauru - MT: 1980-1990," in Mato Grosso: do 
Sonho à Utópia da Terra, ed. João Carlos Barrozo (Cuiabá: EdUFMT, 2008), 236.
 
223 
Barrozo, "Políticas de Colonização: as políticas públicas para a Amazônia e o Centro-Oeste," 21.
 
108 
 
and actions eventually led to the creation of the PEA-Lucas do Rio Verde, among 
other settlements, which would serve as “escape valves” for the unrest in the south 
and, at the same time, transfer what the generals saw as an adept population of 
farmers from the south to the agricultural frontier of the southern Amazon.224 The 
process of occupation of the PEA-Lucas do Rio Verde is discussed in depth below.   
 
Reconciling the frontiers of Vargas and the generals 
 
Though apparently similar, the frontiers of Vargas and those of the military 
dictatorship of the 1960s and 1970s were different in a few key ways. First, as Betty 
Rocha describes, the Vargas government was interested in stimulating agricultural 
production in the Amazon to meet domestic needs, while the military dictatorship was 
primarily interested in modernizing agriculture in the country in general as part of a 
plan to further integrate the Brazilian economy into global markets, of which the 
Amazon was only one part.225 
Additionally, Vargas was not actively seeking so much a modernization of 
agriculture, but more a redistribution of it, and viewed the “fixing” of man to the land 
as an important part of healthy economic growth – as the cities grew more 
prosperous, a healthy rural population would be needed to absorb the growth in 
industrial production.226 For the military government, it was quite the opposite – the 
                                                          
224 The phrase “escape valve” has been borrowed from the work of Turner on the United States and applied to this process in Brazil. 
Ibid., 21.
 
225 
Rocha, ""A Trama do Drama": A Trama das Fronteiras e o Drama dos Migrantes nas Configurações 
do Desenvolvimento de Lucas do Rio Verde - MT," 29.
 
226 
Ibid., 31.
 
109 
 
frontier of the Amazon was to absorb those who were not contributing to the capitalist 
expansion in the cities and the traditional agricultural frontiers, and either get them 
out of the way or convert them into a laboring class to supply capitalist endeavors on 
the frontier.  
Another key difference between the two eras was ideological. For Vargas, 
frontier settlement was  “motivated by the principal of nationality and the affirmation 
of a national identity,”227 along with some concern about protecting national borders. 
The military government was even more concerned about protecting national borders, 
to the point of paranoia, and somewhat paradoxically sought to dissolve boundaries 
on the flow of capital. Nationalist rhetoric was, for the military government, principly 
in service of other goals and not an ideology in itself. In fact, the deliberate actions 
taken by the state during the dictatorship amounted not just to capturing the symbolic 
and material resources generated by the frontiers; but as Becker notes,  
 
the state itself began to generate new space and frontiers through the 
deliberate policies of a socially exclusive military regime…In alliance 
with industrial and financial forces, legitimized by the middle class, 
and repressing the working class, the military regime inaugurated a 
new-style authoritarianism,228 
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 or in other words, bureaucracy.  
 
Globalization on the frontier and the rise of the agrocity 
 
By the 1980s, Brazil’s agricultural frontier had advanced far to the North and 
the West. A mosaic of agencies and private endeavors had reached far into the 
cerrados and the forests of the Legal Amazon with settlements, roads, farms, and the 
emergence of urban areas. The nature of the dominant economies operating in the 
region – industrial agriculture, ranching, mining and logging – and the discourse 
about the expansion of the agricultural frontier together imply that the setting for 
these changes is predominantly rural, almost exclusively oriented toward the efficient 
conversion of natural resources into commodities for national and global 
consumption, and otherwise relatively less developed than the country’s urban 
areas.229 Yet, today, these agricultural frontier zones are the scenes of some of the 
most intense development of mechanized agriculture in the world, and are closely 
linked to global and national markets for agricultural commodities.  
State and capitalist forces initiated and facilitated the creation of many of 
these globally-oriented “agrocities”, but many other factors have also influenced their 
development. By the end of the dictatorship, state power had essentially been eroded 
in the region, yielding to domination of global agricultural firms (tradings) and 
creating space for the emergence of local power (municipal leaders and local 
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businesses). Settlement of the Amazon was an elaborate process of re-
territorialization of the region by state and capitalist forces, in an attempt to more 
effectively control the economic opportunities being generated there.230 Dozens of 
new municipalities were created in the 1970s and 1980s. Persons and families that 
settled in these cities and make up the workforce of the industrial-technical 
agricultural industry in the region have created still other industries to meet their daily 
needs, local and regional links among neighboring cities, and problems that 
characterize life in any urban environment, as well as unique solutions to these needs 
and challenges.231  Though the dominant economic activity in the region remains 
industrial agriculture oriented toward national and international markets, diversity 
among these urban centers is high in terms of population, infrastructure, local 
investment in agribusiness and other industries, and linkages to other cities and global 
markets. 232 This diversity in turn has a real influence on the heterogeneous economic 
and environmental outcomes of neoliberal agricultural expansion in the region.  
The same conditions that made doing business on the frontier attractive to 
many settlers also created conditions favorable for the social and physical violence 
characteristic of frontier areas as people struggled for position in a location with few 
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(enforced) rules, which was a prominent feature of territorialization and settlement in 
much of Mato Grosso a generation ago. The scars of this process on the social and 
physical landscape are apparent in land tenure, social links, and a sense of pride, 
permanence, and investment in the area among those who chose to and were able to 
endure the challenging beginnings in these locales. In the climate of instability on the 
frontier, local factors including the informal economy, strategic acquisition of 
properties and local knowledge, physical attributes of the local geography, personal 
relationships, and savings and local investments in technology of the first groups of 
settlers in these cities had marked effects on the relative success of the blossoming 
industrial-agriculture sectors there. In spite of this, researchers have tended to treat 
the agricultural frontier of western Brazil as homogenous due to the prominent and 
rapid development of monocrop agriculture there.  However, over time, the variation 
across the region will become more apparent in the social and environmental effects 
of the area’s agricultural boom and continued urbanization.  
Indeed, similar, contemporary cases of the creation and development of so 
many cities and towns in one region in such a short period of time; with their 
economies oriented around profitable industrial agriculture; and with such drastic 
environmental consequences, are difficult to find in any other part of the world. And 
yet, in spite of the economic, social, and environmental importance of this new agro-
industrial heartland in Brazil, settlement histories for the region in general are poorly 
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understood in English-language literature, with a few notable exceptions.233 The 
diversity and influence of these urban environments call for closer inspection in the 
context of the motivations of the settlers, the roles of government agencies in the 
settlements, and the environmental changes associated with these settlements. In the 
words of Alves Sobrinho, 
 
the conceptions of the territorial dynamic brings us to reflect about a 
geography of power, in which the idea and the use of territory serve as 
the base for development, which fosters the reorganization of the 
territory through the structuring of valid micro and macro systems. 
The specifics are well-evidenced in the state of Mato Grosso, where 
the process of insertion into the national productive system demanded 
large territorial transformations, facilitated by modernizations in the 
political-administrative organization, which created space for the 
emergence of new internal frontiers for the operation of new powers, 
including new municipalities.234 
 
In other words, political-administrative institutional shifts in the orientation of the 
national economy required major territorial transformations at the local level as well. 
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In Mato Grosso, agrocities linked to highly-technological, productive systems 
on relatively large-scale properties, emerged in the areas best able to link into and 
garner advantages from connections to global productive systems, even in 
geographically remote areas (Table 2). These municipalities have high standards of 
living and have been characterized by rapid economic growth. This has ocurred via 
what Alves Sobrinho calls “specific combinations of economic, political and 
variables that determined the intensity of the competitive advantage of a territory.”235 
Technical innovations made by national and multi-national firms and individuals in 
the growth of soybeans in the tropics and changes in market demand, along with local 
factors such as access to roads and adequate storage and processing facilities, social 
services, and soil type converged to “‘sprout’ [cities] in economically productive 
areas.”236 For Alves Sobrinho, this is a highly exclusive process, as a relatively small 
number of actors are involved in the soy chain and the infrastructure/technology is 
high tech,237 and the local economies in these regions are frequently dominated by 
agricultural activities, with a large share controlled by multi-national companies. As a 
result, economic benefits of these activities are somewhat unevenly divided. 
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Table 2. Select indicators for municipalities formed in Mato Grosso in 1988 
Municipality Pop 2000 Pop 2010 
Percentage Growth 
since 2000 
HDI (PNUD 
2000) (avg. 
Brazil : .699) 
Apiacás 6665 8567 28.5371343 0.713 
Campo Novo do Parecis 17638 27577 56.3499263 0.809 
Campo Verde 17221 31589 83.4330178 0.8 
Castanheira 7790 8231 5.66110398 0.73 
Cláudia 10249 11028 7.60074154 0.813 
Juruena 5448 11201 105.598385 0.751 
Lucas do Rio Verde 19316 45556 135.845931 0.818 
Matupá 11289 14174 25.5558508 0.753 
Nova Mutum 14818 31649 113.584829 0.801 
Tapurah 11561 10392 -10.111582 0.783 
Source: IBGE except for HDI (source PNUD) 
 
 
 
It’s also worth commenting on the nature of teleconnections in these 
agrocities. de Arruda views agrocities as exclusively oriented to attend to global 
markets, with the prominent placement of armazéns, or grain storage facilities, and 
the connections in terms of internet, satelittes and airports that give access to the 
global at least as much as to the rest of the country238 For de Arruda, the agro-
technological specialization of these cities “breaks their geographic isolation and 
promotes the insertion of the predominant activities, which are attending to the 
demands of a globalized market.”239 This view, however, ignores important regional 
connections among families, businesses, and political projects. Simply put, there is 
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more to life in Mato Grosso than being connected to São Paulo, even if this is where 
most of the grains produced thre eventually end up, and important regional alliances 
among municipal leaders, powerful landowners and innovative businessmen, as well 
as families, are also defining, but normally overlooked, characteristics of life in the 
agrocity post frontier.  
 
Settlement of Lucas do Rio Verde on three fronts 
 
Set against the more general history of settlement in Mato Grosso as laid out 
so far in this chapter, the story of Lucas’ settlement is particularly instructive of the 
complexity of the state-private hybrid processes that have influenced settlement of the 
Amazon. This is because Lucas’ story incorporates all of the three separate settlement 
initiatives described so far, which generated heated conflicts and negotiated 
resolutions to these that continue to influence the culture, politics and economics of 
the municipality.  
In the mid-1970s, three distinct groups of settlers, known locally as posseiros, 
parceleiros (settlers who participated in official settlement projects and who were 
formerly landless), and associados (members of a cooperative, originally from São 
Paulo) converged on the banks of the Rio Verde (the Green River).  The 85 posseiro 
families of posseiros were spontaneous migrants to the area, mainly from the state of 
Paraná, who either purchased their lands from brokers or simply claimed them by 
setting about the business of farming them, but relied heavily on the land titling 
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process initiated by the other settlement projects to gain free and clear titles to their 
lands. The 203 families of parceleiros came from the state of Rio Grande do Sul and 
received their lands through an INCRA settlement project and are the most traditional 
representatives of the state-led model of settlement. The 50 families of associados 
were from São Paulo and were members of a cooperative that organized a state-
sanctioned but private settlement project in the area that would become Lucas.  
Here I show that all three groups both received state assistance and furthered 
the state project of divvying up and opening land in the Amazon for industrial 
agriculture expansion, but also, that all three groups ultimately had rather ambiguous 
relationships with the state. In the end, the personal relationships and private 
investments made by the settlers were also highly influential to the outcome of the 
settlement project in Lucas. The posseiros group ended up benefitting the most from 
the municipality’s contentious beginnings, and this outcome continues to mark the 
social, economic, and political situation of the municipality today. 
 
Local settlement prior to the official colonization project 
 
The earliest documented ownership of the area on either side of the Rio Verde 
(Green River), the present territory of the municipality of Lucas, was by the 
seringalista (rubber tapper) Francisco Lucas de Barros, the namesake of the future 
municipality.  Not much is known about de Barros, aside from the fact that he made a 
living along the Rio Verde from the end of the 19
th
 century until the profitability of 
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extracting rubber in the region declined around 1912.240 Then, in the 1970s, a few 
families from the state of Paraná began to buy up land in the area in lots of 1000 to 
5000 hectares in size from individuals or organizations that had registered the lands, 
perhaps sight unseen, in the early- and mid-1970s.241  
Land titling in Brazil, particularly in frontier areas and particularly in the 
1970s, has a long and well-documented history of fraud, deceit, and contradictory 
legal treatment.242 In this vein, the early settlement of Lucas was a classic case: the 
grileiros (speculators) had staked their claim to land that was otherwise unclaimed 
and untitled (land known in Brazil as terras devolutas, or public lands), and had then 
turned around and sold the land, with or without some kind of legal contract of sale.  
As this was common practice, the families that bought land in Lucas at this time, the 
posseiros, knew that, although the legality of their initial land purchase was 
questionable, staying on the land and making it “productive” for one year and one day 
(Federal Law 4504, November 30, 1964/Land Statute) would be extremely favorable 
for their eventual attempts to regularize, or make legal, their land claims in the future.   
As it happened, the posseiros arrived essentially concurrently with the 9
o
BEC 
(9
o
 Betalhão de Engenharia e Construção do Exérico, or 9
th
 Batallion of Engineering 
and Construction of the Army) and the construction of federal highway BR-163, a 
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trunk road running from the state capital of Cuiabá north into the state of Pará.  The 
posseiros by and large were not disenfranchised, uncapitalized settlers; these were 
mostly families who had voluntarily sold some or all of their land holdings in Paraná 
and had come to Mato Grosso with the goal of buying larger landholdings and 
achieve social mobility in Mato Grosso more easily than they could in Paraná.
243
 
Even though the legality of their land purchases was murky and they had few other 
resources,
244
 the local bank – a branch of the national Banco do Brasil — accepted 
these titles and even provided financing for agricultural activities based on them in 
those years.245  
From approximately 1976 until 1981, the posseiros’ claims were uncontested 
in Lucas, and they were able to focus their full attentions on the practical problems at 
hand – learning to farm in a tropical climate on land with sandy, acidic soils.  
Opening the frontier was exciting, but challenging.
246
 Though opening of nearby 
highway BR-163 had been completed ( 
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Figure 4), the quality of the road was terrible, prone to wash-outs, and 
combined with the long distances (it was 200km to the nearest town, the municipal 
seat of Diamantino), travelling was a significant undertaking and represented a 
serious hardship for anyone settling in Lucas.247  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The Opening of BR-163 at Lucas Do Rio Verde, Mato Grosso, 1981 (Source: Municipal 
Archive, Lucas do Rio Verde) 
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In 1981, the posseiros were informed that the area had been appropriated for 
an urgent land reform settlement and that their lands would be confiscated without 
compensation for the settlement of landless families in conflict with the government 
in the south. In spite of promises to the contrary that INCRA had made to the 
posseiros, this settlement project included land that was already claimed by them,248 
thereby setting the stage for continued land conflict and struggle over the 
government’s contradictory agendas regarding titling, populating and developing the 
area.   Some of the posseiros returned home or moved on, but those who did not have 
anywhere to return to decided to organize and work with INCRA for continued access 
to the land there.249 To understand the creation and struggles of the INCRA managed 
settlement project in Lucas, it is useful to examine the roots of the settlers’ land 
problems in Brazil’s southern-most state, Rio Grande do Sul.  
 
Land conflict in Rio Grande do Sul :The formation of the PEA - Rio Verde 
 
Land conflict has a long history in Brazil. Land consolidation has plagued 
Brazil since colonial times.250 Colonial land claims were so exaggerated, in fact, that 
for a time, land titles in Brazil lacked boundaries for the property.251 Fraud on the part 
of landholders (grilagem), fraud and corruption on the part of the government, 
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carelessness and lack of oversight, and contradictory regulations regarding land use 
and land tenure have created a centuries-long history of incorrect titles, missing titles, 
titles for nonexistent lands, and duplicate titles issued to the same person for the same 
piece of land. Land scarcity was caued by the growing rural population, due to 
immigration from European countries through as recently as the 1950s and 
generational population growth. This combined with physical violence against small-
landholders and peasants on the part of large landed interests kept landownership and 
rural population settlement in Brazil’s south dynamic.252 The availability of public 
lands in Brazil and the creation of federal institutions charged with addressing 
settlement and land tenure issues created expectations among landless Brazilians and 
small farmers that state-managed resolutions would be found for these problems. All 
of these factors were at play during the founding and settling of Lucas by Southern 
Brazilians.  
Claims to indigenous land also contribued to the general conflict over land in 
Brazil and had a direct influence on the chain of events that eventually led to the 
settlement of Lucas hundreds of kilometers away. Starting in the early 20
th
 century, 
Brazil had begun to set aside reservations for indigenous populations.  Almost 
immediately, though, white families also began to settle on these lands, though with 
shaky legal standing.253 For example, by 1962, there were 400 families of white 
colonists living in the Nonoai reserve in Rio Grande do Sul (a reserve that belonged 
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to the Kaingang people).  In 1969, 600 more families tried to squat there, but two-
thirds of them were turned back by the Kaingang.  These invasions by squatters 
escalated tensions between the white settlers and the Indians, and in 1974, there was 
another invasion, resulting in the deaths of 10 people.254 In addition to the Nonoai 
reserve, similar situations ocurred in the Cacique Double and Guarita reserves in 
northeastern Rio Grande do Sul and the Chapecó reserve in Santa Catarina, among 
others.   
Inspite of resistance on the part of the indigenous peoples, one important 
result of these invasions was that portion the reserves actually available to the Indians 
was considerably reduced in size due to these invasions of white colonizers.255 For 
example, by the end of 1975, there were 974 white colonist families occupying 65 
percent (9,634 ha) of the Nonoai rseserve.256 As of 1976, 228 families were living 
legally on Kaingang land in Nonoai, but another 682 families were squatting with no 
formal relationship with the Indians.257  
1978, after years of protracted legal battles and petitions with INCRA, the 
indigenous took matters into their own hands and forcibly expelled white settlers 
from the Nonoai, Cacique Double and Guarita reserves in northeastern Rio Grande do 
Sul, and from the Chapecó reserve in Santa Catarina.258 The expelled colonists, 1000 
families in total, were penniless. With nowhere to go, they camped by the side of the 
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road in protest of their inability to get secure access to land, thereby setting off the 
modern landless movement in Brazil.259  
The decamped colonists began talking about retaliating against the Indians 
and the federal government realized that it had to finally step in. In this conflict, it 
saw a chance to use settlers to kill two birds with one stone, so to speak – by settling 
these colonists in the Amazon, they thought they could resolve the landless problem 
brewing in the south, and at the same time advance their interests of productive 
settlement in the Amazon.260 The settlers, though, still held out hope that they would 
remain in the South, where they were from. Thus began a long series of solutions 
proposed by government officials (government jobs, settlements in the Amazon) and 
rejected by settlers. Meanwhile, the day-to-day situation of the settlers was growing 
steadily more precarious.  
In May 1978, around 800 of the families were installed in temporary 
structures inside the Parque de Exposições de Agropecuária in Esteio – RS.261 The 
other 200 or so families stayed on the side of the road in Alto Uruguai.  Soon after, 
the government launched a half-hearted attempt to settle the colonists in Mato 
Grosso. Over 500 of the displaced families were transferred to a settlement called 
Terranova, in Mato Grosso, with promises of basic infrastructure, a good climate and 
biome conducive to farming, and the favorable financing necessary for them to clear 
the land and farm there.  In the end, the government provided none of this, and the 
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majority of the Terranova colonists quickly returned to Rio Grande do Sul.  
Meanwhile, the remaining settlers stayed in the temporary camps and held out hope 
that they would be able to eventually obtain land for settlement in Rio Grande do Sul, 
close to their families and in a familiar climate. 
For those who refused to go north to Mato Grosso, two options remained – 
one was to illegally occupy land, the other was to work with the government to 
attempt to get settled in Rio Grande do Sul. Frustration with the dirty and precarious 
nature of the camps and the failure of land to become available began to stoke 
resentment toward the handling of the crisis on the part of the government, and what 
had at first been a struggle driven by practicality (the need for land to be made 
available), evolved into an ideological struggle based on the right to land on which a 
family could make a living.  
Moreover, some Esteio families elected to try to force the government’s hand 
by occupying land. In 1978, 150 families from Esteio occupied the farm Granja 
Brilhante, and in September of that year another 110 families occupied the farm 
Granja Macali, two farms that had been set aside for agrarian reform purposes some 
time before, but had since been tied up in lengthy court battles.  Starting in February 
1981, the remaining 900 families or so from Esteio set up camp at an intersection that 
came to be known as Encruzilhada Natalino (Natalino’s Crossing – named for the 
first settler who put his tent there).  Nearby Fazenda Sarani, also tied up in a court 
battle over land reform, was taken over by settlers as well.  The situation of the 
landless in Rio Grande do Sul was now no longer one of separate groups of families 
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looking for land; this was now a full-blown social movement willing to take on the 
state, using its own laws, to demand their right to land that was not already being used 
productively (Land Statute, Law 4504, 30 November 1964).
262
 
Government attempts to offer the settlers compensation other than land in Rio 
Grande do Sul, such as jobs at agricultural research stations on lands in the Amazon, 
were rebuffed.  At the same time, conditions in the camps continued to deteriorate.  
There were food and water shortages, illnesses and deaths.263 Dwellings were made of 
cardboard and plastic, and so provided virtually no protection against the elements.  
On top of all of this, state and local police threatened violence against the settlers and 
local landowners hired gunmen to infiltrate the camps and threaten and beat the 
settlers.   
As bad as these conditions were, the settlers were unmoved in their insistence 
that they be given land in Rio Grande do Sul until the arrival of Major Sebastião 
Rodrigues de Moura (known popularly as Major Curió) of the Conselho de Segurança 
Nacional (CSN – National Security Council), who further ratcheted up the  physical 
and psychological threats against the colonists.  He informed the settlers that there 
was no land available in the South (in contrast to the surveys INCRA had already 
conducted which identified over 800,000 hectares of land eligible for redistribution in 
RS alone) and promised that the soils in Mato Grosso were fertile, that the settlements 
had organized amenities, and that it would feel just like home when they got settled in 
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there.264 This was far from the truth, and the settlers knew that.  They had already 
heard about the experiences of the Terranova settlers, but by this point, many of the 
settlers were desperate to get out of the camp conditions and try to find a better 
situation for their families.   
In the end, 203 families agreed to take part in a new settlement project to be 
called PEA-Rio Verde.  The PEA-Rio Verde was to have more than 270,000 ha 
available for settlement in the gleba (unparceled land) along the Rio Verde and the 
new highway BR-163.  These 270,000 hectares would be divided into lots of 200 
hectares each, with 100 hectares of each plot to be reserved and the other 100 hectares 
available for productive use.265 Economic activities predicted for the area were rice, 
corn and soy, as well as a guarantee of rapid return on investments made there.266 The 
colonists were promised the following amenities in PEA-Rio Verde by INCRA – 
basic infrastructure including 96 km of local roads, three schools, two health centers, 
administrative buildings and an armazém as well as access to credit to work the land 
and for planting, including deforestation, root removal, cleaning, grading, technical 
assistance, and fertilizer and corrections. 
Credit was to be conditional based on technical assistance and a requirement 
to plant basic food crops for at least 2 years, a requirement which was to be reduced 
by 50 percent during the rest of the finance period.  The cost of the lot was to be 
based on the land value at the time – 370 cruzeiros per hectare in the Municipality of 
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Diamantino – to be paid back over 20 years, with a grace period of 480 days.  Value 
would be added to the land by the settlers by demarcating and clearing it and 
installing infrastructure, thereby adding to the incentives presented to the colonists by 
the government.267  
 
Arrival and settlement at Rio Verde 
 
The settlers who went to Lucas from Rio Grande do Sul became known as 
parceleiros because of the small parcels of land they received from the settlement 
project.  They arrived in Lucas in three rounds in 1981 and 1982 ( 
Figure 5).  At first, the mood among the parceleiros was positive and hopeful, 
but doubts quickly set in as questions about the legitimacy of their land titles, soil 
quality and the unavailability of expensive fertilizers they would need started to be 
raised.268  
Posseiros had been farming some of the land there for five years, but they had 
not begun the construction of any infrastructure related to a town. All that existed at 
Gleba Rio Verde when the pareceleiros arrived were tents from the army corp, 
9
o
BEC, that was clearing and building the highway and the Rio Verde itself.  Soon 
after the settlers arrived, INCRA assigned lots by a drawing.  According to Zart, this 
was one of the first dehumanizing tactics taken by what would turn out to be a very 
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hostile INCRA director in Lucas. 269   Many of the parceleiros had come to Lucas in 
groups of extended family members or friends, and intended to settle near each other 
in order to cooperate on the arduous tasks of setting up a homestead in a new place.  
However, because of the drawing, they were not even allowed to settle near people of 
their choice.  The parceleiros had been promised houses, but upon their arrival in 
Mato Grosso, they found out they would have to build their own houses with wood 
provided to them by INCRA.  Out of the 200 hectares they had each been promised 
for farming, they learned that in addition to having to leave 50 percent of it forested 
according to the federal Forest Code as written at the time, only 2 ha of the land was 
cleared for them on which to build their houses and begin to plant their crops.  They 
would have to figure out what to do about the other 98ha of dense vegetation with no 
machinery and no access to financing. 
Given the sizes of the plots, the lack of transport available, and the lack of 
roads in the area, the random drawing of lots also contributed to the isolation felt by 
the parceleiros; the distances between plots and the amount of work required to subist 
meant that even one’s neighbors were too far away to see often.  Friends and relatives 
settled on lots that did not adjoin one’s own were seen even less frequently.  All of 
the settlers were supposed to receive plots in town as well, but given the hostile 
situation that soon developed between the parceleiros and the director of the 
settlement project, some had to pay for them and some never acquired land in town at 
all.  Further adding to the tension, many men had come alone to set up the homestead, 
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planning to send for their families later.  Even worse, they discovered that they would 
need permission from INCRA to leave the camp to collect their families, a journey 
that was at least a 5 day round trip by bus. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Arrival of INCRA settlers in Lucas do Rio Verde in 1981, Source: Municipal Archive, Lucas 
do Rio Verde 
 
 
Further adding to their difficulties, farming was extremely challenging for the 
parceleiros in Rio Verde.  The soil, the climate, the landscape – everything was 
different.  They tried to plant the same things they had planted back home – oats, 
potatoes, garlic, onions – but nothing grew. Based on the best science of the time 
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(which was still very basic) for farming the Cerrado, rice had to be planted before 
anything else, to correct the soil. The rice crop only produced in the first couple of 
years, and then other crops could be grown. Even this information, though, basic as it 
was, was not freely shared with less experienced farmers. It was not in the interest of 
INCRA or the more experienced farmers to lift up the settlers who were struggling 
the most. Their failure and departure would mean opportunities for more cheap land 
for whoever could afford to buy it.  
INCRA was supposed to be providing the parceleiros with the assistance they 
needed to settle and farm in Mato Grosso.  Instead, the INCRA executor in Lucas, 
José Ferreira Soares, served mainly a source of threats of violence, corruption and 
oppression in the lives of the parceleiros.270 Just as Major Curió had done in the camp 
in Rio Grande do Sul, Ferreira physically attacked the parceleiros, insulted them and 
threatened their families.  Thus, the parceleiros were completely dependent on the 
services of third party vendors for everything from clearing and plowing to planting 
and harvesting, due to the terms of their contracts with the Banco do Brasil, the bank 
that administered financial aspects of the settlement.271 These prices of the services 
and the payment for the services were conducted exclusively between the bank and 
the vendors, who frequently failed to perform services or failed to perform them 
adequately or with the appropriate timing. The parceleiros never received the money 
they were being loaned; it went directly to the vendors, meaning the parceleiros were 
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stripped of their power to bargain for better services or prices. The nearest Banco do 
Brasil office was more than 200 km away in the city of Diamantino, a week’s journey 
round trip on foot; complaints that did make it to the bank were simply lost in a 
bureaucratic triangle among the employees of the Bank, INCRA and the vendors; and 
the parceleiros were so busy scraping together enough resources to survive that they 
did not have the time to unite and plan any kind of collective action to demand better 
treatment from INCRA and the bank.  
Low crop yields during the first year and changes made to the terms of the 
loan by the Bank furthered the troubles of the parceleiros. Poorly performing crops 
meant that the parceleiros were unable to bring in income via the sale of their crops to 
pay their loans, and a forced refinancing by the Bank meant that the parceleiros had to 
start making payments during the 2
nd
 year of their loan instead of the 5
th
 year, as had 
been the original agreement.  INCRA declined to evaluate the terms of the contracts 
between the parceleiros and the bank during the 2
nd
 year of the settlement based on 
the actual conditions of the settlement rather than the predicted ones which had been 
used as the basis for the original contracts.  This meant that the parceleiros’ inability 
to start making payments was viewed by the Bank as noncompliance with the terms 
of the loan, and the Bank refused to issue any more funds for the settlement in 1982, 
meaning that many of the settlers were unable to plant anything the second year.272 
Because INCRA was to hold the title to the parcels of land for five years, the 
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parceleiros did not even really own their land in the settlement either, leaving them 
with nothing with which to bargain.  
Because their crops were not producing well, some parceleiros worked as day 
laborers on the remaining farms of the posseiros in order to earn a bit of money to 
buy food at the Cobal (government-dry goods store) store in town and make their loan 
payments. Others relied on hunting and fishing.273  
 
Cooperlucas 
 
In addition to the parceleiros and the posseiros, a third group of settlers, the 
associados, representing the third type of government-facilitated settlement 
commonly found on Amazonian frontiers, also set its sights on settling the Gleba Rio 
Verde in the late 1970s. The members of the fledgling cooperative, first known 
Holambra 3, originally had an agreement to create a settlement in Mato Grosso with 
FEMACA (Federaçao Meridional de Cooperativas Agropecuarias de 
Campinas/Southern Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives of Campinas), but the oil 
crisis of the 1970s had a negative effect on the finances of this group and the 
members of Holambra had to turn to INCRA for assistance in starting their project.   
After sending scouts to the Rio Verde area and finding it agreeable, the 
members of Holambra consulted old maps on file with INCRA and finding the name 
of the old rubber-tapper Lucas associated with the area. They decided they would call 
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their settlement project Lucas do Rio Verde, and the name of the cooperative itself 
was changed to Cooperlucas.274 At the time, the associados were not aware that 
INCRA would soon create a planned settlement in that very area.275 With their plans 
in place, the cooperative was officially founded on December 22, 1981 with 50 
members.  Because the area was frontier territory, the cooperative would be 
responsible for the provision of education, social and cultural resources, and the 
technical assistance and infrastructure necessary for producing, buying and selling 
agricultural projects. 
Upon arrival in Lucas, the associados were surprised to find out that not only 
was INCRA settling people from Rio Grande do Sul there, but that there were also 
posseiros in the area who claimed to have rights to the land by virtue of having settled 
it for the five previous years.  To preserve whatever they could of their plans for the 
settlement of the region, a projeto integrado (integrated project) was proposed by the 
associados, which was to include the posseiros in the settlement and operate 
alongside the official settlement project.  This proposal, however, had to be 
negotiated with the regional and national management of INCRA, who eventually 
accepted the continuation of Cooperlucas in the Rio Verde area, with some 
conditions.  The cooperative would be allosed to settle up to 150 families (though 
only 50 ended up going), but it had to set up a “control post” to deal with the 
expected influx of land seekers after word got out about the place.   
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This deal created hard feelings between the associados and the posseiros, who 
were still struggling to resolve situation of their land with INCRA.  The cooperative, 
which planned to provide schools and other social services to everyone at the 
settlement, should have been a unifying force, but instead it was viewed suspiciously 
by the posseiros who viewed it as a sneaky move on the part of the associados to get 
preferential treatment from INCRA.  The posseiros were especially suspicious of the 
associados because they had come from São Paulo with a relationship with INCRA 
already established, though this relationship was certainly not an easy or a happy one.   
The employees of INCRA who were charged with the administration of the 
PEA-Lucas do Rio Verde had a hard time understanding how they were to distribute 
bennefits to the settlers, so they tended to maintain strict control over what went on in 
the settlement.  This draconian approach to running the settlement spilled over into 
other parts of life there; for example, INCRA employees made it difficult for the 
cooperative to execute planned projects such as educational programs, which might 
provided something for the diverse factions to rally around.  The cooperative leaders 
also felt obligated to denounce corruption as they observed it, including the illegal 
purchase of land from colonists for extremely low prices, and the subsequent sale of 
this land to posseiros, by a land broker with close ties to INCRA who was operating 
in the area.276 Like the other settlers, the associados were not immune from aggressive 
behavior on the part of the INCRA executor.  Cooperative leaders reported receiving 
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death threats from Ferreira,277 though at least one author has accused some of the 
associados of threats and social violence to further their cause, as well.278  
The fortunes of the cooperative and of Lucas changed in 1983, though, when 
Cooperlucas received a Japanese commission to negotiate and install PRODECER 
(Programa de Desenvolvimento do Cerrado/Program for Development of the 
Cerrado), a project incentivized by Japan for the production of grains in Brazil’s 
Cerrado region for export to Japan.  Through this project, the cooperative was able to 
install the settlement’s first grain drier – until then, contrary to the promises made by 
INCRA to the parceleiros, they had been dependent on grain middle-men to store and 
process their grains, at considerable cost. The drier was important in this history of 
Lucas because universal access to it improved relations between the cooperative and 
the remaining parceleiros, as well as the posseiros, all of whom benefitted from the 
presence of a local grain drier.279  
The PRODECER project represents yet another example of the public-private 
cooperation that characterized the settlement and territorialization of the Amazon. 
Projects like PRODECER were a continuation of the state project for developing the 
Amazon, but this was now carried out in partnership with private agencies as sources 
of funding. The government’s goals for extending its control over the region were 
also articulated via other types of hybrid state and private initiatives including 
regularization of lands claimed through posse (settlement first and applying for the 
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title later) and the collaboration with cooperative settlements in the Amazon. All of 
these projects had in common that they created opportunities for individuals who 
were able to meet the requirements set explicitly or implicitly by the state to turn the 
country’s so-called empty spaces into globalized production spaces and effectively 
extend the reach of the state to regions and resources that were previously 
uncontrolled by it in practice.  
 
From settlement to district to municipality 
 
On August 5, 1982, the municipality of Lucas was declared an agrovila 
(agricultural settlement), within the municipality of Diamantino.  The text of the 
declaration act gives the impression that relations among the residents of Lucas were 
good by then, but this was an overly optimistic view of the situation, at best.
280
  As a 
result of the social tensions, physical hardships, isolation, violence, and lack of 
economic opportunities, many parceleiros had already abandoned their plots or were 
in the process of doing so by the end of 1982.  In fact, more than 90 percent of the 
parceleiros would leave Lucas do Rio Verde by the end of 1983, almost without 
exception ‘selling’ their plots to posseiros for the cost of a bus ticket home or to the 
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next settlement.281 These ‘sales’ of land were illegal, since the parceleiros had never 
truly owned their lands; the terms of their contracts with INCRA and the Banco do 
Brasil had deferred transfer of titles to the colonists until five years after settlement. 
They appear, however, to have gone uncontested by the government, not uncommon 
in the region even today.  After all, the main purpose of the settlements from the 
government’s perspective had already been achieved – the land had been delimited 
and entered into the national register for titling, thereby extending the Brazilian 
state’s control of the territory. 
In spite of the exodus of parceleiros, the population of Lucas continued to 
grow and the settlement was granted the status of District in 1985.  One driver of 
continued immigration to Lucas was the opening of branches two cereal processing 
companies - COPACEL and Sementes Palotina - from Paraná.  Another factor was 
that starting in 1982, after the parceleiros started to leave, the local INCRA 
employees sold and gave away rural and urban lots in Lucas indiscriminately.282 
Though these sales and transfers were illegal, ultimately the legal transgressions 
involved in these transactions were absolved or forgotten.  
From the point of view of the land tenure and regularization priorities of the 
government, the settlement was successful even though the majority of the settlers 
left.  The cumbersome, contentious and legally ambiguous process of converting the 
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lands in Lucas from terras devolutas to parcels that could be privately owned and 
farmed had been completed.  After the settlement in 1981-1982, though, federal 
involvement in the settlement of Lucas was nearly complete. In 1985, INCRA 
brought 10 families from São Gabriel do Oeste, Mato Grosso do Sul. They also got 
200 hectare lots, but from this point on, settlement and development in Lucas became 
essentially a private endeavor, facilitated by the government only in terms of 
favorable conditions for the growth of the agro-industrial sector, as discussed further 
in Chapter 6.  
Lucas was legally elevated to the status of municipality on 4 July 1988 (State 
Law no. 5.318), counting 5,500 inhabitants at the time.  These legal milestones for the 
city did not come easily, as Diamantino and other neighboring municipalities were 
reluctant to cede their land and shares of resources to the newly forming city of 
Lucas.283 Moreover, the residents of early Lucas had to grapple with the history of 
social and physical violence among their neighbors.
284
  This history left scars in the 
social fabric of the new town that are still visible today, in the discrepancies between 
the official history of settlement as told by municipal sources and the stories told by 
early settlers, both those who stayed and those who left.   
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. He basically thinks the bad things that happened 
here were because of greed.  
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Rapid changes in property ownership due to high turnover of settlers of Lucas 
in the 1980s also brought changes to society.  During the 1980s, early settlers report, 
links among communities in the region were strong.  In spite of the violence among 
some persons and groups, in general, settlers on the frontier relied on one another to 
accomplish large and small tasks, fomenting relationships among the families of early 
settlers in the region that remain strong today.  The frequent sale of land and the 
resultant concentration of land as people bought up their departing neighbors’ lands 
had the effect of creating more closed communities and weakened the links among 
settlements in the region.285 The lasting influence of this process is also apparent 
today.  Long-time residents and “founders” of Lucas continue to be extremely 
influential in town, and local and regional leadership frequently positions itself as 
protecting local interests against damaging or out-of-touch economic and 
environmental efforts by state and federal governments.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The military government was eager to industrialize the country’s agricultural 
sector in order to become more self-sufficient and to capture profits from 
international markets.286 In the mid-20
th
 century, they enacted several policies to this 
end, including the removal of bans on the import of tractors, rural credit programs, 
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minimum price supports and the construction of highways.287 These policies had the 
combined effect of increased land-concentration in the south, the country’s traditional 
bread-basket and of encouraging the development of more mechanized agriculture on 
newly opened land in the Center-West of the country.  Moreover, the military 
government also continued the work of past governments of actively trying to 
populate the Amazon through the creation of organized settlement projects.  These 
developments, in turn, spurred spontaneous migration of smaller-scale and less-
capitalized farmers toward cheaper and more abundant lands to the north.288  There is 
a rich and well-documented literature on unofficial colonization and private and 
hybrid (cooperative) colonization projects that had varying levels of state support.289 
In fact, all three of these kinds of settlement projects – official, private, and 
spontaneous – were incorporated into Brazil’s Land Statute and federal plans for 
development of the Amazon.290  
The conventional view of the authoritarian, state-driven frontier expansion in 
Brazil from a political economic point of view has been the most prominent 
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framework emplyed to describe the settlement and development of the Amazon since 
the 1970s. This view asserts that the frontier of the Amazon has featured a more or 
less linear expansion of capitalism – in which there is an ever increasing level of 
accumulation until the whole place was homogenized, hollowed out, and gobbled up 
by powerful landed interests and capitalism.291 Yet the rural frontiers of the Amazon 
remain diverse and appear to be diversifying further, even years after the expanision 
of captitalism supposedly began. 292  Further problems with this view, illustrated by a 
careful look at the settlement histories of Mato Grosso and Lucas do Rio Verde, 
include the esssentializng nature of the frontier it depicts, the failure of it to address 
the frequently decoupled nature of policy and practice on the frontier, and the  lack of 
space in this view for agency of local actors and non-economic actor motivations.  
In this chapter, the trajectory of development and frontier expansion in Mato 
Grosso, and more specifically, Lucas has been explored and critiqued drawing on 
theories of frontier expansion in the Amazon. The state was an important driving 
force as far back as WWI in the expansion of the economic frontier in Mato Grosso, 
but it did not act in a vacuum. Nor is it possible to trace the linear progression toward 
the state’s goals because these were not static through time or throughout its 
bureaucracy. Moreover, various forces and agencies acting in the region led to the 
recreation of some traditional social structures on the frontier ( in the political-
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economy view), but also created opportunities for new social and economic structures 
to emerge through the process of (re)territorialization of the frontier.  
As for the efforts of the state, its efforts to develop an agriculture industry that 
would link the frontiers of the Amazon to global markets may have in a sense worked 
too well in the end, and despite the resistence and challenges to these plans; the 
generation of new agro-cities and the erosion of the rural/urban divide in post-frontier 
regions has weakened the legitimacy of the state as the state has proven increasingly 
incapable of responding to needs and opportunities generated in the Amazon.  
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CHAPTER IV – THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY IN MATO GROSSO  
Brazil has recently been making strides toward more effective environmental 
policy and management after decades of notorious corruption and ineffective 
enforcement of laws in the environmental arena, particularly in the Amazon. Federal 
laws governing the environment have long been quite progressive in Brazil, 
beginning with the enactment of the Federal Forest Code in 1964, and prior to even 
more developed countries passing laws of comparable scope and strength. Effective 
enforcement and application of these laws, though, especially with regard to limiting 
deforestation, has proven to be elusive, in spite of periodic national- and state-level 
attempts. More recent decentralization of environmental responsibilities to the state 
level has also had uneven results in this regard.  
Given these challenges at the national level, it has long been assumed that 
controlling deforestation would prove to be exceptionally difficult in Mato Grosso, 
which has, since the 1970s, been one of the states most rapidly undergoing land use 
change related to agriculture and ranching,
293
 and where these industries are also the 
predominant drivers of the state’s economy and have formidable political influence, 
which could be leveraged to block environmental policies viewed as threatening to 
these industries. Somewhat surprisingly, though, some of the most visionary and 
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effective developments in terms of environmental law application and enforcement 
have occurred in Mato Grosso – namely, the creation of Sistema de Licenciamento 
Ambiental em Propriedades Rurais/Rural Properties Licensing System (SLAPR) in 
1999, the founding of Lucas Legal in 2006, and the 2009 scaling up of Lucas Legal to 
Mato Grosso Legal (MT Legal). This chapter will explore the evolution of 
environmental legislation and management in Brazil and Mato Grosso as pertains 
most specifically to the present-day situation in Mato Grosso.  State-level, socio-
political factors that help explain the shift in disposition toward environmental 
licensing and monitoring observed in Mato Grosso since 1999 will also be presented.  
 
The federal level 
 
 Environmental regulations set at the federal level set the minimum standards 
for environmental conservation. Most regulations that affect rural producers are 
legislated by the federal Forest Code, a progressive law that has been periodically 
updated but inconsistently and weakly enforced. This has made the Forest Code a 
lightning rod for both environmentalists looking for more rigorous enforcement of the 
instruments in the Code and of a block of agriculturalists looking to strip many of the 
same instruments from the Code. For most rural landowners, consistency between the 
law and enforcement regimes is the main concern. 
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The Forest Code 
 
 Brazil’s current Forest Code has been in effect since 1964, though it has 
undergone several revisions since that time.
294
 In terms of its importance to 
agricultural activities, deforestation, and native vegetative cover more generally, the 
current Forest Code requires all farmers to maintain riparian zones (known as Áreas 
de Preservação Permanente/Permanent Preservation Areas, or APPs) on their 
properties intact, as well as a private reserve (Reserva Legal, or RL) of a certain 
percentage of their land holding, depending on the biome in which it is classified. In 
the humid tropical forest (or “Amazonian”) biome of the Legal Amazon (an 
administrative district), the reserve must total 80 percent of the size of the property; in 
the Cerrado biome inside the Legal Amazon, the reserve must total 35 percent of the 
property; and on all properties outside of the legal Amazon, the reserve must total 20 
percent of the size of the property, these percentages do not include the APPs – they 
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are in addition to them.
295
  These reserve requirements are ambitious; properties in 
compliance with the reserve requirements are the exception rather than the rule.
296
  
 The Forest Code, now viewed as a fairly progressive environmental 
instrument, dates from the 1960s when less than 1% of the Amazon region was 
deforested
297
 and Brazil was under a military dictatorship. However, Brazil’s military 
period was not known for its progressiveness in terms of the environment or 
otherwise. Thus, it is worth asking - why would the generals pass such a sweeping 
piece of environmental legislation, especially given their contemporaneously and 
contradictory strategizing regarding developing the Amazon for foreign and domestic 
investment,
298
 extraction of natural resources, bolstering against potential “guerilla 
subversion”, and bolstering their legitimacy by finally “unifying” the whole of the 
country via the “fervent ideology of modernization”?
299
  It appears that these 
inconsistencies in the generals’ objectives are precisely the reasons that such a law 
could be enacted.  
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 The Amazon was still largely viewed as “virtually unpopulated,”
300
 (the “land 
without people” as the saying went
301
) and, thus, remote from the realities of 
individual land ownership in the 1960s. As such, the prohibitions on land use, perhaps 
intended all along to only be enforced at some later date, would have easily gone 
without objection because they would have seemed “insignificant”
302
 to many due to 
their apparently hypothetical nature. The much smaller percentages for areas outside 
of the Amazon with many already established properties appear to have never been 
consistently or rigorously enforced, which perhaps served early on as a reassurance to 
agricultural groups that subsequent settlement in the Amazon would not be limited by 
this law.  
 Taking another view, as the generals were evidently aware of the importance 
of natural resources to Brazil’s development, this law may be perceived not as a way 
to protect the environment, but as a way to ensure that natural resources (in this case, 
forests and land) would be available for later stages in the country’s development. In 
this way, the law is part of a discursive project, common to industrializing nations, to 
demarcate, quantify, and define nature in such a way that it could be incorporated into 
industrial projects.
303
 On the other hand, if the law was, indeed, more about 
environmental protection than natural resource rationing, it is evident in any case that 
the law reflects the dominant view of conservation at that time, which, in the words of 
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Ferreira, “did not consider the human dimension in conservation strategies.”
304
 While 
the military government was hardly known for its environmentalism, neither was it 
known for its humanism; if land and forests were determined to be of national import, 
individual rights over that land would hardly have been an obstacle for this 
government.  
 And yet, though it is little discussed today, there is historical reason to believe 
that environmental conservation might have registered on the generals’ radar even in 
the 1960s. Brazil had, by the 1960s, witnessed the near total destruction of the 
Atlantic Forest; legislation like the Forest Code calling for the creation of large 
protected areas and restrictions on private use could serve as a tool to prevent the loss 
of other biomes,
305
 though given the uneven enforcement of the law, these 
conservation concerns were likely only secondary to more resource management-
oriented motivations as discussed above. Ferreira suggests that the blatant 
“loopholes” written into the law are codified proof that environmental conservation 
was not, in fact, a prime motivation for the law:  
 
[a]lthough the land owners were obligated to maintain a certain 
minimum percentage of native vegetation, there were no restrictions 
on the sale of the forested area, that, once acquired, could be newly 
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deforested respecting the limits [percentages of forest required on a 
property] and so on and so forth.
306
  
 
In this interpretation, the Forest Code appears from the outside to be a piece of 
environmental legislation but actually serves as a tool to encourage rent-seeking 
behavior in land purchasing: each purchase and sale added value to the land by 
increasing the amount of land that could be deforested. Of course, this legal 
positioning was really of little consequence because, as has been amply documented, 
the restrictions on deforestation set forth in Forest Code have historically been 
notoriously poorly enforced.
307
  
 Furthermore, whatever the true motivations for the law on the part of the 
government, because the country was under a dictatorship instead of democratic rule, 
objection to such a law on any grounds by the populace would have been highly 
unlikely. The foreign and domestic elites who sympathized with the military rulers 
were receiving plenty of kickbacks related to the Amazon – in the form of tax breaks, 
land concessions, and favorable terms of trade, credit, and loans – in the simultaneous 
promotion of development in the region and elsewhere in the country,
308
 so they had 
little incentive to object to the law. The more humble classes lacked the power to 
object, and even still, they too eventually received their piece of the Amazon in the 
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form of settlement projects to occupy the region, although these settlement projects 
were poorly executed and, in hindsight, seemed designed to fail from the 
beginning.
309
  
 
A federal legacy of weak enforcement 
  
Until the 1980s, after the return of democracy in Brazil, the requirements of the 
Forest Code were essentially inconsequential to the majority of activities taking place 
in and around the Amazon due to lack of enforcement, as mentioned above. 
Development initiatives have at various times aimed to populate the Amazon for 
national security reasons, incorporating the area into the national economy (“Integrar 
para não entregar,” or “Integrate to not hand over”), alleviating population pressures 
on the coasts, and providing agricultural and natural resource commodities for 
consumption in the major population centers and abroad (See chapter 3). On the 
whole, these development initiatives have had significant and negative impacts on the 
environment, as well as yielding mixed results in terms of their development goals. 
These projects have played major roles in deforestation, massive carbon releases, 
threatening biodiversity and altering soil and hydrological resources in the Amazon 
(which includes both the humid-tropical forest biome and the Cerrado biome).  
 The federal requirement for licensing of environmental activities in rural areas 
began in 1983, following the passage of a law in 1981 (L6938/81) bestowing the 
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responsibility for licensing on state agencies under a National System for the 
Environment (SISNEMA), and eventually supporting the quite visionary formation of 
a National Environmental Council (CONAMA) to recommend policies and 
coordinate action among different levels of government (federal, municipal, and state) 
and non-state actors.
 310
 The timing of this move, at the beginning of a period of 
transition from the military dictatorship to democracy, was key, as the federal 
government was systematically relinquishing power to ease the transition and, as one 
observer has noted, was likely also seeking to relieve itself of obligations in light of 
the economic crisis during that period.
311
 Unfortunately, the law was unclear about 
which level of government was to be responsible for which tasks, thereby setting a 
precedent of vagueness that would undermine many future environmental laws in 
Brazil.
 312
   
 Following the SISNEMA legislation, the 1980s in Brazil was a watershed 
period for the creation of environmental laws and for environmental activism, though 
these achievements did not always translate into improved environmental protection. 
As Hochstetler and Keck have clearly documented, the transition to democracy 
during the 1980s created new opportunities for environmentalism, in both the state 
and extra-state realms. Among these changes were the formation of the Green Party, 
the passage of several laws relating to the federal organization of environmental 
agencies, and the return of many environmental activists from abroad following an 
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amnesty granted in 1979 to persons in exile for their opposition to the military 
government.
313
 Democratization has not, however, proved to be either “unidirectional 
[n]or unilinear” for environmental conservation objectives.
314
 Rapid political change 
and social problems tied to stark inequality variously complicated, diffused, and 
intensified different elements of the Brazilian environmental movement. The strong 
tradition of federalism in Brazilian politics (featured in all eight of Brazil’s 
constitutions) has also been influential, though again, in sundry and changing ways. 
The infamous Brazilian bureaucracy that results from the federalist division of power 
into multiple jurisdictions has, after all, the effect of both increasing the opportunities 
for political conflict over policies, confusion, and inefficiencies, as well as allowing 
for input from more varied actors at various levels.
315
  
 
Progressive laws and their discontents  
 
Corruption and more general mismanagement of funds and power in federal 
agencies have seriously undercut the effectiveness of even promising environmental 
laws in Brazil – a situation that seems to have reached its nadir in the 1990s. Stories 
of corrupt officials have been well documented in the press, though infrequently 
studied and documented in academic literature.
316
 The Brazilian government began to 
address this situation in earnest in 2003. Between 2003 and 2006, for example, 90 
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IBAMA (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais 
Renováveis/Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Resources) 
officials were fired for corruption and another 300 were otherwise disciplined, 
whereas between 1989 and 2002 only 10 IBAMA officials lost their jobs for 
corruption, in spite of widespread public knowledge of corruption during this time 
period.
317
  
Other challenges faced by Brazilian environmental agencies include the 
contradictory nature of their charges with respect to missions such as development, of 
other agencies,
318
 and the high level of susceptibility to outside influence fostered by 
the high number of appointed positions in environmental agencies.
319
  Appointed 
positions are, of course, more easily filled with individuals who might be disposed to 
look the other way in the case of a violation of the law by the lawmakers who 
appointed them. A related issue is the high level of turnover these appointed positions 
create in environmental agencies;
320
 when different people move into positions every 
time there is an election, continuity of programs and commitment to undertaking long 
term projects both suffer. Another issue was the refusal of the federal government to 
comprehensively address the environmental issue at any point after the transition to 
civilian rule. In the words of Hochstetler and Keck: 
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The content of [environmental] reforms [since the transition to 
democracy] shows a profound uncertainty about the definition of 
environmental issue: Are they basically urban? About natural resource 
development – or their conservation? Instead of projecting a holistic 
vision of environmental concerns, each reform emphasized one piece 
or another of the environmental agenda. Major institutional 
restructuring every two years, on average, undermined the agencies’ 
sense of mission and direction.
321
 
 
Environmental management in the Brazilian Amazon has been heavily 
influenced by federal legislation (as opposed to state legislation). Federal law has 
addressed issues such as natural resource management and the establishment of 
protected areas – issues that predominate in the Amazon, while states have 
traditionally legislated more urban issues like pollution control, which have so far 
been less important in the Amazon.
322
 State agencies take their authority largely from 
powers granted to them by the federal government, then, and have become somewhat 
more empowered since the mid-2000s when the federal government began actively 
seeking to decentralize control over environmental and other issues. As for Mato 
Grosso, the state signed a Pacto Federativo (Federative Pact ) in 2005 which 
specifically granted the state control over environmental licensing and led to the 
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creation of the first state-level environmental licensing system in Brazil, SLAPR, 
discussed in greater detail below. 
McAllister has identified three ways that environmental agencies (federal and 
state) act under the authority of environmental laws – issuing environmental permits 
or licenses, performing inspections, and imposing penalties or fines for 
noncompliance.
323
 In practice, this has often meant three different opportunities for 
environmental agencies to fail to fulfill their obligations, be it through corruption or 
lack of capacity. There is some evidence, though, that the capacity of environmental 
management is improving in recent years as a series of laws and decrees granting 
more autonomy and reach to various government agencies and to the public 
attorney’s office have been passed and as these three aspects of environmental 
management have become much more closely linked. The next section will explore 
how these three aspects have become more integrated in Mato Grosso and what this 
has meant for the effectiveness and evolution of environmental management there. 
 
Mato Grosso 
 
 As a state with an economy heavily dependent on agriculture, ranching, and 
mining, Mato Grosso may be viewed as an unlikely site for innovations in 
environmental licensing and monitoring. On the other hand, its bursts of 
progressiveness in licensing and monitoring of rural activities can be traced precisely 
                                                          
323
 Ibid., 42. 
157 
 
to its need for these types of institutions that meet the needs of the stakeholders who 
participate in them. Innovations in environmental licensing at the state level in Mato 
Grosso have been obscured by the corruption that has plagued the state government 
and by failure to execute well the institutions, but the efforts of the state of Mato 
Grosso beginning in the 1990s form an important part of the technical and 
institutional legacy of the Lucas Legal project.  
 
Unique Environmental License  
 
 Mato Grosso was the first Brazilian state to institute a state-level 
environmental license for rural activities including agriculture, the legal framework 
for which was initiated in 1995 with Lei Complementar 38.
324
 This law marks the 
first appearance of the Licença Única Ambiental (Unique Environmental License - 
LAU), which currently features in licensing in several states, including Mato Grosso 
and Pará, and was included in heated negotiations for revisions of the Forest Code in 
2011. The creation of LAU was meant to give teeth to the Forest Code in Mato 
Grosso, until this point basically unenforced, by officially linking environmental 
management to individual properties in a real way and prohibiting any further 
deforestation outside of the percentages of each property allowed in the Forest Code 
and, crucially, tying environmental licensing to the legal registration of properties.
325
 
                                                          
324
 Azevedo, "Legítimação da sustentabilidade? Análise do Sistema de Licenciamento Ambiental de 
Propriedades Rurais - SLAPR (Mato Grosso)," 67. 
325
 Ibid. 
158 
 
 As outlined in the Forest Code, the unit for licensing was thereby set at the 
“unidade produtiva” (productive unit), or, in other words, the property. GIS and 
ground-truthing were to be used to track activities on individual properties and 
provide the information needed for licensing. The LAU was to be complemented by a 
deforestation licensing system, whereby the producer would have to apply for official 
permission to deforest on his property, even if he had not yet surpassed the allowed 
percentage on his land. Thus, the Mato Grosso approach would be two-pronged: the 
LAU, once fully instituted, would freeze deforestation in place with every property 
meeting or exceeding federal rules for Legal Reserve sizes, and the deforestation 
licenses would allow state certification and tracking of all future deforestation.  
 The problem was that, faced with the task of licensing all of the properties of 
Mato Grosso, it soon became clear to FEMA (Fundação Estadual de Meio 
Ambiente/State Environmental Foundation) officials that the more than 30-year gap 
between the creation of the Forest Code and the creation of the LAU, particularly the 
large amount of settlement that took place in Mato Grosso during that time, meant 
that there was a staggering amount of vegetation that had been cleared already and 
that there needed to be some workable legal solution to this. With that in mind, in 
2000, Mato Grosso passed law 7330, creating the possibility for landowners to 
“compensate” past environmental transgressions in state-held Unidades de 
Conservaçao (Conservation Units), or UCs, an option not included in the Forest Code 
or other federal legislation. 
159 
 
 The UC solution was something of a challenge to the Federal Forest Code in 
two ways – 1) it called attention to the inadequacy of the Forest Code in providing 
solutions in situations in which there were transgressions and 2) the Forest Code had 
always been assumed to require that Forest Reserves were to be private and the sole 
responsibility of the property owner. Now, the possibility for servidão ambiental, or 
making up for excess deforestation by renting a forested area or paying money into a 
state-managed fund, had been created. In 2001, the federal government followed 
Mato Grosso’s lead and with federal provisional regulation 2166-67/2001, 
landholders nationwide gained the right to satisfy their forest requirements via a 
forest reserve located on another property. This law also opened the possibility for 
one’s reserve to be owned by someone else, which in turn created a possibility for a 
market in legal reserve rights, a market previously impossible under Brazilian law. 
 Shifting set-aside requirements also hampered efforts at licensing and 
increased farmer resentment of environmental regulation. From 1964 until 2000, the 
Forest Code required 50 percent reserves in the “Amazon,” defined inexplicitly but 
understood to be the North region and the northern part of the Center-West (above 
parallel 13).  Everywhere else, RL was 20percent. In 2000, a law was passed 
changing the required amount of RL to 80percent in the Amazon, 35percent in the 
rest of the Legal Amazon and 20percent outside of the Amazon. Meanwhile, in 1989, 
the government increased the significance of violating these requirements, declaring 
transgressions of the law to be environmental crimes, whereas before they had simply 
been administrative infractions. 
160 
 
 
Federal pacts 
  
 In 1999, the state of Mato Grosso signed a Pacto Federativo with the national 
government, effectively granting the state agency FEMA the right to police the 
environmental activities of the state.  Under the pact, properties larger than 200ha (in 
other words, the vast majority of properties in Mato Grosso, where even the 
MST/agrarian reform settlements are often at least 200ha) would be governed by 
FEMA, while IBAMA would control small-holder licensing.
326
 In 2005, a new pact 
was signed, transferring licensing responsibilities for all properties, regardless of size, 
to the state. In theory, the federative pacts mean that as long as environmental 
activities in Mato Grosso were held at least to the level of the standards set by the 
federal government in the Forest Code, federal agents should not be involved in 
enforcement and fining of rural producers and other activities in Mato Grosso.   
 Unfortunately, FEMA was plagued by corruption and inefficiencies that 
impeded its ability to effectively carry out licensing and enforcement. The corruption, 
in particular, did nothing to improve the image of FEMA in the eyes of Mato 
Grosso’s farmers and land owners, an image that was already poor (see Chapter 6). 
Therefore, farmers’ willingness to comply with its regulations, given that compliance 
usually came at the expense of profits, was also low.  Farmers knew that if they were 
to be fined (unlikely, in any case, due to the expanse of the state and the few 
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resources available to FEMA agents); the going-rate for a bribe to have the fine 
disappear was around 10 percent of the total value of the fine. Corruption was so 
prevalent that farmers report that they were basically obligated to enter into bribery if 
they were fined – the fines were significant and the agencies were so corrupt that one 
could not fight the charges legitimately.  Moreover, if a famer declined to bribe, he 
found himself at a significant competitive disadvantage to his neighbors, who had 
likely bribed their way out of the full costs of compliance with the law.
327
  
 In 2005, Federal Police and IBAMA busted a major ring of illegal timber 
harvesting and selling based in Mato Grosso. Among those arrested were the 
president of FEMA, Moacir Pires, and the superintendent of IBAMA in Mato Grosso, 
Hugo José Scheuer Werle, along with more than 80 other loggers, agents, officials 
and businesspeople. The sting, known as Operation Curupira, was a watershed event 
in forest management in Mato Grosso and carried significant consequences for 
environmental management in general in Mato Grosso, even for sectors besides 
forestry, including ranching and agriculture. This was the first major action on the 
part of the government to end the deep-seated corruption that had forestalled attempts 
to control the impacts of environmental change in rural areas (further detailed in 
Chapter 6).  
 Operation Curupira led to the dissolution of FEMA and the creation of SEMA 
(Secretaria Estadual do Meio Ambiente/State Environmental Secretariat) (under law 
214 (23/06/2005)). The creation of SEMA included the reaffirmation of the 
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Federative Pact between the government of Mato Grosso and the federal government, 
in principle, affirmed the responsibility of Mato Grosso for managing its own forest 
resources. In reality, incongruence between the missions of INCRA and IBAMA,
328
 
lack of transparency in processes related to land titling and licensing, a lack of 
resources, and lack of coordination with IBAMA plagued SEMA from the beginning 
and rendered the agency less effective than it might have been given its strong 
mandate. 
 
The unlikely providence of state-level environmental licensing in Mato Grosso 
  
 The organization of Mato Grosso’s state environmental agencies and the legal 
requirements and opportunities for licensing the state’s rural properties underwent 
substantial changes in the 2000s – so, too, did environmental licensing and 
monitoring processes. The first, and most fundamental of these was the establishment 
of SLAPR in 1999. SLAPR was the first targeted attempt in Brazil at licensing and 
monitoring activities on rural properties on the basis of geo-referenced property 
boundaries and regular satellite monitoring. Permits for legal deforestation up to the 
limits defined by the federal Forest Code were tied to this licensing process. Thus, 
SLAPR was meant to create the first, complete geo-database of properties and 
APPs/RLs in the state, as well as an inventory of deforestable land.  The second goal, 
though, was lost on many landowners in Mato Grosso, who viewed the program as a 
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threat and evidently preferred to take their chances with illegal deforestation rather 
than enroll in the program to get permits for clearing. 
 From one point of view, the emergence of a more comprehensive approach to 
environmental management in Mato Grosso is unsurprising and reflects, if predates 
slightly, an emerging trend toward more comprehensive solutions to environmental 
degradation in Brazil. The traditional, fining-only approach has proven to be almost 
completely ineffective in terms of environmental enforcement in Mato Grosso. 
Andrea Aguiar Azevedo has done meticulous work documenting metrics related to 
the efficiency of operations of SEMA-MT. According to Azevedo, the average 
proportion of fines actually received by the state versus the fines levied in the years 
for which she has data, 2005-2007, is 7 percent;
329
 the received/applied proportion 
drops to a mere 2.8 percent when looking only at fines related to deforestation in 
Legal Reserves (the main aspect of environmental legislation dealt with by Lucas 
Legal). Looking further back, the effective payment rate of environmental fines in 
Mato Grosso for 2001-2003, as calculated by the federal Ministry of the 
Environment, was only 6.2 percent,
330
 indicating that the figures calculated by 
Azevedo were not anomalous. They are also consistent with reports I received from 
informants during my time in the field in Mato Grosso. In 1998, the passage of the 
federal Environmental Crimes Law created the possibility for criminal prosecution for 
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environmental crimes, but this is typically used as an option of last resort,
331
 and in 
any case, massive arrests of landowners and farmers would hardly be a productive 
approach to maintaining economic growth while pursuing more effective 
environmental compliance. 
 And yet, the creation of SLAPR in Mato Grosso in 1999 was unexpected for 
several reasons. First, prior to 1999, there had been very little organized effort on the 
part of the state to control the rapid deforestation taking place in Mato Grosso since 
the 1970s.
332
 SLAPR, far from being a cautious step toward geo-based licensing, 
represented an expensive and extensive investment in satellite imagery, technological 
infrastructure, and staff. The cost of the program was about R$6 million per year (~3 
million USD/year), though most of these costs were covered by the World Bank-
funded PRODEAGRO loan program and grants from the PPG7 (Pilot Program to 
Conserve the Brazilian Rainforest).
333
  
 A second curiosity concerning the emergence of SLAPR in Mato Grosso in 
1999 was that it came to be not with the election of a new, more environmentally-
concerned state government, but in the middle of a governor’s tenure. This governor, 
Dante de Oliveira (1995-2003),
334
 had previously shown little interest in deforestation 
and related issues.
335
 According to Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff’s political economic 
interpretation of SLAPR’s creation, the reason for de Oliveira’s sudden interest in 
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environmental licensing and monitoring was not due to a sudden concern about 
deforestation so much as a desire to leverage PPG7 funding for the project as a 
springboard to other international funds for improving infrastructure and other 
services in the state.
336
 Indeed, Wertz-Kanounnikoff reports that supplemental funds 
from the PRODEAGRO loan seem to have freed up state monies to fund 
improvements to the state’s water supply, rural electrification, and road 
improvements.
337
 Azevedo seems to concur, suggesting that SLAPR was two projects 
in one: both an environmental and an economic project. In this view, the monitoring 
aspect of SLAPR, which was more explicitly environmentally-positive than the 
licensing aspect of the project, was more weakly supported by the state government, 
even under de Oliveira. The licensing aspect, on the other hand, offered clear 
economic benefits to farmers and the state, as licensing would create more 
opportunities for legal deforestation, and so, received greater support.
338
  
 The program was enacted after de Oliveira’s reelection to his second and final 
term as governor, and it is reasonable to assume, given the growing economic and 
political clout of agricultural interests in the state of Mato Grosso at that time, that de 
Oliveira would have faced difficulties being reelected had the program been instituted 
earlier in his tenure as governor. As it was, it took “[s]ubstantial state-level political 
support” to implement SLAPR in the milieu of the unsurprisingly “strong opposition 
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of the state-deputies who were mostly rural producers.”
339
 A final factor that likely 
contributed to the successful implementation of SLAPR was friendship between de 
Oliveira and the State Secretary of the Environment, and their mutual respect based 
on their common professional background in civil engineering.
 340
 Given these 
factors, the election in 2002 of Blairo Maggi, a major agricultural producer and 
landowner, appears to have been, at least partially, a referendum on SLAPR, which 
Azevedo believes was seen by the rural producers bloc “as a strictly environmental 
project whose objective was to do them harm,” instead of the economic/commercial 
endeavor as it had been presented by the de Oliveira administration.
341
  
 In fact, so dissatisfied with the state government were the rural producers at 
the time that SLAPR was created, they organized and presented a plebiscite (PDC 
495/2003) on the issue of separating the northern part of Mato Grosso (where the 
economy is almost exclusively tied to farming, ranching, and to a certain extent, 
logging) from the southern part of the state where the capital is located and where 
agriculture, in particular, plays a less prominent role. The plebiscite eventually failed, 
perhaps due to the election of Maggi, whose interests aligned closely with those of 
the rural producers in the North, but their dissatisfaction with the direction of the 
government in Cuiabá had been registered. Indeed, funding to SLAPR quickly dried 
up after Maggi took office, though environmental licensing and monitoring continued 
quietly without the banner of the SLAPR program over it.  
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 In any case, SLAPR and subsequent environmental licensing in Mato Grosso 
hardly turned out to be the crushing blow to the agricultural sector that some had 
feared it would be. André Lima and Alicia Rolla of the Instituto Socioambiental 
determined that FEMA managed to license properties totaling approximately 17 
percent of the total land area of the state during the four years that the project was 
fully functional, 2001-2004, and that even for properties in the program, the licenses 
did little to curb deforestation and in fact, seem to have had the opposite effect.
342
 
They found that, based on INPE’s deforestation data for 2003-2004, 2.15 percent of 
the total area of private properties not enrolled in SLAPR was deforested, while 
within the total area covered by the SLAPR program, 3.21 percent was deforested and 
1.75 percent of the total registered RLs were deforested illegally,
343
 though only 
forest (not cerrado) areas as detected by PRODES/INPE were part of the analysis.
344
 
It is unknown how effective SLAPR would look if Cerrado data were incorporated. 
On the other hand, some scholars, including Fearnside, have hailed SLAPR has 
highly effective and cite talk from the federal level of environmental management 
about extending the SLAPR system to “all of Amazonia based on the experience in 
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the Mato Grosso” [sic].
345
 Wertz-Kanounnikoff also found that SLAPR had a positive 
effect on reducing deforestation.
346
 
 Though a full assessment of the precise environmental outcomes of SLAPR is 
unavailable, retrospection on the process of implementing the program and of the 
inefficiencies of FEMA/SEMA in general are available. Many of the current 
misgivings about the project seem to be institutional and technical in nature, as 
opposed to political. For example, the first years of the SLAPR program relied on 
manual interpretation of LANDSAT-TM imagery by staffers to detect deforestation, 
which involves magnifying an image on the computer screen and manually tracing 
over the features with a curser to detect changes in the vegetation since the last 
year,
347
– hardly a reliable and consistent long-term method for such a large area (the 
state of Mato Grosso is over 900,000 km
2
). Moreover, there were serious problems 
with the images and the geographic databases available for the region. Lacking the 
capacity to do the work in house, SEMA contracted a company called Tecnomapas 
(http://www.tecnomapas.com.br) in 2000 to create a cartographic database at 
1:100,000 scale, using the national-level survey data from Radar da Amazônia 
(RADAM) that comprised the state’s hydrographic database, to use as their “primary 
material” for georeferencing the satellite images.
348
 This database was not approved 
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by the DSG (Serviço Geográfico do Exército/Geographic Service of the Army), 
though, citing lack of procedural and methodological documentation and poor 
scanning equipment, so the SEMA database was never reconciled with the national 
level database held by IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geográfica e 
Estadídsticas/Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), and as of 2007, still 
was not.
349
 In any case, the “primary material” hydrographic database is based on 
survey data from the 1960s and 1970s and is inaccurate and out of date.
350
  
 The only other complete geographic database for the state is the one created 
by SEPLAN (Secretaria de Planejamento/Secretary of Planning ) via ZSEE 
(Zoneamento Socioeconômico Ecológico/ Socioeconomic Ecological Zoning), at the 
scale of 1:250,000, but the resolution of this database is far too course for property-
level analysis. In fact, even the geodatabase made by Teconmapas (but rejected by the 
army) is too low in resolution for meaningful property-level analysis. In general, a 
lack of data with appropriate resolution, as well as deslocamento (dislocation, or the 
failure of layers to correctly match up) have plagued licensing efforts in Mato Grosso. 
Thus, precise property boundaries were often impossible to define during the 
licensing process, making property areas, and consequently, RL areas as a percentage 
of the property area, impossible to precisely calculate. Under SLAPR, up to 120 
meters of dislocation and 80 meters of tolerance in cases of overlap were accepted 
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due to the low resolution of the maps,
351
 which could easily lead to considerable error 
in property and Legal Reserve size estimates. Delays in receiving the licenses were 
also considerable due to these complications. 
 Over time, and in spite of farmer resistance to licensing, reasons for farmers to 
be interested in licensing became apparent as license applications gradually 
accumulated and as pressure to get licensed after being fined or in order to access 
rural credit increased. This greatly increased pressure on FEMA to improve their 
methods to more efficiently process all the licenses, even as they were provided little 
support. This became particularly true after 2005, when a new federative pact 
transferred licensing responsibilities for all properties, including small properties of 
less than 200ha, which previously had been excluded from FEMA’s purview, to 
SEMA (née FEMA). These developments further crystalized the technical problems 
related to the mapping and licensing, and according to Azevedo, led to a move by 
SEMA in 2008 to require certification from INCRA regarding one’s property title in 
order to apply for the LAU.  
 This move was apparently an effort on the part of SEMA to reduce the flow 
and backlog of applications, which could take years to process. In the words of 
Azevedo: 
 
[b]ecause the certification is difficult to get, for various reasons...the 
same criteria as the [INCRA] certification came to be established [with 
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SEMA]: precision GPS measurement (geodetic) and declaration of 
boundaries [of the property] within a reasonable buffer. Preference 
was given to projects that entered with these specifications met. This 
caused a long time period (5 to 10 years) for the correction of the 
database.
352
 
 
In other words, after decades of environmental agency missions being undercut by 
competing and contradicting institutional mandates on the part of other types of 
agencies (like INCRA, which historically relied heavily on the Land Statute to require 
land owners to deforest excessively), requiring properties to be vetted by INCRA 
alleviated some of the burden on SEMA. In fact, this was a rather cunning example of 
self-defensive behavior and blame shifting in the face of substantial problems in the 
process. Now, future backlogs would be the fault of INCRA, who many landowners 
were quick to blame in any case due the agency’s history of poor project execution, 
and even violence in the region (See Chapter 6).
353
  
Who to blame for SLAPR’s failure? 
  
 Azevedo suggests that when Mato Grosso signed its first Federative Pact in 
1999 and took on the responsibility of environmental licensing, the state inherited a 
complex set of internal and external pressures regarding the management of rural 
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areas. Pressure on Brazil to better protect forests had grown considerably through the 
1980s and 1990s, and, by 1999, it was clear that a strictly developmentalist approach 
without concern for the environment was no longer acceptable. Democratization had 
created space in the political scene for both homegrown and foreign/international 
environmental activism in the country and for a larger scientific voice in public 
policy.
354
  
 The state of Mato Grosso could have avoided or put off the environmental 
question at the time of SLAPR. For example, it might have focused more narrowly on 
the type of development advocated by the agricultural bloc, which ostensibly held 
sway comparable to international environmental interests.
355
 Instead, though, the state 
opted to place the deforestation issue prominently in the public agenda, in order to 
capitalize on political legitimacy it stood to gain from pulling in funds from the 
national and the international sphere.
356
 In implementing SLAPR, the de Oliveira 
government was not truly interested in reigning in agricultural production. Instead, de 
Oliveira and his allies took a calculated risk of disregarding the interests of one power 
bloc (land-owners) in favor of the interests of another bloc (international funding 
groups) that they perceived would provide them greater latitude to act in the future. 
 Another controversial aspect of SLAPR was the fact that the government 
contracted out most of this work, a move for which the state was heavily criticized. 
From the point of view of proponents of the outsourcing, Tecnomapas had a clear 
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capacity to quickly do work that the state was under-prepared to do.
357
 Once the 
federal government “punted” the issue of deforestation down to Mato Grosso in 1999, 
the state found to match the technological level of federal-level INPE in order to 
produce useable maps, which had been monitoring the Amazon biome since 1988 
with satellites,
358
 though apparently without having access to INPE’s data. In this 
view, the state outsourced the work in order to “compete” with and accelerate its 
independence from the federal government in a grasp for greater legitimacy. In doing 
so, though, it opened itself up to criticism for not having the capacity to do its own 
work and not being transparent. It also missed what could have been a crucial 
opportunity to integrate licensing of forests with other environmental issues such as 
game management and management of water resources.
359
 The result of having a 
company in charge of the license was that the lack of capacity in the public sector was 
self-perpetuating and no institutional memory was created in the state agencies – the 
public employees did not understand anything about the licenses or the mapping and 
so they “just signed” the licenses without developing effective improvements to the 
process as it went on.
360
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The meaning of SLAPR for Lucas Legal and MT Legal 
  
 SLAPR has been roundly criticized for its lack of transparency, the degree of 
involvement of contractors in the process, and its lack of effectiveness. Yet, though 
not explicitly recognized as such by the architects of Lucas Legal and MT Legal, it 
was a precursor to these programs and must have influenced their design, and it 
would have been well-known to all landowners in Mato Grosso in the mid-2000s. 
Thus, the story of SLAPR (actually the first satellite-monitoring-based environmental 
licensing system in Mato Grosso, and, indeed, in Brazil) can give us some important 
insights into the institutional logic of the design of Lucas Legal and of pursuing 
greater environmental control over the rural sector when the rural sector was the clear 
driver of economic growth and a formidable political force in general. 
 Azevedo argues that the creation of SLAPR was far from being an endeavor 
based on ideals of environmental conservation. Instead, it was part of a broader 
strategy on the part of the state government to contend with a still rapidly expanding 
agricultural frontier at a time when this kind of unabashed “developmentalist 
approach was continually losing legitimacy.”
361
 Wertz-Kanounnikoff agrees, noting 
that under the leadership of de Oliveira, the interests of international donors (i.e., 
environmental interests) held sway due to their part in a larger strategy for 
development held by the administration and due to the temporary lack of influence of 
the rural producers bloc given that de Oliveira would not be up for reelection again 
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after SLAPR was established.
362
 On the other hand, after Maggi took office in 2002, 
the availability of international funding for environmental projects diminished in 
Mato Grosso,
363
 and licensing and monitoring once again became secondary to 
agricultural development in the discourse of the state. 
 Regarding the practical and institutional challenges that ultimately marred the 
legacy of SLAPR and contributed to its end, at least two possible explanations can be 
considered. The simplest is that, given the novelty of this project, the learning curve 
was bound to be steep, particularly in the context of a poorly staffed government 
agency. Unfortunately, more comprehensive numbers were unavailable to the author 
at the time of writing, but a snapshot of the staffing situation at SEMA as detailed in a 
report by the non-profit Instituto Centro de Vida (ICV), funded by the Packard 
Foundation and USAID, indicates that in 2008-2009 there were at most 45 total 
employees and interns at SEMA involved in monitoring for the entire state of Mato 
Grosso,
364
 a small number indeed when the large size of the state and the complexity 
of monitoring wide-scale land use change in an area with 3 or 4 distinct biomes. 
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that during the first half of the 2000s, there were 
even fewer employees involved as government commitment to environmental issues 
was even less consistent and well-defined then, and due to the fact that the flagship 
environmental project in Mato Grosso, SLAPR, was largely outsourced as described 
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above. Thus, a rapid and effective implementation of such a complex program was 
bound to face challenges.  
 Another, more cynical explanation is that the de Oliveira administration (and 
FEMA at the time) understood that the project would come with high political costs 
and purposefully implemented it in a less than efficient manner in order to deflect 
some of the backlash. Azevedo has suggested that the de Oliveira administration 
attempted to frame the project as apolitical and inevitable by emphasizing its 
technological aspects and deemphasizing its political aspects. Drawing on the work of 
Habermas, she notes that the “in a technocratic society, instrumental interests 
overpower the emancipatory interest, creating the myth of science and 
technology…which is more flexible than [often] understood by political actors and 
need not be transformed into a black box,”
365
 although it frequently is. In other words, 
if a political power faces uncertainty in a confrontation, presenting the issue as 
scientific or technical can dampen objections. Of course, technology does not 
determine what is legal or illegal, or even what counts as deforestation: people do, 
and in this case, the people who determined it were not even public officials.  
 Furthermore, the (unsurprising) inefficiencies in applying the technology 
(satellite monitoring and geo-referenced property lines) to the on-the-ground situation 
in Mato Grosso in some ways allowed the state to have its cake and eat it, too, so to 
speak: the state could take a suddenly hardline stance on environmental issues by 
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requiring licenses in order to carry out rural activities – so hardline, in fact, that no 
grace period was offered for landowners to undertake the work required to get their 
properties into compliance – and impress international funding-agencies with 
newfound environmental predilections. At the same time, the technological (and 
indeed, outsourced) challenges faced by the project allowed the “targeted,” but also 
economy-driving agri-ranching sector, to largely continue to conduct business as 
usual, thereby reducing and deflecting the blame directed at the state government. Of 
course, in the end, de Oliveira’s party was passed over in the next election for a soy-
producing land-owner, under whose administration SLAPR was quickly ended, but 
who, eventually, and paradoxically, would come to champion a similar project – MT 
Legal.  
 
Conclusion  
  
 The experiences of SLAPR can be readily applied to the current situation with 
Lucas Legal (and Mato Grosso Legal). By the time of Lucas Legal, some farmers and 
other stakeholders had become convinced that licenses could be in their favor, too. 
The two-pronged approach of 1) depoliticizing the issue by emphasizing the role of 
technology, and 2) simultaneously promoting the project as a way to legitimize farm 
activities, instead of limiting them was unsuccessful with landowners when the de 
Oliveira administration used it to market its SLAPR program. However, the same 
approach has had much better success as a feature of the Lucas Legal project 
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narrative. The question is: how and why did farmers and landowners come to have 
this shift in perspective? Is it due to differences in the two projects, and if so, which 
ones? Or did the outlook on environmental conservation and licensing of the farmers 
and landowners in Mato Grosso really undergo such a dramatic change in the seven 
years between the implementation of SLAPR and the implementation of Lucas Legal 
and the ten years between the implementation of SLAPR and the implementation of 
Mato Grosso Legal that similar policies shifted from highly unpalatable to tolerable, 
or even desirable, in their view? 
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CHAPTER V – THE SOYBEAN ECONOMY IN LUCAS 
 
The cultivation and processing of soybeans is the principal economic activity 
in Lucas and was an early, key factor in the settlement and development of the 
municipality. Soybeans were produced in the South of Brazil prior to their expansion 
northward and westward beginning in the 1970s, and many of the farmers who 
eventually settled in Lucas had experience farming soybeans and other row crops in 
the South. This chapter will first describe the history and nature of the soybean 
industry (and industrial agriculture more broadly) in the Amazon-Cerrado, in Mato 
Grosso, and in Lucas. Then it will describe a series of crises that shook the sector in 
the mid-2000s, as well as the responses to these crises by various actor groups. 
Finally, it will examine how the unfolding of the crisis events and the disjointed and 
incomplete nature of the state’s responses to them help contextualize the emergence 
of Lucas Legal shortly thereafter.  
This chapter continues the task begun by previous chapters of constructing a 
historical framing of the emergence of the specific scenario that produced the Lucas 
Legal project, and more broadly, the highly industrialized agriculture in Lucas. A 
combination of secondary literature review, primary documents such as newspaper 
articles and archival sources, and agricultural census data are used.  
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Early soybean production in Brazil 
  
Before the soybean “boom” began in the 1970s, soybean production in Brazil 
faced a number of significant hurdles. Soybeans have been grown in Brazil since the 
early 20
th
 century, but, until the 1940s, they served primarily as a forage crop. In the 
1940s, a handful of foreign companies (Anderson Clayton (US), Sanbra (Argentina) 
and Matarazzo (Italy)) entered the Brazilian market to develop the domestic vegetable 
oil industry.
366
 Thanks to the marketing efforts of these companies, vegetable oil, and 
specifically soya oil, slowly became a mainstay in Brazilian kitchens.
 367
  Prior to this, 
Brazilians had relied on lard, coconut fat and tallow for cooking. Brazilian export 
soybeans and soy products only took off in earnest after the conclusion of World War 
II.
368
  
 Given this early growth in domestic and international opportunities for a 
Brazilian soybean market, beginning in the 1960s, the Brazilian government began to 
encourage wheat farmers in the south of Brazil to alternate the planting of wheat in 
the winter with the planting of soy in the summer in an effort to bolster the 
profitability of wheat production. Brazilian farmers were slow to warm to soybeans 
due to their exoticness.
369
 The failure of the wheat crop in 1972 and rapidly 
increasing prices for soy on world markets finally convinced Brazilian farmers of the 
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value of soy.
370
 Stories abounded of farmers who had made their fortunes growing 
soybeans.  
 Soon, another major change came to Brazilian agriculture -- the settlement of 
the Amazon-Cerrado. Though the reasons for frontier expansion and extension 
starting in the 1970s were diverse [this is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3], 
rapid expansion in soybean production in Brazil in the 1970s was both a driver and an 
effect of this process. Land prices in the South quickly rose as the market for 
soybeans and soybean products developed both domestically and abroad; as farmers 
began to realize the potential for making quick money growing soybeans; and as 
governments and cooperatives provided incentives and facilitated the planting of 
soybeans, both on new lands and at the expense of other crops.
371
 This put a lot of 
pressure on less well-capitalized farmers, many of whom eventually moved north and 
west to settlements in the Amazon-Cerrado. 
 At first, soybean farming was not possible in the Amazon or the Cerrado. The 
principal reason is that the soil is highly acidic, though some soils can be made 
suitable for agricultural production. To become suitable for agriculture, these oxisols 
(or latossolos in Portuguese) require the addition of lime, which is mined throughout 
the region, to reduce the acidity and fertilizers to improve fertility. Additionally, 
farmers have traditionally grown rice on new lands for about three years to prepare 
Amazon-Cerrado soils for the production of other crops. Secondly, soybeans are 
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temperate crops, and so traditional varieties had to be selectively modified to grow in 
the tropical sun and under the relatively shorter daylight hours of the tropical soy 
growing season.
372
 Present-day productivity and profitability of soybean production 
in the Amazon-Cerrado would not have been possible without significant research on 
the part of government agencies like EMBRAPA,
373
 as well as private companies and 
farmers who experimented with different varieties. 
 
Present day soybean production in Brazil 
  
In 1960, Brazil planted only 171,000 ha of soybeans, and 92 percent of the 
crop was grown in Rio Grande do Sul.
374
 By 1981, the year Lucas was “officially” 
settled as part of an INCRA project, about 8 million ha of soybeans were being 
planted in Brazil, with the majority of these still being produced in the South: 71.5 
percent of Brazilian of the soybean-growing area being in Rio Grande do Sul and 
Paraná, 12 percent in São Paulo and Santa Catarina,
375
 and 10.5 percent in Mato 
Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul.
376
 Today, nearly 24 million ha of soybeans are 
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planted in Brazil. About 40 percent of this area is in the states of the Center-West 
(Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul and Goáis).
377
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 6. Soybean expansion in Brazil, major soy producing regions, and Mato Grosso, Source: 
CONAB 
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Figure 7. Production of soy in Brazil, major soy producing regions, and Mato Grosso, Source: CONAB 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 6, the area devoted to soybean production has expanded 
rapidly in Brazil as a whole, as well as in the present major soybean producing 
regions, the Center-West and the South (Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do 
Sul), though the area being planted with soy in the South has increased less rapidly 
than in the Center-West. Production has also expanded considerably throughout 
Brazil (Figure 7). Figure 8 shows the geographic extent of soybean production in 
Brazil as of the most recent agricultural census in 2006. 
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Figure 8. Extent of soybean production in Brazil, 2006, Source: IBGE 
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Industrial Agriculture in Lucas 
 When the first settlers in present-day Lucas arrived at the end of the 1970s, 
the area was decidedly not conducive to productive agriculture, much less the 
profitable, industrial-scale agriculture described above. The area was covered with 
Cerrado vegetation and, in many places, it was quite ‘heavy’ Cerrado (dominated by 
trees and shrubs as much as or more than grasses), which made the work of clearing 
the land and planting difficult. INCRA itself said as much; official documents note 
that the soil in Lucas “is poor in natural nutrients,” but that rice, corn, manioc and soy 
could be profitably grown there as long as it is “adequately treated with correctives 
and fertilizers.”
378
 Looking back on those years, one of the municipality’s pioneers 
put it thusly: “there were so many difficulties: the land was poor, we planted, but it 
hardly produced, because it [the land] needed correction.”
379
 Many settlers report that 
they realized early on that Lucas could be a promising region for soy if they just 
learned to correct the soil, learn to work in the harsh conditions of the cerrado, and 
adapt to a strange, new climate defined by oppressive heat and daily rains for half the 
year and almost no precipitation the other half of the year.
380
 
Because Lucas was primarily settled by families with little or no capital, the 
work of clearing the native vegetation and preparing the land for agriculture was 
particularly difficult, as most settlers did not have tractors or even trucks, and had to 
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either hire the clearing out at exorbitant fees or do it by hand.
381
  Many settlers left 
within two or three years because they could not adequately feed their families on this 
land with so few resources. It was not until around 1984 that farmers in Lucas first 
began to plant soy, after they had first prepared the soil, having eked out little more 
than their subsistence growing rice for a few years. Most families only survived in 
Lucas if they had enough kids to work in another city and send them money for the 
first few years.  
Besides the poor quality of the soil for agricultural purposes, early farmers in 
Lucas faced the challenge of not having varieties of soybeans and other temperate 
crops adapted to the tropical climate of the Cerrado. The state did not provide 
assistance of this type; the nearest EMBRAPA office was hundreds of kilometers 
away in Dourados – Mato Grosso do Sul,
382
 which has a completely different climate, 
soil profile, and ecology than the tropical Cerrado of northern Mato Grosso. Pioneers 
in Lucas frequently relate that they themselves were responsible for breeding the first 
varieties of soy that were viable to plant there. In fact, the apparent lack of effort on 
the part of the government to develop cultivars of soy and other crops for the tropical 
climate during this time remains a point of contention in Lucas and in northern Mato 
Grosso in general even today, and contributes to the sense of independence from and 
disavowal of the state, especially the federal government, that is characteristic of 
farmers’ and local leaders’ rhetoric.  
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Finally, after years of struggle, by 1984, farmers in Lucas were planting 
soybeans. The local cooperative, COOPERLUCAS, was an important early supporter 
of local efforts to produce soybeans at a commercial scale. The cooperative’s efforts 
received a major boost in 1985 when Lucas was selected for participation in 
PRODECER II, a Nipo-Brazilian partnership with the objective of promoting 
agricultural development in the Cerrado via cooperative organization and resource 
distribution.  PRODECER resources helped COOPERLUCAS construct silos, 
granaries, farm machinery, offices, and technology and resources for researching soy 
cultivars for the Cerrado,
383
 as well as planned for the settlement of up to 40 new 
farmers who were to be ‘pre-screened’ for their “entrepreneurial spirit.,”
384
 though in 
the end, only a handful of farmers arrived in Lucas through this program. In total, the 
budget for PRODECER’s projects in Lucas was nearly $20 million dollars.
385
   
 
                                                          
383
 Rocha, ""A Trama do Drama": A Trama das Fronteiras e o Drama dos Migrantes nas Configurações 
do Desenvolvimento de Lucas do Rio Verde - MT," 113. 
384
 Huber, Tempestade no Cerrado: 219 & 30; Rocha, ""A Trama do Drama": A Trama das Fronteiras 
e o Drama dos Migrantes nas Configurações do Desenvolvimento de Lucas do Rio Verde - MT," 113. 
385
 Huber, Tempestade no Cerrado: 219 & 30. 
189 
 
 
Figure 9. Rio Verde Foundation's first test field in 1981, Source: Fundacaorioverde.com.br 
 
 
Figure 10. The author in front of the Rio Verde Foundation sign, Oct. 2011, Source: Éverton Ventura 
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Producers in Lucas and surrounding municipalities also organized separately 
from the activities of the cooperative and started the Rio Verde Foundation for the 
Support of Research and Integrated Development (Fundação de Apoio a Pesquisa e 
Desenvolvimento Integrado Rio Verde), known today as the Rio Verde Foundation 
(Fundação Rio Verde). The Foundation’s first efforts were a complete survey of the 
soils of the region and the creation of test fields for rice cultivars (Figure 9).
386
 
Eventually, the scope of the Foundation’s research activities expanded to include 
other crops, including soy and corn, as well as cotton and wheat. EMPAER (Mato 
Grossense Firm for Research, Assistance, and Rural Extension/Empresa Mato-
grossense de Pesquisa, Assistência, e Extensão Rural) and EMBRAPA, as well as the 
Rural Credit Union (SICRED) and several national and multi-national agricultural 
firms became partners with the Foundation by the beginning of 2000 (Figure 10).  
Years of personal, state, and cooperative investments of time, money, and 
sweat have paid off in Lucas. Today, Lucas is one of the most productive agricultural 
municipalities in Brazil, if not the world. According to the municipal government’s 
website, the municipality produces a full 1 percent of the total amount of grains 
produced in Brazil, while occupying only 0.4 percent of the national territory (Figure 
10 and Figure 11).387 The main crops produced in the municipality are soybeans 
(typically grown from November to March) and corn (typically grown as safrinha 
(little crop, or second crop) from March to June). Cotton, beans and rice are also 
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produced. Some farmers produce coconuts, wheat, and other non-traditional crops as 
supplements to the main crops, though the economic impact of these alternate crops is 
insignificant at the municipal level.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Area planted of principal crops, 1990-2010, Lucas do Rio Verde – MT, Source: IBGE - 
Produção Agrícola Municipal 
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Figure 12. Total production of principal crops over time, 1990-2010, Lucas do Rio Verde – MT,  
Source: IBGE - Produção Agrícola Municipal 
 
 
 
Present-day agriculture in Lucas is overwhelmingly industrial, and properties 
are fairly large. The median property size in Lucas in 1996 was between 201 and 500 
ha, while in the state of Mato Grosso as a whole, the median size was between 51 and 
100 ha (Figure 13Error! Reference source not found.). Even when you remove 
properties of less than 100 ha from consideration to consider only properties large 
enough to be likely to be used for commercial scale agriculture or ranching, median 
property size in Lucas is larger than the average in Mato Grosso (501 – 1000 ha range 
in Lucas compared to 201 – 500 ha range in Mato Grosso as a whole).  
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Figure 13. Distribution of properties by size in MT and Lucas do Rio Verde, Source: IBGE, compiled 
by author 
 
The municipality is generally not affected by the issues related to land tenure 
insecurity common to other parts of Brazil because land titling in Lucas is highly 
secure. As of the 2006 Agricultural Census, only 23 out of 273 rural establishments 
had less than secure title, and these were all small properties (one property between 
51 and 100 ha, and the rest less than 10 ha).
388
 These few cases of insecure land 
tenure in Lucas are easily explainable; except in one case, the owners of properties 
with insecure title had been on their properties for less than 5 years. Most farmers are 
own and operate their land themselves, with only a few relying on hired managers or 
renting out their land completely. 
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Diversification, reduction of distance, and vertical integration 
 
A pro-development coalition has undertaken various projects in Lucas, all of 
which have been closely linked to an umbrella project of making Lucas into a center 
for agro-industrial activity at all levels on the production end of the commodity chain, 
from growing soybeans, corn and soy to processing these products into animal feed, 
to raising poultry and livestock, to processing these animals.  
Lucas is in many ways very well situated geographically for the development 
of industrial-agriculture activities. It is located on a major highway (BR-163, or the 
Cuiabá-Santarém), has ample water supplies in the form of rivers, streams and 
springs, has a predictable rainy season and well-drained soils, and crucially, its 
vegetation is classified as Cerrado so most properties in Lucas are only required to 
have 35 percent of their property under native vegetation (as opposed to up to 80 
percent in the Amazon forest biome). Farmers are able to plant two crops per year –
soybeans and corn—(or three with the help of irrigation), and highly productive 
tropical varieties of soybeans and corn have been developed. Current soy yields in 
Lucas average from 55 to 58 sacks per hectare (3,300 to 3,480 kg/ha), with potential 
for even higher yields depending on the variety and planting strategies (Figure 14). 
Corn yields may reach nearly 90 sacks per hectare.  
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Figure 14. Soy area planted compared with production, 1990-2010, Lucas do Rio Verde, Source: IBGE 
- Produção Agrícola Municipal 
 
 
 
Industrial-scale agricultural production in central Mato Grosso, though, has 
significant challenges that are extremely expensive and difficult to surmount. The 
most important of these is the physical isolation of Lucas from major population 
centers in Brazil and from ports that ship products to overseas markets (Figure 15). 
Lucas is situated on a federal highway that leads to Santarém, Pará, a port city on the 
Amazon River, but much of this road is still unpaved, making it impassable for soy 
trucks for much of the year. The road is currently being paved, a process that is 
expected to be completed in 2012. Until the pavement is completed, soy, corn, and 
other products must travel south to Porto de Paranaguá in the state of Paraná, more 
than 2,000 km by truck from Lucas. Once the trucks arrive, they often face long waits 
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to unload, as the line to unload can stretch dozens of kilometers, due to the high 
volume of soy that must pass through the port and the outdated infrastructure at the 
port. The considerable costs of this transport are ultimately paid by the producer, who 
can receive up to 5 dollars less per sack of soy in Lucas as a farmer near the port in 
Paraná would receive for the same soy.  
Producers, political leaders and business elites in Lucas (categories which are 
not mutually exclusive) and other municipalities along the route, as well as state 
leaders in Mato Grosso and Pará, have lobbied extensively for pavement and 
improvements to the road for years, but misdirection of funds and challenges from 
environmental groups have been among the factors delaying the project.
389
 The 
journey to Santarém is 1,400 km from Lucas, and the paved road will only be two 
lanes in most places, meaning that this shorter journey to port will still not exactly be 
short and freight costs for products out of Lucas will likely always be high.  
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Figure 15: Grain transportation by truck on BR-163 in Lucas 
 
 
 
To this end, local leaders and elites have embarked on an elaborate process to, 
to some extent, bring the market home for themselves. Until recently, most Lucas 
soybeans were sold whole and exported to China, Europe, and the Middle East, where 
they were then crushed and processed. In 2008, a soy crush facility was installed in 
Lucas.  Now soybeans and other commercial crops in Lucas can be put through a 
crush process that extracts the oil from the seeds for use in vegetable oils, biofuels or 
other industrial processes and separates the husks for use in animal feed, including for 
cattle, poultry and swine, all of which create new economic opportunities for the 
agriculture sector in Lucas. The facility is an installation by the Grupo Amaggi, a 
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major soybean buying firm owned by the former governor of Mato Grosso (2003-
2010) and Senator (2011-present), Blairo Maggi, who is also the world’s largest 
soybean producer. The superintendent of the Amaggi facility in Lucas was frank that 
the facility’s construction was also related to other efforts being made in Lucas to 
extend the “vertical” reach of the local agriculture sector: “The decision for the 
construction of this facility is due to the new economic outlook that is also being built 
in the municipality, in which more value will be added to the product via 
industrialization.”
390
  
The installation of the crusher was just one part of a local scheme to integrate 
industrialization processes and other agricultural activities to the production of grains. 
The crusher is part of a large industrial complex constructed on the outskirts of the 
city with the express purpose of attracting national and international firms to operate 
in a coordinated manner at locations on the production chain and in concert with local 
business. The firms that make up the industrial complex and their relationships are 
shown in Figure 16 below. 
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Figure 16. Schema of major Firms operating at Complexo Industrial Senador Atílio Fontana 
 
 
 
Products travelling among the firms do not generally even need to be loaded 
onto trucks or trailers; pipe lines and conveyer belts connect the firms. Firms were 
offered incentives to buy into the complex, including subsidized land with “all of the 
necessary infrastructure” and guaranteed access to subsidized energy and water.
391
 
Prior to this, construction of a 28 megawatt power station on the Rio Verde in Lucas, 
financed by the Brazilian Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social – BNDES), began in 2005 and was completed in 2007, just 
before the Amaggi facility was installed. It should also be noted that one of the 
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companies that installed a facility in the industrial complex, Fiagril, is owned and 
operated by the mayor of Lucas, Marino Franz, and his two brothers.   
Stated goals of the municipal government include promoting “vertical 
integration” of the local economy, becoming a local center for “big business,” and 
having a “strong presence in regional and national levels” of production.
392
 In 2006, 
Sadia S/A (now part of Brazil Foods, Inc.) began construction on a massive 
slaughterhouse in the Industrial Complex of Lucas. The facility is capable of 
processing 375,000 chickens and 5,000 swine per day.  
The presence of Sadia in Lucas, like that of Amaggi, can be directly tied to the 
efforts of local business and political elites to promote development in their 
municipality. In 2005, a group of local business elites in Lucas approached Sadia 
about installing a facility in Lucas. These elites, themselves major local producers, 
were searching for a way to avoid paying freight costs for their grains. Initially, Sadia 
was not interested. Undeterred, the group (including the brothers Franz, one of whom 
is the current mayor of Lucas) formed their own business, called Grupo EMA, and set 
about the process of securing permits and contracts to process poultry in Lucas. There 
is reason to believe that the Grupo EMA never intended to open a slaughterhouse, but 
instead only wanted to facilitate the entry of Sadia. The Grupo EMA project never 
grew larger than a small building with a few computers in it, and none of the owners 
of the project had ever been involved in working in or running a slaughterhouse. In 
the end, this did not matter. One of Sadia’s national competitors – Perdigão – opened 
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a large facility in a neighboring municipality in 2005. Within days, Sadia bought out 
Grupo EMA and began plans for a slaughterhouse in Lucas.  In 2009, Perdigão and 
Sadia merged to form Brasil Foods, Inc.  
During the 2000s, a host of other multinational companies in the industrial 
agriculture sector opened branches or franchises in Lucas. These include John Deere, 
New Holland, Case, Dow Chemicals, Bayer, Bunge, Cargill and Archer Daniels 
Midland. Many smaller firms are present as well. Together, firms and producers have 
invested heavily in non-transferrable assets in terms of land improvements, buildings, 
roads, and other infrastructure.  
 
Emergent environmentalism in Southern Amazon industrial agriculture  
  
Industrial scale agriculture, ranching, and other extractive activities are 
expanding rapidly not just in Lucas, but in the Amazon as a whole. Agricultural 
exports make up 40 percent of Brazil’s trade surplus, and the country’s agricultural 
sector as a whole contributes to 25 percent of the country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP).
393
  Much of the recent growth in agricultural production comes from Brazil’s 
Amazon region, where production has jumped from 5.6 percent of national totals to 
24.4 percent since 1977.
394
 Brazil is a major producer and exporter of soybeans, 
second only to the United States; in 2009, it produced 25 percent of the world’s 
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soybean crop.
395
 Of the Amazonian states, Mato Grosso continues to be by far the 
most productive, representing 26.8 percent of total production of soybean production 
in the 2008/2009 harvest.
396
   
 Some of this agricultural expansion is still occurring at the expense of 
environmental objectives as enforcement and licensing on the ground race to catch up 
with promises being made at the national and state levels. Deforestation rates have 
fallen in recent years (down from 27,770km
2
/year in 2004), but remain significant 
(estimated 6,451km
2
/year in 2010).
397
 These environmental gains, while laudable, 
may be misleading, as conversion of the Cerrado biome is not included in 
“deforestation” tallies by INPE.
398
   
 Conversion of the two main biomes inside the Legal Amazon, the Cerrado and 
the humid tropical rainforest, to soybeans and sugar cane for biofuel production has 
been shown to create a “carbon debt” that will take decades to repay.
399
 Amazon 
transformation may cause the release of between 15 and 32 billion tons of carbon by 
2050 (or 1.5 – 3.2 decades worth of total anthropogenic carbon emissions based on 
the 2008 rate), depending on measures taken by markets and the Brazilian 
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government.
400
 The availability of local water resources may also be threatened.
401
 
The environmental consequences of these changes will be felt globally, but the more 
immediate effects will be noted locally, particularly reductions in precipitation.
402
 
Such changes represent eventual but very real threats to the livelihoods of local 
residents of “neo-liberal agricultural frontiers” and “agro-cities” in the Legal 
Amazon, giving them a strong stake in the outcomes of environmental and agro-
industrial changes in the region.
403
  
 Pressure from domestic and international academics, politicians, pop stars, 
NGOs and indigenous groups have called attention to these changes in the 
environment of the Amazon. As Brazil takes on a more prominent role on the world 
stage, pressure on political leaders in Brazil and on the businesses that operate in the 
Amazon to minimize environmental destruction and increase accountability for the 
actions of individuals and groups acting in the Amazon has increased. To this end, the 
Brazilian government has increased monitoring and enforcement of environmental 
laws, enacted transparency measures, and decentralized enforcement responsibility. 
At the same time, market pressures for ‘sustainable, ‘green’, or ‘traceable’ products 
have led to a number of private and/or NGO initiatives that either extend the work of 
the state or, in some cases, circumvent the state all together in fostering conservation 
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of forests, grasslands and other natural resources. In any case, there is now more 
interest than ever before on the part of the agricultural industry to improve its 
environmental practices in the Amazon. Thus, though considerable work remains to 
be done, in terms of meeting environmental goals in Brazil, there is reason to be 
optimistic. Furthermore, these advances are not coming at the expense of economic 
growth in Brazil or in Brazil’s agricultural sector more specifically.  
 While lofty environmental goals set at the national level receive both 
laudatory attention and criticism, it is licensing and compliance programs at the state 
level, inter-agency agreements regarding enforcement jurisdiction, local governance 
climates, and local socio-economic situations and histories that most affect how and 
where conservation measures occur. The Amazon is a vast and remote place, and 
accessibility and a frontier culture of independence from and distrust of higher-level 
government officials are deeply ingrained in even the most integrated parts of it. At 
the same time, higher-level (federal, and to some extent, state) goals for conservation 
are often complex, changing, poorly communicated to the public, and known to be 
circumventable with bribes due to notoriously rampant corruption in the public sector. 
The importance of these factors is frequently discounted in discussions of 
conservation and exploration in the Amazon. Environmental regulation mechanisms 
were undergoing transformations and so was the economic and public climate for 
agricultural production in the Amazon.  
In 2005, a downturn in market prices and the valuation of the real eroded 
producer profits. Inconveniently-timed and excessive rains supported the spread of 
205 
 
Asiatic rust and made harvests difficult or impossible. Roads were washed out and 
tractors and trailers engaged in the transport of soy were stuck or overturned. When 
this diverse set of bio-climatic, economic and extra-economic challenges manifested 
themselves simultaneously in 2006, producers and their allies mobilized to demand 
solutions from federal and state governments. Some assistance was eventually 
provided, but producers were disappointed in the scope of the assistance offered. A 
near-simultaneous assault on the reputation of the industry for environmental and 
social abuses posed further economic threats, particularly in terms of market access. 
To address this, powerful, non-governmental industry groups rapidly mobilized to 
address these charges by imposing a strong, but narrowly-focused ban on purchasing 
soybeans that had contributed to recent deforestation.  
 
Grito de Ipiranga : A backlash against government policies 
  
 In 2006, the agriculture sector in Mato Grosso faced a crisis that can be traced 
to a complex set of contributing factors. An appreciating real and weak soybean 
prices meant negative returns on harvests for many producers.
404
 Asian soybean rust 
was wreaking havoc on fields, adding the cost of three or four applications of 
fungicide to producers’ tabs in order to save the crops. Excessive rains in the 2004/05 
planting season had left soybeans rotting in fields as trucks and tractors were unable 
to navigate flooded fields and the washed out dirt roads which comprise not only the 
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transportation networks of the interior, but also state and federal highways (Figure 
17). Federal funds for subsidized loans to banks and private-sector lenders such as 
agricultural trading firms and agrochemical dealers were delayed and credit outlays 
were restricted due to overdue payments and defaults from previous years’ loans, 
thereby compounding financial problems for all producers dependent on loans.
405
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. A flooded soybean field in Lucas in 2006, Source: Municipal Archive - Lucas do Rio Verde 
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 In order to express their dissatisfaction with the perceived-lack of support 
from the federal government, a block of producers, with the support of several 
industry organizations, civil society organizations, and soy buyer firms, mobilized 
and staged a protest under the name of the “Grito de Ipiranga,” or “Shout of 
Ipiranga”
406
 in April of 2006. Producers alleged that the nation relied heavily on the 
agriculture sector for food supplies and foreign exchange, but lacked adequate 
policies and institutions to mitigate the hardships periodically faced by producers in 
the volatile global markets for primary agricultural products. The producers 
blockaded highways and silos against the transport of grains in several cities, and 
threatened to extend their blockade to halt bus and car traffic if their demands were 
not met (Figure 18). In some cities, tractors were set ablaze on the highway (Figure 
19). 
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Figure 18. Grito de Ipiranga protest in Lucas, Source: Municipal Archive: Lucas do Rio Verde 
 
 
Figure 19. A tractor burns on BR-163 during a Grito de Ipiranga protest in Lucas, Source: Éverton 
Ventura 
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  Though the roots of the crisis were diverse, the president of the Federation of 
Agriculture and Livestock of Mato Grosso (Federação da Agricultura e Pecuária de 
Mato Grosso – Famato) framed the protest as an open threat to the federal 
government, proclaiming “[i]f the government does not meet our demands, we are 
still going to achieve one thing: we will cause discomfort to the president of the 
Republic who opted in favor of the financial system in detriment to the producer class 
of Brazil.”
407
 The governor of Mato Grosso, Blairo Maggi, himself a major producer, 
took the message to heart and visited many of the cities that participated in the 
protest, including Lucas do Rio Verde. He also personally relayed the message of the 
Grito regarding the direness of the situation faced by the agricultural sector to 
Brazilian President Luis Ignacio da Silva (known popularly as Lula), in a meeting 
convened with the president and the governors of the 13 so-called agricultural states. 
Asked about the meeting, Maggi was blunt: “[w]ithout agriculture, and without 
ranching, the [agricultural] states do not exist. We are working on the political line 
and the producers are there to convince society…And it is not a situation to play with, 
because agribusiness is responsible for 35 percent-37 percent of the wealth of 
Brazil.”
408
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State and federal response and producer reception 
  
 The producers’ demands for solutions to these problems were ambitious and 
diverse.  They called for the dissolution of the Mato Grosso State Transport and 
Habitation Fund (Fundo Estadual de Transporte e Habitação – Fethab), the use of the 
Workers’ Support Fund (Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador – FAT) to absolve 
producer debts to private-sector lenders, and a reduction in the state ICMS tax 
(Imposto sobre Operações relativas à Circulação de Mercadorias e Prestação de 
Serviços de Transporte Interestadual e Intermunicipal e de Comunicação/Tax on 
Operations Relative to Circulation of Merchandise and Providing of Interstate and 
Inter-municipal Transport and of Communication). They called for vaguely defined 
changes in enforcement of regulations related to their activities, improvements in 
infrastructure, and the emergence of an “agricultural politics” in the state and federal 
governments.
409
 They also called for the Ministry of Agriculture to declare Asian 
soybean rust as an epidemic, thereby freeing up federal resources for combatting it. 
Above all, they called for a change in policies related to the exchange rate.  
Economist Fábio Silveira told reporters, “[t]he principal driver of the crisis in 
agriculture is the exchange rate. The climatic problems, the plagues and the fall in 
international prices are contributing factors.”
410
 Because the valuation of the real was 
thought to be the direct result of federal policy (and the state was actively pursuing 
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conventional neoliberal policies of economic management including targeted inflation 
and privileged surplus creation), it was clear that the producers blamed the federal 
government for the crisis. As one producer succinctly put it, “The [valuation of the 
real against the] dollar is a situation that the government created and needs to 
resolve.”
411
 
 The protest and periodic blockades went on for over a month, and appear to 
have been modestly persuasive at both the state and the federal levels. Fethab was not 
dissolved, but its funds were redirected toward paving roads, another of the 
producers’ concerns.
412
 FAT monies were freed up for refinancing of rural debts.
413
 
The Federal Government released a Plano Safra (Agricultural Plan) for 2006/07 that 
included 50 billion reais in credits for commercial agriculture, an increase of 13 
percent over the previous year, and the opportunity for refinancing depending on the 
region and the product for which the loan had been offered.
414
  In spite of these 
significant concessions, the producers were not impressed, mainly because of the 
limits placed on refinancing with government monies and because, unsurprisingly, no 
measures to correct or compensate for the valuation of the real were included. The 
president of the Confederation of Agriculture and Ranching of Brazil (Confederação 
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da Agricultura e Pecuária do Brasil – CNA) called the plan an example of 
“governmental myopia” for not offering more extensive relief to the farmers. 
415
 
 
Agriculture’s environmental turn: Greenpeace protests and the Soy Moratoruim 
  
 At the same time as the events related to the Grito de Ipiranga were unfolding, 
the reputation with global consumers of commercial agriculture in the Amazon came 
under attack as the ENGO Greenpeace International launched a coordinated and 
pointed campaign against the soy industry in the Brazilian Amazon.  In April of 2006, 
Greenpeace released a report entitled “Eating Up the Amazon” detailing social and 
environmental abuses related to the expansion of industrial-scale soy production in 
the Amazon.
416
  On 19 May 2006, Greenpeace activists parked their ship, the “Arctic 
Sunrise”, at Cargill’s grain port in the Amazonian port city of Santarém, Pará and 
staged a public protest against the activities of the grain giant in the Amazon. They 
succeeded in stopping port operations for a short time, and the event garnered 
international attention for the environmentalists’ cause.
417
 Starting with companies 
that buy beef and soy from the Amazon, such as McDonalds of Europe, this negative 
attention set off a chain-reaction of international market pressure for measures to 
improve traceability of soybeans. This pressure rapidly led to the creation of the Soy 
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Moratorium, a pledge by Brazil’s vegetable oil industry association (ABIOVE) and 
grain exporters association (ANEC) to not trade soy grown on fields deforested 
within the “Amazon Biome” after the date of the agreement, 24 July 2006.
418
 The 
Moratorium was signed into effect a mere two months after the protest in Santarém.   
 The Moratorium itself is inconsequential for most soy farmers in Mato 
Grosso, as the Cerrado Biome, secondary forest areas, pasture and already-cleared 
areas, which describe the vast majority of potential and current soy-growing areas in 
Mato Grosso, were not addressed by the Moratorium language. Still, the unfolding of 
the Moratorium was closely watched from Mato Grosso and pressure from 
international markets was keenly felt by producers there; after all, the exclusion of  
much of Mato Grosso (including most of Lucas) from the Amazon Biome, the 
entirety of Mato Grosso’s inclusion in the administrative definition of the Amazon, 
and the “high-forest bias” of the Moratorium agreement are somewhat semantic,
419
 
and would be largely lost on global consumers. As the mayor of Lucas put it, “if  
someone was going to not buy or eat McDonalds because McDonalds is buying beef 
from Mato Grosso or from someone who is buying soy to turn into feed for the meat 
from Mato Grosso, well, that was really shocking.”
420
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 The efficacy of the ban and the benefits of it to soybean farmers and the 
environment are far from clear,
421
 but the significance of the ease and forcefulness 
with which ABIOVE and ANEC moved to address the issue is difficult to overstate. 
Firms and other private industry organizations are highly motivated to protect their 
reputations with regard to social and environmental issues for fear of losing market 
access.
422
 Political leaders and government agencies and institutions, on the other 
hand, may have a less direct incentive to address a single-sector crisis, may have 
other, more pressing priorities, and the multitude of institutions and agencies that 
must respond may hinder the speed and flexibility of government response.
423
  
Indeed, in the case of the 2005/06 crisis, the state proved to be slow and partial in its 
reactions to (different elements of) a crisis, while the industry groups were able to 
present a solution to a different but also significant crisis (though this solution was 
also imperfect) within only two months, and this solution was also able to evolve over 
time as needed.
424
  
 The Moratorium was a swift and effective response to a crisis, as opposed to 
the set of government responses to the crises that spawned the Grito de Ipiranga 
protests, because its developers were largely unencumbered by the complex concerns 
and bureaucratic processes of government. The stakeholders in the Moratorium and 
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the associated meetings of the Roundtable on Sustainable Soy included a cross-
section of participants in the global market for commercial agriculture, including 
consumer, foreign government, academic, and civil society groups. No 
representatives of the Brazilian government were included as participants in the 
moratorium until two years after it was established.
425
 However, government 
institutions including the Forest Code Legal Reserve requirements and the definition 
of the Amazon Biome established by the Brazilian government were integral parts of 
the Moratorium agreement. In this way, Moratorium signatories benefitted from 
legitimacy lent to their agreement by incorporating longstanding governmental rules 
and goals – advocating for compliance with forest reserves required by a long 
standing federal law and beyond – without the bureaucratic constraints of the 
government.  
 The Moratorium may be seen as a sort of vigilante-style approach to the 
federal (governmental) Forest Code, which had previously been poorly enforced. 
Under the Moratorium, the forest code is to be complied with, and beyond that, there 
will be no new deforestation for soy production, even if that deforestation is “legal.” 
Thus, within an admittedly limited scope, an industry agreement quickly achieved 
compliance with a law that had eluded the state for decades. And yet, an institution 
like the Moratorium is an opportunity for self-regulation on the part of the firms that 
buy and trade soy from the Amazon. The government had ineffectively enforced its 
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own laws in the past;
426
 the Moratorium spares signatories the uncertainty of eventual 
effective enforcement. It may also bring other benefits like consumer preference and 
premium prices, though this is far from certain.
427
 It is also a formalization of the 
direct link between the soy that comes from the Amazon, the transnational companies 
that buy that soy, and the global markets where it the soy is sold.   
 In the Amazon, there is considerable distrust of upper-level government 
institutions based on decades of local dissatisfaction with government assistance, 
uncooperative agencies and uneven enforcement of outdated laws by state and federal 
governments.
428
 Moreover, because they are unencumbered by many of the trappings 
of a well-established bureaucracy in Brazil, non-governmental and corporate entities 
are much freer than government agencies to swiftly respond to changing 
circumstances. Producers were not enthusiastic about the Moratorium itself, as they 
were not represented in the negotiations and would ultimately bear the cost of 
implementing the agreement,
429
 but the establishment of the Moratorium outlined an 
alternate path to addressing some of the very real problems the industry faced.   
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Industry response and producer reception 
  
 As the crises in 2006 evolved, soy trading firms and other industry groups 
organized around a common concern – maintaining continued market access for 
commercial agriculture products in the face of changing economic realities and 
increased global scrutiny over local production methods.  They pursued strategies to 
this end within the resources available to them, including the appropriation of the 
legal restrictions on planting included in the Forest Code in a new marketing strategy 
– a public pledge to produce soy sustainably. Thus, the soybean industry of the 
Amazon made a play to flip the discourse and present itself as an environmentally 
sustainable option for soybeans and soybean products in Brazil. Soybean farmers 
were not included in the Soybean Working Group that administers the Moratorium, 
and most of the producers in the southern Amazon were unaffected by the 
Moratorium, but the events of 2006 proved to producers in Mato Grosso that they 
could not rely on the state to promote their interests, and so international industrial 
agriculture and its newfound friends in Big Environment began to look like a more 
appealing recourse for their problems.  
 At first, the apparently-muddled or unenthusiastic responses from the state to 
the demands of producers appears to be a consequence of the state being unable to 
fully accommodate the demands of the capitalist project as it becomes ever-more 
globalized. The price-fluctuations, currency valuation, bio-climatic problems and 
crisis-of-reputation issues faced by the producers could all be traced to national 
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policy, as well as global factors, and, yet, the federal state was evidently unable or 
unwilling to solve them.
 430
 The refusal on the part of federal entities to fully 
accommodate the producers and the importance of more local and extra-governmental 
responses to the producers demands can be seen as symptoms of what Harvey has 
called the “radical reconfiguration of state institutions and practices” that accompany 
the neo-liberal project and the related process of globalization of markets.
431
 Harvey 
has associated neoliberalism with a process of re-scaling regulatory and institutional 
power “up” to international and transnational scale and/or down to the local.
432
 For 
Himley, the growing role of nonstate actors and institutions in environmental 
governance scenarios has sometimes occurred when marginalized groups have 
“wrested” authority over resources or decision making from the state. In other cases, 
power has been ceded to non-state actors and institutions in an ongoing process of 
decentralization of power.
433
  The role of the state is not eliminated, it is simply 
reconfigured. 
 Though this rescaling of agency away from the state or the federal level has 
been an important feature of the evolving neoliberal project, so has been a “stretching 
of the neoliberal policy repertoire” to include not only non-state extra-market 
regulatory mechanisms (e.g. NGOs, public-private partnerships),
434
 but also 
reconfigured roles for federal-level institutions. Peck and Tickell have observed that 
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“[a]t the level of the national state, neoliberalized forms of macro-economic 
management – based on low inflation, free trade, flexible job markets, regressive 
taxation, downsized government, and central-bank (relative) autonomy – now 
constitute the taken-for-granted context for political debate and policy 
development.”
435
 Likewise, Harvey has shown that the contemporary neoliberal state 
seeks to, above all, promote a “good business climate” by careful regulation of social 
programs to ensure accountability and the establishment of pro-business policies, 
particularly financial institutions, as well as the “reduction of [external] barriers to 
movement of capital across borders,” even when this requires “discipline” of internal 
elements.
436
  The state has not been rendered unnecessary by neoliberalism; it has 
simply shifted its priorities.  
 In 2005, the industrial-agriculture producer class of Mato Grosso found itself 
confronting the ground-level realities of these transformations in the priorities or role 
of the late- neoliberal state. When a series of crises struck, the (federal) state offered a 
sympathetic ear, but from the producers’ point of view largely declined to offer 
aggressive short-term solutions, whereas, previously, they had been part of a 
preferred industry. For producers, the straw that broke the camel’s back was what 
they perceived to be a state-directed policy to promote valuation of the real, 
prejudicing farmers who entered into futures agreements when the dollar was high, 
but this issue was not addressed in government responses to the crisis, as the (federal) 
state’s focus remained the preservation of longer-term capital-centered financial 
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including maintaining an elevated real. Instead, more local agencies and transnational 
agricultural corporations offered quick if imperfect solutions to their plight. 
 
Conclusion: The influence of the pro-soy development regime in Lucas 
 
The soybean economy in Lucas is heavily capitalized and industrial, and by 
all accounts, will continue to develop in this way for the foreseeable future. Less than 
thirty years ago, though, subsistence-scale production in this region was difficult and 
highly profitable agriculture was only a dream for early settlers in Lucas. Well-timed 
and well-placed investments by some early producers in the region, as well as by 
powerful politicians and agricultural firms have made Lucas one of the most 
productive municipalities in Brazil in a very short time. These investments and their 
high potential for continued returns have contributed to the formation of a local pro-
development coalition to promote the continued diversification and growth in the 
agricultural sector in Lucas.  
Investment in fixed assets may be evidence of the formation of pro-
development industrial agriculture regimes in places like Lucas related to the 
continued expansion of capital in Mato Grosso. Once national and international firms, 
as well as producers, have invested heavily in a building, in staff for a local facility, 
or in land, their capital is spatially “fixed,” which creates an incentive for these non-
local firms to join forces with local producers and business and political elites to 
221 
 
make continued investments in the success of the region.
437
 In Lucas, because the 
mayor is also heavily invested in the local agricultural sector, national and global 
firms apparently face little resistance in local government. Moreover, though 
donations and frequent civic involvement on the part of local staff, national and 
multi-national firms have forged close ties with local politicians. Thus, national and 
international firms have become part of the pro-development coalition in Lucas, 
though their interests also continue beyond the local scale to include regional, 
national and even global capital concerns.
438
  
In the following chapters, I will trace the influence of this regime on the 
creation of the Lucas Legal project, and contrast this explanation with other possible 
explanations for the emergence of the project, including the development of a 
sustainable development discourse/advocacy coalition and the possibility that the 
project simply fills a more instrumental role in the governance gap created by a 
retreating federal and state government in the environmental arena. I will ask, is the 
Lucas Legal project a strategy for continued development and economic growth on 
the part of heavily invested members of a local regime?  If so, has there been any 
evolution on the part of project participants (i.e., elites, farmers, or any residents of 
Lucas) in their environmental views as the result of their participation in the project 
and as the scope of the project has evolved and expanded, and does this matter? 
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CHAPTER VI – THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LUCAS LEGAL 
 
 
 Among the questions at the heart of this dissertation are how and why Lucas 
Legal developed and what this means for how its leaders and other associated 
stakeholders define and successfully meet the objectives of the project. As described 
more fully in chapter 2, I have proposed three frameworks for analyzing these 
questions – an environmentality approach that contends that Lucas Legal represents 
and extension of power in Lucas via technologies of government and the resulting 
creation of environmental subjects even out of unlikely agricultural frontier residents; 
a discourse or advocacy coalition (or hybrid of these) approach that views Lucas 
Legal as the outcome of some diverse actors working toward a shared goal; and a 
more general environmental governance approach in which Lucas Legal is an 
example of a sort of middle ground between fully government-led or fully private 
sector-led management of the environment. In this chapter, I draw on field notes, 
interview data, and primary and secondary printed and electronic sources to describe 
the genesis and early accomplishments of Lucas Legal, which viewed through any of 
the proposed theoretical lenses, is, in any case, an evolving scenario dependent on a 
variety of structural and personal factors.  
 Lucas Legal is, in some ways a performance of the changing views of 
environmental conservation amid the changes that neoliberal globalization has 
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brought to the agriculture sector. By now, neoliberal globalization has led to “a 
radical reconfiguration of the organizational and institutional arrangements through 
which society-environment relations are governed,”
439
 which can easily be observed 
in the trajectory of Lucas’ history and development. Indeed, no longer are farmers 
largely responsible to and dependent on their communities as they were in the past;
440
 
instead, they are now supported and constrained by a host of institutions, 
organizations, and technologies functioning at scales ranging from the farm level to 
the global level. As such, the agriculture sector of contemporary Lucas is not limited 
to farmers, but instead encompasses a wide range of actors including locally 
influential business elites, foreign investors, and even foreign consumers. The 
presence of this range of agricultural actors likewise creates space for a wide range of 
views for the appropriate positionality of agriculture with regard to the environment, 
which is an important input for agricultural activities, and environmental policy, 
which can be an important constraint. 
  In this chapter and the next, I argue, though, that an actor’s place in this 
structural matrix, while certainly influential, is not wholly determinant of how he or 
she relates to nature or the environment. Put in more blunt terms, my argument is that 
even among people with considerable power and motivation for personal financial 
gain, persons motivated purely by short-term economic interests to the exclusion of 
all other goals and values are difficult to find. It is in this context that I seek to 
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position the emergence and evolution of Lucas Legal and to problematize overly 
simplistic and dualistic notions of development versus the environment, or agriculture 
versus the environment. The agricultural actors in Lucas participate in a variety of 
power networks, which help shape their behavior and beliefs; a network oriented 
around the continued production of agricultural commodities is one of these and a 
(strengthening) network of discipline with regard to environmental constraints and 
changing environmental knowledges is another. 
 I am not, of course, the first to observe the complexity of agri-environmental 
positions in Brazil. Christian Brannstrom has analyzed environmental discourses in 
industrial agriculture (in another part of Brazil) to identify four distinct social 
perspectives on the environment (Critical environmentalism, Agri-environmentalism, 
Private environmentalism, and Statist environmentalism), in an attempt to more fully 
define “environmentalism” in agricultural areas.
441
 He has shown that the discourses 
associated with these environmentalisms “are not attributable to an actor’s structural 
position within a bureaucratic, political, or socioeconomic system; rather, they are 
deeply held and contested truths representing foundational ideas about environmental 
or social processes,”
442
 an idea I seek to expand on here.  
 As I show in this and following chapters, initial drivers for the creation of the 
project included both economic development and environmental motivations, as well 
as goals apparently consistent with what would be expected given the leaders of the 
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project. For example, agricultural elites who founded the project point to continued 
market access as a motivation for creating the project. Many farmers point to the 
same thing with regard to their initial motivation for participating in the project, 
though it is unclear how direct material benefits have transpired as a result of the 
project. Instead, as the project has progressed and evolved. In fact, some producers in 
Lucas credit Lucas Legal with helping them meet environmental goals and sparking 
their interest in environmental conservation and preservation. Thus, the task in this 
chapter and the next is to understand what Himley has called “the complex and place-
based sets of practices through which particular actors have produced, reproduced, 
and challenged [this] novel [mode] of governance.”
443
   
 
Reconciling agricultural and environmental ethics 
  
 The modern agriculture industry of the type dominant in Lucas is generally 
viewed as environmentally destructive due to the environmental processes that are 
associated with it, such as increased carbon emissions, changes in water quality, 
destruction of native vegetation and biodiversity, and the effects of agrochemicals on 
humans, plants and other animals. Critics of this model of production argue that these 
costs of agriculture are externalized under a “productionist paradigm,” in which 
efficiency is paramount and producers are unable, unwilling, or otherwise expected to 
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not take into account such environmental costs.
444
 This highly structural view of 
agriculture fails to account for non-economic motivations of farmers, including their  
ethics or the importance of personal experiences, or even alternate economic 
motivators. Alongside the productionist paradigm, after all, exists another, older 
agricultural paradigm – that of land stewardship.  
 An older agrarian paradigm of land stewardship may be conceptualized as an 
environmentalist ethic which values “prudence” in the use of resources.
 445
 It is 
reproduced at the farm level as work tasks are passed on directly to the farmers’ 
children, who have a role on the farm from an early age and quickly learn the direct 
relationship between the survival of their community and their way of life, and the 
continued availability of natural resources in their surroundings.
446
 Far from being the 
unaware and unethical resource abusers of environmentalists’ ire, Thompson notes 
that, in fact,  
 
farmers develop an interest-based notion of stewardship deserving of 
our respect in virtue of its ecological sophistication…[because, after 
all] life on the farm can more readily engender knowledge of 
ecosystem cycling than does environmental activism.
447
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Indeed, depending on the land for one’s livelihood is highly conducive to one 
learning to understand it and learning to conserve it.  
 Productionism (or productivism as it is alternately called) is its own sort of 
agricultural ethos, which in the West, is closely tied to Judeo-Christian beliefs. As 
Lowe and Ward note, it resonates with 
 
a Protestant work ethic which sees sloth rather than greed as sinful and 
links virtue and industriousness and sees greater wealth as the just 
reward for hard work. In this sense, productive farmers are seen as 
better farmers, with greater yields displaying the virtuousness of hard 
work.
448
 
 
It emerged “slowly and painfully from a process of trial and error” in farming systems 
around the world, though it has not always been applied evenly by all farmers; and it 
inherently advocates sustainable use in place of opposing use of natural resources.
449
 
This productionist paradigm need not be in conflict with a paradigm of land 
stewardship, though. Because farmers are dependent on such environmental inputs as 
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soil and continued access to water from streams and rainfall, for example, agrarian 
stewardship is, for Thompson, “an ecologically based duty that is entirely consistent 
with the farmer’s interest in producing food and fiber commodities,”
450
 for use and 
for financial gain. The conflict between agriculture and the environment, then, is 
manufactured – not by farmers, but by other agricultural actors whose reliance on 
environmental inputs is less direct and whose access to financial gain from the 
commodification of agricultural products and inputs is more direct. 
 Rational use of natural resources by indigenous and other “traditional” 
farmers has been extensively documented, particularly in Political Ecology 
literature,
451
 but the value of rational resource use, however minimized or obscured 
by the drive for greater production, continues in some form even in commercial or 
industrial agriculture. Instead of seeking to reemphasize this paradigm in these 
landscapes, though, the rise of an urban-based environmental movement has had the 
somewhat perverse effect of “eclipsing” agriculture as society’s “major source of 
natural values and…[a] key mediator of natural morality.”
452
 In Thompson’s words:  
 
Farmers’ understanding of self-interest has been confined to visible 
consequences. While they have been reasonably attuned to 
environmental consequences that are visible on their own farms, they 
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have been oblivious to the accumulative effects of many farms. Little 
in the traditional stewardship ethic would have directed them to the 
ecosystem consequences of production practices employed by many 
individual decision makers. What is more, stewardship has seldom 
taught farmers to love nature in its natural state.
453
 
 
The paradigm of land stewardship provides a starting point for a comprehensive agri-
environmental ethic, but it, alone, is insufficient.  
 This conflict will only be resolved when farmers, as well as those who benefit 
from the farmers’ activities, accept a broader definition of economy that requires that 
they bear (closer to) the true costs of their activities.
454
 If environmentalism is 
conceived of solely as preservation and a wholesale rejection of altering natural areas 
at all, any kind of agriculture will always be in conflict with it; likewise, an 
agricultural stewardship based solely on rational use of resources on each farm will 
eventually become unsustainable, as well. A combination of these views, a balance of 
values in this regard, should be the mutual goal of farmers and environmentalists.
455
 
Reconciling the ethic of agricultural stewardship with the productionist paradigm 
fostered by neoliberal capitalist expansion and increased dependence on technology 
in agriculture, though, is more difficult.  
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 For Thompson, the emergence of the technocratic productionist paradigm of 
industrial agriculture has weakened, though not destroyed the influence of 
stewardship on agriculture. As noted above, industrialization of agriculture has, at 
least to some extent, “shift[ed] farmers’ economic livelihood away from dependence 
on soil, water and genetic resources and toward dependence on finance.”
456
 It has 
also, for some, led to a hopeful reliance on agricultural science to “compensate for 
declining soil fertility, water quality [and] genetic variability.”
457
 The problem, in 
sum, is that, “[t]raditional agrarian stewardship is [now] conceived as a duty ethically 
subservient to production; hence when stewardship would entail constraints on 
production, duties to nature seldom prevail over the productionist ethic.”
458
 For Berry, 
the only answer is a rejection of ever-accelerating technological change and the 
fostering of community instead of competition among farmers,
459
 unlikely given the 
integration of productionism in highly entrenched capitalist systems. 
 The case of Lucas Legal offers up a challenge to this rather dire assessment. It 
is a case in which industrial agriculture actors have apparently embraced the 
“imposition by government of various controls on agriculture to restrain the excesses 
of agricultural productivism,”
460
 without abandoning, in any way, the actual 
productivist approach to agriculture. The question is, why and how have they done 
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this? Have “environmental subjects” been made or remade?
461
 Or are agriculture 
actors simply “colluding” to paint Lucas green and attract more growth without 
actually changing substantially their agriculture practices?
462
  
 
The genesis of Lucas do Rio Verde Legal 
  
 The Lucas Legal project was implemented in response to the economic, 
environmental and socio-political uncertainty that had increasingly become more 
apparent in the agriculture industry of the Brazilian Amazon in the early 2000s.
463
 
Local leaders saw that to ensure the continued investment of national and multi-
national companies in their growing municipality and achieve their vertical 
integration goals in this climate, they would need to reduce risks for the companies 
investing there, including reducing environmental enforcement risks. In fact, Lucas 
Legal was not the first of their efforts. When Sadia decided to invest R$800,000 in an 
enormous new slaughterhouse in Lucas, they did so with the assurance from local 
leaders that they would have a “guarantee of sustainable growth.”
464
 This guarantee 
included the usual guarantees of attractive tax arrangements, access to essential 
resources such as water, and the availability of labor, but it also included assurances 
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that profits would not be threatened by legal and market embargoes due to wanton 
local disregard for environmental regulations.  
 Also, crucially, Lucas was located just below the famed ‘13
th
 parallel’, an 
apparent misappropriation of the definition of the Legal Amazon in the states of 
Goiás and Tocantins from an amendment (Medida Provisoria 1511/96) to the Forest 
Code. Though Mato Grosso has been included in its entirety in the boundaries Legal 
Amazon since its dismemberment from Mato Grosso do Sul in 1977, there remains a 
considerable amount of confusion about this. In other words, though the 13
th
 parallel 
has never had any legal meaning concerning the Forest Code in Mato Grosso, 
considerable apprehension has existed around it, and this apprehension has actually 
had an effect on major business decisions in the region.
 465
 Even today, producers in 
Lucas continue to believe that Forest Code requirements are less stringent and so they 
have some sort of advantage for being “below parallel 13,”
 466
 though this is actually 
entirely irrelevant.  
 The exact genesis of the idea for the Lucas Legal project is unclear. The 
current mayor of Lucas takes, and is generally given, credit for the idea; at least two 
American businessmen with investments in Mato Grosso also claim that the idea was 
theirs. According to one of the businessman, KD, neither the TNC nor any other large 
ENGO was working to address environmental issues associated with agriculture in 
the Amazon until he bought land there, became aware of environmental issues first-
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hand, and used his personal connections to reach out to ENGOs like TNC. KD 
currently runs his own environmental agriculture non-profit in another region of the 
Amazon, though he claims the idea for working with producers in the Amazon to 
improve their conservation ethic was his idea from the beginning. According to KD,  
 
The TNC stole the idea of working with producers…conservationists 
were busy saying the soils [in the Amazon] were bad and farming was 
unviable in the Amazon and trying to stop people that way. When I 
started [my] project, the TNC wasn’t even working in the Amazon. 
They were buying up swamp in the Pantanal and desert in the 
Northeast. I don’t want to talk about that because it’s in the past, but 
look and see who was working with producers in 2004. Nobody! They 
stole the idea.
467
 
 
In fact, environmentalists, including international ENGOs, have been working in the 
Amazon for since at least the early 1990s,
468
 but KD is correct that working with 
commercial-scale producers is new for environmentalists acting in the Amazon.  
 Another businessman with more direct ties to agri-business in Lucas and the 
surrounding regions, SS, claims the idea for the local agriculture industry to engage 
with environmentalists was his. He claims that he and his business partners in Lucas 
got nervous about protests in Santarém, Pará, coordinated with David Cleary of the 
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TNC (who he claims is a personal friend of his), and submitted the proposal for what 
would become Lucas Legal to the mayor. Once Franz travelled to Europe and saw 
news stories about Greenpeace protests in the Amazon, he put the project into 
action.
469
  
 And finally, as mentioned above, the current mayor of Lucas is generally 
given credit for the idea for Lucas Legal, credit which he also claims for himself. 
When asked how he developed the idea for the project, he says: 
 
Actually, in 2005 I took a trip to Europe. I saw a Greenpeace 
campaign, really powerful, against products from Mato Grosso. For 
example, not to eat McDonalds because McDonalds was buying beef 
from Mato Grosso and people were buying soy for cattle feed, so it 
was really shocking. So I saw that what we are doing here doesn’t 
have anything to do with what’s going on up there [in Pará where 
Greenpeace had been protesting]. The world has the idea that here 
there are only thieves and bandits that knock down trees. So I came 
back to Lucas, called Luciane Copetti, who was the municipal 
Secretary of Environment back then, and brought TNC in, and we 
talked and came up with an idea that could be the project that could 
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create an image, and we called the businesses to finance the project, 
and that’s how it was started.
470
 
 
When asked about the initial contact with TNC, the mayor corroborated SS’s story. 
He said, “I have a business that has an American who works with me and was friends 
with the president of TNC Brasil. The NGOs, normally we have an aversion to them, 
or apprehension about them. So this was important.”
471
 Other producers confirm the 
mayor’s story, though it is unclear if this is because they have simply heard the 
mayor’s story retold frequently in the media.
472
  
 These interviews clearly illustrate that, whoever came up with the idea for 
Lucas Legal, they were heavily influenced by pressures being placed on the 
agriculture industry even in places as distant as Santarém. Hochstetler and Keck have 
characterized changes in environmental politics over time capable of being affected 
by “random or contingent events.”
473
 Indeed, given the differences outlined in other 
chapters between the situation for agriculture in the Cerrado versus the Amazon 
forest, and efforts on the part of people in Lucas to separate themselves from 
producers in the Amazon biome (calling them thieves and bandits), it is curious that 
they would undertake significant efforts based on events occurring deep in the 
Amazon.  And yet, in spite of discursive efforts to separate themselves from the 
goings-on of agriculture in the Amazon, the fact is agriculture in Lucas is closely tied 
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to agriculture in other parts of the Amazon, particularly further north on BR-163 due 
to road networks and teleconnections that link supply chains, farmer networks, and 
migration patterns.
474
 Pavement of BR-163 will only increase this dependence.
475
 
 Local elites in Lucas, of course, were not the only powerful actors competing 
for influence in the region. Certainly, powerful national and transnational companies 
have been flocking to the region,
476
 but so too have been ENGOs. As mentioned 
above, until relatively recently, the Cerrado was seen as a “wasteland,”
477
 unsuitable 
for farming and “seen as essentially uninteresting from a biologic standpoint, and 
widely modified by human action, especially fire” by environmentalists and 
scientists.
478
 They recognized their mistake by the late 1990s and early 2000s. After 
massive conversion of Cerrado to pasture and croplands was well underway and had 
been for two decades, wider recognition of the highly-diverse and high-biomass 
Cerrado and associated transitional ecosystems began to be more widely known,
479
 
and the race to preserve the Cerrado along with the Amazon’s humid forests was 
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underway.
480
 When the plans for Lucas Legal were being made in 2006, International 
ENGOs were just beginning to start programs in the Cerrado.
481
 Indeed, simply 
staking a claim in the Cerrado seems to have been a motivating factor in TNCs 
decision to participate in Lucas Legal.
482
 This is consistent with the “direct 
competition with [other NGOs] in terms of campaign profiles, sponsorship, 
membership base, media attention and identity” observed by other scholars.
483
 
  
Implementation of Lucas Legal 
  
 The goals established for the new project were to achieve total compliance 
with socio-environmental laws in the agricultural and livestock sectors of the 
municipality, including compliance with the Forest Code, labor laws, and sanitation 
laws. Once the mayor and TNC had agreed to be partners in this endeavor, they 
brought on the mayor’s own company, Fiagril, a regional distributor of soy and other 
agricultural products; Sadia (now part of BrasilFoods SA); and the Swiss company, 
Syngenta, a multinational manufacturer and distributor of chemical agricultural 
defensives as sponsors of the project, with each of these companies pledging an initial 
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R$115,000 reais (about $51,000 USD at 2006 exchange rate).
484
 The total initial 
budget for the project was R$450,000 reais. About 20 professionals from the 
municipal government, the rural producers’ union, the Ministério Público (Public 
Attorney’s Office, or MP), and TNC were charged with carrying out the project. 
SEMA was also brought on board to provide legal cover for the project, which could 
be risky for farmers as outside groups like TNC were brought in to essentially 
document farmers’ environmental crimes.  
 The project was to be carried out in two phases. Phase one would entail 
“registering” all of the municipality’s rural producers and georeferencing and 
mapping the entire municipality. Initially, registration with the project was envisioned 
as separate from any legal title or registration. Indeed, all properties in Lucas were 
“registered” with the project and mapped without any action on the part of the 
landowner besides allowing members of the georeferencing team onto their 
properties, allowing the project to claim 100 percent participation in the project as 
soon as the maps were ready in 2007.
485
 Later, a supplementary goal of licensing all 
properties with the state would be added (described more fully below). Phase two 
would entail the actual reforesting of APPs and RLs under the requirements set forth 
by the Forest Code and as identified by the mapping process. Compliance with labor 
and sanitation laws appeared to hang in the background of the project, sometimes 
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referenced by staff but apparently pursued in a less public manner than the goals 
related to Forest Code compliance.  
Project leaders recognized from the beginning that proven compliance with 
the Forest Code by landowners would be the public centerpiece of the project. After 
all, the idea for the project had grown from anxiety threats to agricultural activities by 
environmental groups pressuring firms and government agencies to take actions to 
limit deforestation. As described in chapter 4, Brazil’s environmental laws are rather 
progressive. The centerpiece of this legislation, the long-standing Forest Code, for 
example, requires that farmers in Lucas leave more than a third of their properties 
under native forest cover, in addition to certain amounts of vegetation along streams, 
springs, and lakes. Enforcement of the Forest Code at the property level, though, 
requires that producers have their properties correctly surveyed and adequately titled, 
conditions that cannot be taken for granted in the Amazon, which was settled under 
somewhat tumultuous circumstance and where land tenure arrangements have been 
notoriously rife with fraud.  
At times, though, a tumultuous beginning of a settlement can lead to a well-
defined tenure regime in the location. Because Lucas was settled by three different 
groups – private settlers associated with a cooperative, INCRA-sponsored settlers, 
and posseiros – most title disputes or irregularities had been resolved by the 2000s 
due to significant attrition on the part of some settlers and the dedication of those who 
were able to stay to resolving title insecurities to avoid repeated future conflict.
486
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Most of the INCRA settlers moved on, and in resolving early conflicts with INCRA 
over the lands, the posseiros had negotiated official recognition of their land claims.  
Settlers associated with the cooperative negotiated for their titles through the 
cooperative.
487
 This situation of uncontested land tenure is somewhat unique to Lucas 
and has eluded claimants to land in many other parts of the frontier.
488
 Wendy Jepson 
has noted that access to a secure title was one of the “valued good[s]” offered by 
cooperatives and private firms, which could easily reduce the risks faced by settlers in 
the inherently risky proposition of moving to a frontier area.
489
 Secure titles increase 
the value of the land, as well as making it less risky for a farmer to make the 
necessary investments to improve and maintain the productivity of farmland. Thus, 
Lucas’ history of conflictive and competitive settlement, perhaps unexpectedly, led to 
secure titling for most property owners. Without this land security, it is unlikely that 
producers would have any incentive to undertake long-term improvement projects on 
their properties, including preservation of forested reserves.  
Early achievement of secure land tenure, though, meant that most properties 
had not been surveyed since the 1980s or so. TNC staff report that in other parts of 
the state, errors regarding property size and extent on titles and deeds can be 
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considerable and likely associated with purposeful deceit,
490
 though in Lucas errors 
are less egregious and can mainly be attributed to error in mapping methods. Even so, 
discrepancies among cadastral maps held by the city, the state, and property owners 
were not insignificant and presented challenges to some property owners as they 
undertook licensing.  
 In order to assess land use, coverage and the quality of the existing cadastral 
records of rural properties in Lucas, in early 2007, each property in Lucas was 
georeferenced by a team of TNC employees. TNC also purchased and mosaicked 
10m resolution SPOT4 satellite images (all captured in 2005) to provide complete 
coverage of Lucas plus a 5 km buffer on the outside of the municipal boundary.
491
 
Satellite images were prepared using standard image equalization techniques such as 
LUT (Look-Up Table) and Histogram Matching, and a program called Agrogeo 
which was developed by a contracted data processing team. They were then analyzed 
using both automated and visual interpretation to generate polygons classified 
according to the Brazilian System of Vegetation Classification, IBGE publications, 
previous scientific studies on the phytophysionomy of the Cerrado, and the RADAM 
project (Figure 21).
492
 The results showed that of the total land area 68.73 percent of 
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the municipality is deforested and 31.02 percent remained forested.
493
 A deficit of 12 
percent was found for the municipality’s RLs.
494
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Land cover in Lucas do Rio Verde, 2006 
Land Use/Description Area (ha) Percent of Total 
Annual Agriculture 237,242.63 65.32 
Irrigated Agriculture 1,833.73 0.50 
Permanent Agriculture 293.32 0.08 
Cerrado – Scrubby Savanna 9,736.12 2.68 
Cerrado – Woody/Grassy     
Savanna 
1,627.23 0.45 
Cerradão – Closed Savanna 46,144.42 12.71 
Water Bodies 494.41 0.14 
Riparian Areas 55,115.69 15.18 
Pasture 9,173.07 2.53 
Urban or Constructed Areas 1,408 0.39 
TOTAL 522,273.69 100 
 Source: TNC, 2006 
  
 
 
 While property owners are allowed to determine for themselves where on 
their property (or, possibly, off their property) their RL will be located, APP locations 
are by definition determined by the law and the location of water bodies, and thus, 
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their presence, absence, and adequateness can be easily determined with satellite 
images and GIS software. It is for this reason that the project initially focused only on 
APPs.  
 To demarcate the APPs in Lucas, GIS technicians simply applied buffers of 
the appropriate sizes to rivers, springs, and lakes according to the requirements of 
Supplementary Law 38 (21 November 1995). For example, streams with a width of 
50 m or less require an APP of 50 m on each side; streams with a width of 50 to 200 
m require an APP of 100 m on each side; streams with a width of 220-600 m require 
an APP of 200 m on each side; streams with a width larger than 600 m requires an 
APP of 500 m on each side; and other water bodies such as springs, lakes and 
reservoirs require an APP of 100 m on all sides.
495
 A new layer was created for the 
hydrography of the municipality with buffers of the appropriate width around each 
water body. Further analysis revealed that there were 4,873 ha of “degraded APP 
area,” or area that should be forested in APP but is not, totaling 1.3 percent of the 
municipality’s total area.
496
 
 RL areas cannot be mapped without the participation of the property owner 
due to their potential for variation in location, though most property owners, in 
practice, compensate their RLs by adding additional width to their APPs. A later step 
in the licensing process involves demarcating and recovering degraded RLs; this will 
be discussed in the next chapter.   
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 After georeferencing the boundaries of every property in the municipality and 
comparing these results with cadastral records held by the municipal government and 
SEMA, TNC found that SEMA had less than 1 percent (0.7%) of polygon perimeters 
correctly defined which was not unexpected given the challenges SEMA has faced in 
compiling its environmental database. The municipality’s database had 8.7 percent 
correctly defined (Table 4).
497
  Most of the offsets discovered by TNC were slight 
(Figure 20), but because in agriculture, space (land) is directly related to income 
generated, it is important to producers that the boundaries be correct. Some producers 
commented in interviews about how important the process of having their properties 
georeferenced and correcting errors in their own understandings of where their 
property boundaries and water bodies was to them.
498
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Table 4. Comparison between SEMA and municipal cadastral records for Lucas do Rio Verde 
Inconsistency Percent of Perimeters 
– SEMA 
Percent of Perimeters - 
Municipal 
Perimeter OK 0.7 8.7 
Perimeter offset on hydrography 0.7 12.7 
Perimeter offset on hydrography and 
access road 
66.9 61.3 
Perimeter offset on hydrography and 
access road/duplicate polygon 
2.6 0 
Perimeter offset on hydrography and 
access road/overlaps adjacent 
15.2 0 
Perimeter offset on access road 6.0 17.2 
Perimeter offset on access road/duplicate 
polygon 
2.6 0 
Perimeter offset on access road and 
overlapping adjacent 
2.6 0 
Perimeter overlaps adjacent 2.0 0 
Not evaluated 0.7 0.1 
 
TOTAL 100 100 
 Source: TNC, 2006 
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Figure 20. Example of perimeter offset on waterway and access road, Source: TNC, 2006 
 
 
 
Local agriculture elite places trust in an international ENGO 
 
To understand the curious circumstances that led the agricultural elite of 
Lucas to ally with TNC, one must keep in mind the vast amount of distrust of and 
dissatisfaction with the state and federal environmental authorities among agricultural 
actors in Lucas. As described in previous chapters, by 2006, when Lucas Legal was 
first proposed, this distrust was firmly rooted among farmers and municipal leaders 
based on decades of their mistreatment by authorities from state and federal agencies 
247 
 
and by failures on the part of these agencies to meet even a basic standard of 
preparedness—technological and otherwise—to do their jobs adequately.  
It is first worth commenting on the relatively poor quality of the state SEMA 
records and maps, which is particularly instructive as to the alliance among 
agricultural elites in Lucas and TNC. In 2000, the state of Mato Grosso, through 
SEMA’s predecessor agency, FEMA, launched the first deforestation control system 
in Brazil that relied explicitly on satellite imagery of individual properties to license 
these properties.
499
 The system, called SLAPR was quickly and optimistically touted 
as having “a significant effect” on clearing and as proof that deforestation in 
Amazonia is controllable for relatively little financial outlay.
500
 The efficacy of this 
system, though, soon came under scrutiny as FEMA officials were busted for 
participation in an illegal logging ring in 2005 (Operation Curupiri, discussed in 
greater detail in chapter 4) after having already been accused of falsifying images and 
maps in order to issue fraudulent environmental licenses in 2003.
501
 Indeed, a 2005 
study carried out by a Brazilian ENGO showed that in 2003-2004, illegal or non-
permitted deforestation rates on RLs of properties licensed under SLAPR was barely 
different than rates on properties with no environmental license, and was six times 
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higher than the rate on public lands in Conservation Units and on Indigenous 
Lands.
502
  
In other words, the reputation of FEMA/SEMA at the time Lucas Legal began 
in late 2006/early 2007 was poor. The reputation of SEMA (and the federal 
environmental monitoring agency, IBAMA) among farmers is summed up by this 
small holder producer, KWM, who has adequate APP and RL on his small property: 
“I think that IBAMA and SEMA are very bad agencies. Very lazy, very slow, very 
unwilling to do certain things.”
503
 
The scandal-ridden history of state and federal environmental agencies and 
their poor regard among farmers does raise the question of how a state system with a 
history of systemic fraud and incompetence with regard to satellite-image-based 
monitoring and licensing of properties could be expected to move forward in on their 
own. This also helps illuminate one answer to an obvious question of why leaders in 
Lucas turned to an International ENGO (TNC) rather than simply turning to the state, 
which already had a monitoring and licensing system in place, when they determined 
that they desired achieving legitimate environmental licensing throughout the 
municipality. TNC’s analysis seems to only confirm what leaders in Lucas seem to 
have suspected – that the state environmental agency was not competent or 
trustworthy enough to license properties on its own.
504
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Another, more cynical explanation for local leaders reaching out, past the state 
and its SLAPR system to TNC in order to put their plan into action lies in the 
importance of legalizing future deforestation (permitted deforestation after licensing) 
under SLAPR. In a very comprehensive study for her dissertation, Andrea Aguiar 
Azevedo has shown that: 
 
[o]ne important characteristic of the System [SLAPR] is to identify the 
types of deforestation in terms of legality, as outside of the System, 
this was not possible, when all deforestation was illegal, even that 
which would be possible to be legalized inside of individual 
properties. In this way, one of the objectives of SLAPR was 
specifically the legalization of “legalizable” deforestation and the 
punishment of illegal deforestation (basically in RL).
505
 
 
Legalization of “legalizable” future deforestation outside of RLs was not 
likely an important objective for farmers in Lucas. Because of the early adoption and 
success of industrial agriculture in Lucas, there was very little “legalizable” land for 
deforestation outside of RLs left in Lucas by 2006. Instead, leaders in Lucas were 
interested in achieving licensing that absolved local producers of any obligation for 
previous allowable deforestation and providing landowners an opportunity to redress 
excessive deforestation inside of RLs and APPs without paying fines and risking 
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imprisonment. Applying for a license under the SLAPR system and the licensing 
system that followed it exposed landowners to the possibility of expensive fines for 
previous deforestation, even if this was not in excess of the 35 percent plus APPs that 
land owners were responsible for maintaining under native cover in Lucas. Thus, it 
was rational for leaders in Lucas to look for support in their licensing initiative 
beyond the state system which would have offered them very little.  
 The alliance that formed between local leaders in Lucas and TNC at the 
beginning of the Lucas Legal project is consistent with the “boomerang pattern” of 
advocacy network formation toward policy change described by Keck and Sikkink.
506
 
In the boomerang, local or domestic groups that are ignored, blocked, or otherwise 
discouraged by the state may, according to Keck and Sikkink, 
 
bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to 
bring pressure on their states from outside…Linkages are important 
for both sides: for the less powerful third world actors, networks 
provide access, leverage, and information (and often money) they 
could not expect to have on their own; for northern groups, they make 
credible the assertion that they are struggling with, and not only for, 
their southern partners.
507
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Of course, the “third world” status of Brazil was already in question by the 
mid-2000s and, in any case, large-scale land owners and political elites in a 
commercial-agriculture boom town like Lucas can hardly be thought of as 
disenfranchised in the way that many of Keck and Sikkink’s examples of indigenous 
groups, rubber tappers, and political dissidents are. However, elites in Lucas, while 
able to generate and manage a very profitable local agriculture industry with strong 
ties to the global market still faced obstacles to achieving continued local growth and 
success over the long term, which they attributed to a threat to market access due to 
increasing global emphasis on conservation and lack of support (manifested in 
different ways) from the (non-local) government.  
When the situation is viewed in this way, it is clear that elites and other 
agricultural actors in Lucas had strong reasons to select for working with an 
international group as opposed to a state agency like SEMA. First, working with 
TNC, though initially viewed with apprehension, quickly began to resonate with the 
project leaders-to-be and producers. Although TNC is an American ENGO of the 
type popularly vilified by many in the Brazilian Amazon,
508
 the fact is that 
international ENGOs also have access to substantial financial, knowledge, and 
political resources. It is impossible to know but reasonable to expect that if there had 
not been personal connections between Lucas elites and TNC that such a partnership 
would not have arisen. This is consistent with the work of Keck and Sikkink on 
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environmental network formation in other geographical and social spaces in the 
Amazon, for which they also say that “personal connections were crucial.”
509
 
Second, until the mid-2000s and continuing today, confidence in the 
competence of the state government of Mato Grosso and the Brazilian government is 
rather low in Lucas. From the outside, it is easy to see how certain state policies have 
been kind to Lucas, especially the agriculture industry, such as the construction of 
Highway BR-163 and tax and finance benefits accrued by producers over the last 30 
years. At the same time, there is near universal agreement among stakeholders of 
every kind in the agriculture sector in Lucas that the state (other than the local state) 
has done very little to contribute to their successes. In fact, as discussed more 
extensively in Chapter 5, there is a real sense in Lucas that they have risen above the 
obstacles set for them by the state to become the successful agricultural commodity 
exporter that they are today.
510
 When asked about the government’s role in protecting 
the environment in the context of the agriculture industry, DD, a producer, captured 
this view by saying “Really, they don’t do anything. Who does it is the producers and 
everyone in agriculture.”
511
 Another producer, RG, noted: 
 
I don’t think it’s an obligation, it’s more of a compliance thing, 
huh?...You know, the law is there, sometimes someone knows what 
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the law is and can’t comply because the public agencies don’t work. 
They are slow, they are ineffective…for people who do work that 
involves forest and things like that, it’s complicated – it involves 
SEMA. If it involves animals, it’s a question of LO, (licença de 
operação, or Operating License) and it’s a bit easier. There is 
monitoring and if you are o.k., a few days later [the permit] is issued. 
But if it involves forest and the involvement of the state, and all of 
these things, it takes a long time. So, the government should be more 
agile, much more agile.
512
  
 
This view, though, is not universal. Some producers, such as TU, a producer and 
posseiro, note that the government did support some early settlers whose arrival 
predated the official settlement: “We received a title from INCRA. And later we went 
buying more land from those who were given it and couldn’t make it, and we bought 
for more than nothing.”
513
  
 Lack of confidence in the competence of the state to manage rural areas is 
something that environmentalists and ruralists, often seen as opposing sides in the 
battle over rural land use and management, have in common in Brazil. Hochstetler 
and Keck have summed up the reasons for ineffective rural management in Brazil as 
being threefold: the “public authority” over matters environmental is not unified, the 
federal government lacks the authority it needs to enforce environmental laws, and 
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the northern and northeastern states, where environmental regulations on 
deforestation have the most potential to limit economic growth, have disproportionate 
representational strength in Congress.
514
   
Indeed, it is this perception of incompetency of state and federal officials that 
compelled municipal leaders to turn to TNC for support. TNC responded favorably 
because they, too, recognized the need for an improved reputation to continue to work 
effectively in the region. After all, as one producer, KQ, put it “[TNC] gained 
credibility here for developing this project, and I think if it depended just on people 
from here, it would have taken a long time. They [TNC] know how to do it, to 
organize it. It’s not easy. If we just did it with people here in house, there would be 
lots of personal interests [at play].”
515
 In other words, the boomerang was mutually 
beneficial for TNC and local elites – each gained credibility and accountability. 
 
Property diagnostics 
   
Once the GIS had been completed, environmental diagnostic documents were 
created for each property and presented to property owners (Figure 21). These 
documents were meant to provide landowners with an “x-ray” of their properties, 
including a map, the total size of existing reserves, and the location (in the case of 
APPs) and sizes of reserve deficits.
516
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Figure 21. Example of a diagnostic document from Lucas Legal, Source: TNC, 2011 
 
 
 
The value of these diagnostic documents to TNC was that they showed 
producers where they needed to replant vegetation that had been unlawfully cleared.  
After all, for TNC, as a conservation organization, is ultimately interested in trees 
being replanted, with mapping and licensing as a means to this end.
517
 They believed 
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that providing clear information about legal requirements and the actual situation of 
producers’ properties would remove obstacles and help motivate landowners to 
reforest. One reason frequently cited by farmers, politicians, and other individuals 
familiar with the situation for the lack of compliance with the Forest Code is that it is 
unclear and that farmers do not know what their obligations are. Farmers and others 
explain this issue in many ways; some of the most common of these are: that the 
Forest Code has changed over time; that the government and enforcement of the 
Forest Code are too unwieldy; and that farmers get their information from suspect 
sources.  
A common complaint from farmers about environmental laws is that they 
have changed over time and that the new requirements are often retroactive. The 
Forest Code has, indeed, changed a few times since Lucas was first settled. For 
example, as detailed in Chapter 3, when Lucas was settled, farmers were not only 
allowed to deforest 80 percent of their property, they were expected and sometimes 
required to do so.
518
 In  1995, this amount was reduced to 50 percent as the state of 
Mato Grosso designated Lucas and surrounding regions as “transition” vegetation 
(Lei Estadual Complementar 38/1995), though, the state’s transition vegetation 
designation was later struck down by the federal government, and most of Lucas was 
classified as Cerrado and given the 35 percent RL plus APPs obligation. APP 
requirements have also changed through time. Furthermore, the Forest Code has gone 
from being largely present only on paper at the time of settlement in the 1970s to 
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being more strictly enforced (if unevenly so) today. These changes in requirements 
have created room for confusion and doubt. In the words of one producer, RG: 
 
You could deforest back then and you can’t now. It’s complicated. 
Because there are lots of situations, lots of differences. The law was 
never very clear. And it changed! It changed many times, not just one 
time.
519
 
 
Another farmer and business owner, GR, agrees: 
 
Before, we didn’t think, today you have to think about conservation, 
leaving forest close to water, you know? You have to leave forest, but 
before we didn’t have this. Before it was knock down everything, you 
could do it and you did. Today you can’t.
520
  
 
Another farmer, TV, who arrived as a posseiro, and has owned land there since before 
the INCRA settlement, described his confusion about changing APP requirements 
and the legal problems he is facing as a result.  
 
I was fined because [the law] changed so many times. At one point it 
was 100 meters [APP] along the river, later it was 50, and now it’s 30. 
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So when it was 100 meters, they marked off a part for me to do 
[reforest], and then, I closed it in, but because I have cattle, the cattle 
passed over the dam. I didn’t do anything about it and now they come 
to fine me. I had stopped [doing anything about that area] because they 
couldn’t decide if it was 50 or if it was 30 meters, but either way, I 
wasn’t planting crops there. And now they are fining me and I’m 
defending myself. So now I am going to plant there. I am going to 
leave about 50 meters…I have to reforest a little piece in that area. But 
I was fined so I am making mounting a defense to not have to pay the 
R$15,000
521
 they fined me because I don’t think it is right. There are 
so many things that, you know how it is with the government agencies 
– the agencies don’t know, one does one thing, the other does another 
thing, and then you have IBAMA…
522
 
 
In other words, TV and the other farmers explicitly frame their lack of 
compliance as an information gap issue stemming from changes in requirements (and 
level of enforcement) over time. The quotes presented above illustrate how 
detrimental this uncertainty about requirements is for compliance prospects among 
farmers; not only do they not know what they should be doing, but they express a 
sense of hopelessness that they can achieve compliance in a scenario with shifting 
requirements. This frustration can lead producers to figure that they have little to lose 
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by returning to plant on land that they had previously set aside in an effort to comply 
with requirements. TV, for example, had stopped planting 100 meters from the edge 
of the stream on his land, but eventually found himself to be so frustrated by fines 
(and his own failure to fully exclude cattle from his APP areas) and confused that he 
reverted to planting on land that he had previously set aside.  
Another set of issues is the unwieldy bureaucracy, the lack of a united front 
among government agencies, and the lack of honesty that can exist in such a situation. 
According to one influential producer, KD, “there are 16,000 rules. One agency 
created its rules, another created its rules, you have SEMA, you have another agency 
enforcing rules – it makes it impossible to comply.”
523
 TV also hinted at this in the 
quote presented above. Another producer, GR, summed his frustration with this issue: 
 
It’s not fair…This guy over here can cut down so much, and this guy 
over here can cut trees, and this guy over here can’t, and no one knows 
which is the right Code. It has to be made more transparent. If you 
can’t, you can’t. Everywhere. Not in some places you can, in others 
you can’t, one can, one can’t. If you can’t [cut trees] for so many 
meters [from a stream], then you can’t.
524
 
 
When government agencies, and indeed, individual officials and employees of 
agencies do not interpret or apply the law evenly, producers not only do not 
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understand which interpretation of the law is correct, but they also do not have much 
incentive to comply with the law. Indeed, at a different place in our interview, GR 
described how well connected or more financially well-off producers can bribe their 
way out of fines at a going rate of about 10 percent under the table on the cost of the 
fine.
525
 The diagnostic documents for each property created by an outside group (US-
based TNC) go a long way in closing the space in which this kind of uncertainty and 
dishonesty exists. 
Finally, clearly presented information about a property’s accomplishments 
and deficits in complying with the forest code, such as those on TNCs property 
diagnostics, was a crucial first step in Lucas Legal due to the staggering amount of 
misinformation that exists among producers about environmental regulations, 
changes in laws over time notwithstanding. Far from there being perfect information 
transfer from regulation-setting bodies in Brasília and Cuiabá, it is common for 
farmers to get information from other farmers (their neighbors, family members), 
through the media, or from employees of agricultural supply companies with which 
they interact. Cuiabá is 340 km away from Lucas, and neither SEMA nor IBAMA 
have a satellite office in Lucas, so direct access to information about regulations is 
difficult. Few farmers have internet access on their farms and most farmers in Lucas 
live on their properties. Thus, farmers are somewhat isolated from their governing 
agencies and turn to 3
rd
 party sources for information, so the possibility for 
misinformation is high. Indeed, of the 20 producers I interviewed, 8 reported getting 
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their information solely from either the media or friends and neighbors.  The 
producers who reported getting information directly from government sources or 
from well-organized producers’ groups typically were more elite farmers with close 
ties to these groups.  
Another value of TNCs diagnostic documents was that they provided 
relatively rapid and definitive evidence of progress. As the reputation of agriculture in 
Lucas was a clear motivating factor for local elites to lead the project and for industry 
groups to fund the project, the quick achievement of demonstrable results was highly 
desirable for these groups. It only took the TNC and their contractors about a year to 
do the analysis and produce the property diagnostics. As alluded to above, once the 
diagnostics completed, project leaders could boast of “100 percent participation” in 
the project, even if they had no evidence that a single tree had yet been planted as the 
result of it.
526
 Indeed, this has been effective as various national and foreign media 
outlets have anointed Lucas “the epicenter of what could become an environmental 
revolution,”
527
 based only on what are really relatively minimal environmental 
achievements. 
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The creation of the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR) 
 
As described earlier in this chapter, the first step taken by project leaders of 
Lucas Legal was to sign all of the landowners up for the program by mapping their 
properties and documenting their titles. This created a registry of properties in the 
municipality thereby providing necessary information such as property location, 
dimensions, and features for the diagnostic portion of the process. Though initially 
not a key feature of the project, this registry came to be recognized as one of the most 
innovative features of Lucas Legal. Through the registry and with the associated 
geographic information, the extent of the properties and APPs (or lack of) on the 
property were well-documented, along with other basic information about the 
property and the owner, which facilitated outreach on the part of the project to 
improve compliance and give project leaders a sense of their starting point in Lucas. 
This process easily viewed through the lens of governmentality; it was impossible to 
discipline (or correct) the landowners prior to the survey and registry. Greater control 
over farmers and properties occurred not with more enforcement, but with more 
information. Upon collecting information about each property, properties could be 
classified based on their attributes (e.g., compliant/non-compliant), improvement (or 
regression) could be tracked, and, crucially, defining compliance as normal (and, so, 
non-compliance as abnormal), thereby creating social pressure to conform.
528
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However, for farmers, the immediate value of the registry and the diagnostic 
document provided by the project for their properties was not immediately clear. On 
the one hand, it gave the farmer a sense of what lie ahead of him in order to comply 
with the Forest Code. On the other hand, participation in Lucas Legal alone does not 
provide producers with any kind of license; for that, they had to and still have to work 
with SEMA to eventually get a LAU. Producers in Lucas became painfully aware of 
this in September of 2008, shortly after Lucas Legal was launched, when IBAMA 
suddenly fined 15 producers in Lucas, an action that enraged project leaders in 
Lucas.
529
 This was devastating to project leaders, who hoped that the federal 
government would respect the temporary reprise from prosecutions informally agreed 
to by the state government, but it also pushed Lucas Legal leaders to improve their 
project 
Soon after the raid by IBAMA, Lucas Legal project leaders and other 
influential persons in Mato Grosso, including staff of TNC and at SEMA and the 
SAMA in Lucas, won approval with state law makers for a Provisional Law (Lei 
Complementar 343/2008) that officially created the provisional license CAR 
(Cadastro Ambiental Rural/Rural Environmental Registry) at the state level in Mato 
Grosso. CAR, modeled on Lucas Legal, is an innovative proto-license that breaks 
down the process of compliance with the Forest Code into more manageable steps 
and grants the land-owner a certain period in which to comply with certain steps 
toward full compliance without fear of being fined in the process. Whereas, 
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previously, farmers only applied for the LAU, now there is a legal, step-wise process 
for licensing. In this case, more licensing (and bureaucracy) was beneficial to many 
farmers. After all, it takes time and money to plant and regrow large amounts of 
native vegetation. In the meantime, if a producer is fearful of paying large fines or of 
even going to jail while he tries to bring his property into compliance, and also risks 
losing access to funding until his property is in compliance and he has LAU in hand, 
he cannot really win. In the words of producer RE, “when you do CAR, you are 
opening your heart. I did this wrong. You showed your crime and you could be fined. 
So this pact [MT Legal/insertion of CAR in the process prior to applying for LAU] 
fixes what was wrong with it and I think it was a good idea. I’m happy that this idea 
came.”
530
  
The creation and institutionalization of CAR at the state level was certainly 
beneficial to producers, but the Lucas Legal diagnostic document was only useful, in 
the end, in terms of the pressure it put on the state to create CAR. The CAR issued by 
SEMA requires that a licensed environmental engineer (not TNC staff) complete the 
paperwork and file for the license online. For this, the hard-copy, TNC-issued 
diagnostic document can function as a guide, at best.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
530
 Interview, 4 November 2011. 
265 
 
Conclusion: Environmentalism beyond carrots and sticks? 
  
 The establishment of Lucas as a municipality during the broader process of 
territorialization of the Amazon during the 1970s and1980s was a crucial part of the 
process of extending regulatory power and neoliberal capitalist influence over 
resource extraction throughout the region.
531
 The individuals who settled in Lucas, 
though, were not content to simply participate in this without participating on their 
own terms, which led to conflict and dissatisfaction with the state. With Lucas Legal, 
this dissatisfaction was a factor in locals (elites) looking not to the state, but to 
international and national business and civil society groups to administer was most 
clearly a state-policy issue, and what eventually came around to be resolved by the 
state, in the end. The state was brought in out of necessity, as the ultimate goal of the 
project was to mitigate the transgressions of environmental law in order to add 
stability to the local environmental sector. However, the state solution, building on 
the successes of Lucas Legal, was naturally heavily influenced by the solutions to 
licensing and compliance issues devised by the local elite of Lucas, in partnership 
with TNC. 
 The last chapter described the successes of the local, global-agriculture 
industry, as well as the period of turmoil in environmental governing in the Amazon 
against which Lucas Legal emerged. During the 2000s, the state was extending its 
control in some ways and withdrawing its influence in others, leaving plenty of 
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regulatory room for local agencies to maneuver. Meanwhile, messages of 
environmental (and economic) vulnerability of agricultural systems in the Amazon 
were being delivered by non-state forces. This chapter has explored the organizational 
unfolding of Lucas Legal on the ground for the various stakeholders in the project. 
The next chapter will explore the invention and reinventions of the Lucas Legal 
project have given Luquenses a prop with which to consider, define, and enact their 
own environmentality.  
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CHAPTER VII – ASSESSING LUCAS LEGAL 
 
I will tell you, with Lucas, it’s really impressive when you walk into 
Fiagril and the other companies; they are really on board with the 
forest code compliance. Their frustration is with the amount of time 
it’s taking them to get the Forest Code straightened out. Nobody talks 
about how they don’t want to preserve. Lucas is really the proof on the 
ground of how Forest Code compliance works. It’s frustrating for 
them that they can’t show how strong their forest code compliance is 
since we still don’t know what that means. – David Cleary, TNC. 
 
 The final judgment on whether or not Lucas Legal “succeeded” depends 
ultimately on the criteria on which it is judged. Which criteria are most appropriate 
for assessing environmental governance projects, though, remains an open question 
among policy makers and scholars of environmental governance, and few studies 
seem to have attempted to holistically assess the outcomes of these projects as 
successful or not.
532
 The lack of agreement on assessment criteria (and, indeed, what 
is even to be considered an environmental governance project) has likely hampered 
efforts to assess these projects, and, likewise, the lack of assessment attempts has 
likely impeded the creation of assessment criteria. Moreover, the inherently site-
specific and also multi-scalar nature of these scenarios of decentralized management 
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of nature/natural resources makes them difficult (but surely not impossible!) to 
compare among cases. This chapter will outline a set of potential criteria for 
evaluating environmental governance projects by exploring the evolution and 
outcomes of Lucas Legal. 
Since at least the mid-1980s, a shift toward substantive decentralization has 
become a major characteristic of environmental governance.
533
 For Müller, this 
decentralization has created “fragmented institutional landscapes,” on which 
scholarship has yielded “minimal empirical evidence either supporting or refuting the 
advantages and disadvantages,”
534
 apparently because of the dearth of holistic studies. 
Maria Carmen Lemos and Arun Agrawal have suggested three features of 
“successful” decentralized governance: a change in how lower-level decision makers 
related to those further up the hierarchy; a change in how lower-level decision makers 
relate to their constituents; and a change in the subjectivity of constituents.
535
 It is this 
last criterion that Lemos and Agrawal stress distinguishes contemporary forms of 
environmental governance from previous, colonial-esque attempts to rule from afar, 
and in short, they find that decentralized governance is, in fact, more effective at 
regulating the behavior of individuals with regard to a given issue than highly 
centralized government was.  
Moreover, there is the question of the utility of assessing projects of 
environmental governance. If we assume the successful projects will be scaled up 
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and/or adopted elsewhere from where they first emerged, we must also remember that 
such policy models  
 
reveal their character as relational constructions; they do not simply 
travel, intact, from sites of invention to sites of emulation, like some 
superior export product. Instead, through their very movement they 
(re)make connections between these sites, evolving in form and effect 
as they go.
536
  
 
A shifting and highly-contingent policy landscape makes both single-case and 
cross-case assessment challenging indeed. That these types of projects are difficult to 
assess, due to the need to account for the experiences of various stakeholder groups, 
their multi-scalar nature, or any other reason that poses a methodological challenge 
should serve as, if nothing else, a call for geographers and other scholars to attempt to 
study them.
537
  
With these challenges in defining and evaluating project success in mind, as 
well as the increasing importance of decentralized governance of the environment and 
market incentives for improved environmental outcomes in the Brazilian Amazon and 
elsewhere,
538
 this chapter pursues the task started by Lemos and Agrawal to define 
criteria against which Lucas Legal and other projects of environmental governance 
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may be assessed. Their criteria of 1)transformation of relationships among individuals 
up and down the existing governing hierarchy, 2)the transformation of the 
relationship between lower-level decision makers and their constituents, and 3)the 
facilitation of subject-making among constituents (and even lower-level decision 
makers) outline important functions of a successful project with the individual (policy 
maker, constituent, etc.) and relationships among individuals as the basic unit of 
analysis.  Missing from their analysis, I argue, is an assessment of the appropriateness 
and effectiveness of the institutions generated or transformed by the project 
(including their scale), and the flexibility of the project itself to changes in local 
resource availability, stakeholder demands, and other local circumstances, as well as 
in terms of its ability to be transferred to other locales or implemented at a larger or 
smaller scale. For the purposes of this study, the better a project meets all five of the 
criteria described above (and shown in Table 5), the more “successful” it may be 
considered.  
271 
 
Table 5. Criteria for assessing a project of environmental governance 
Criteria Target 
Changes in relationships up and down the hierarchy of 
government* 
Individual Changes in the relationship between decision makers and their 
constituents* 
Facilitation of subject-making among constituents* 
Appropriateness and effectiveness of institutions generated or 
transformed by the project 
Institutions 
Flexibility of the project itself to changing circumstances/its 
ability to be transferred or re-scaled 
Project 
Source: after Lemos and Agrawal, 2006. 
 
 
 
However, in the messy world of environmental governance, it should be noted 
that “success” is not an absolute or an endpoint; successful environmental governance 
is an ongoing process. As crops are planted each year, as forests and species adapt to 
changes in and around themselves, as technology changes, and as power continues to 
circulate through relationships,
539
 the “environment-related incentives, knowledge, 
institutions, decision making, and behaviors” of various actors must and should also 
evolve.  And yet, the criteria defined here should remain appropriate, if differently 
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met as scenarios change: flexibility and appropriateness in scale and institutions, the 
promotion of inclusiveness, and cross-scale linkages among actors. 
 
Lucas as a shifting policy landscape 
 
The official and original objectives of Lucas Legal, according to TNC 
documents, were to “regularize all rural properties in the municipality from the point 
of view of the Forest Code and end labor violations and the incorrect use of 
agrochemicals.”
540
 Regularizing rural properties was and remains the touchstone of 
the project, and this was to be achieved using the same kind of satellite technology 
that the state was using to enforce the Forest Code. By mapping all properties at the 
beginning of the project, the project was supposed to give local landowners spatial 
information about their farms and their gaps in compliance with federal laws, and 
shield them from fines while they addressed the gaps and secured environmental 
licenses for their properties. The project, which began in 2006, was originally 
supposed to be completed between 2012 and 2014.
541
  
The objectives of the project, though, have undergone shifts as challenges to 
the project as well as new, previously unseen pathways to the achievement of 
objectives were revealed. In this way, Lucas Legal conformed to the expectations of 
the policy mobility/mutation criteria from the outset in which “policy designs, 
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technologies, and frames are […] considered as complex and evolving social 
constructions rather than as concretely fixed objects.”
542
 Indeed, at different points in 
the same interview, David Cleary, who was the director of the Amazon program for 
TNC at the time of the project’s formation, explained that the original objectives of 
the project for various stakeholders were to “get some market advantage out of 
[satellite monitoring of deforestation],” to create a presence for TNC in the Legal 
Amazon in a place that was more accessible to foreign visitors than, for example, 
TNC’s other projects in Santarém, Pará, and to “create a state level rural property 
license with an environmental component.”
543
 That a project has multiple objectives 
is not necessarily problematic, but it does complicate the task of assessing the 
project’s success(es) and failures. The evolution of the project in response to its social 
and political context is instructive about the future of environmental licensing in the 
Amazon (and its role in reducing deforestation associated with agriculture). Project 
leaders quickly realized that the gaping void between objectives and reality in the 
existing governance regime in the region involved not only a lack of economic 
incentives for farmers and a lack of adequate maps for licensing under existing laws, 
but also flexibility of institutions and local leadership willing and able to implement a 
licensing initiatives in any meaningful way.  
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Defining success for Lucas Legal 
 
In the sections that follow, several outcomes of Lucas Legal will be explored 
using the results from a previously unanalyzed pre-project survey of local producers 
conducted by TNC in 2006 and municipal staff and interviews with farmers and 
project leaders conducted in 2011. The challenges still faced by the project will also 
be examined. The following successful outcomes of Lucas Legal will be explored in 
the context of the framework outlined in Table 5: reframing local environmental 
issues as farming issues and the mediation of a more positive relationship between the 
government and farmers, facilitating the process of environmental subject making in 
Lucas; effective scaling-up of the project to solve problems at the most appropriate 
scale; and the incorporation of a wide diversity of participants and environmental 
activities to build on positive reception of the project.  
 
Framing environmental issues as farming issues 
  
Current political ecological thought, tracing its roots as far back as Foucault 
and even Immanuel Kant, calls on us to question dominant understandings and 
discourses about the environment.
544
 As described in the previous chapter, there was a 
time, not so long ago, that farmers were seen as stewards of nature,
545
 more recently, 
and especially in the Amazon, agriculture has come to be implicated as an important 
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driver of deforestation and perpetrator of other environmental ills.
546
 The key issue is 
not whether agricultural expansion in the Amazon has had transformative effects on 
the natural landscape of the Amazon; it certainly has. The critical political ecological 
issues, instead, are whether or not these transformations must continue, and how 
discursive, political and scientific constructions of these transformations have 
contributed to agriculturally driven deforestation. By describing deforestation in 
primarily spatio-ecological terms,
547
 and with technologies undergirded by the 
assumption that a given location in a given time can have but one land use (i.e., 
nature or agriculture), policy makers have naturalized the supposed absolute 
opposition of “nature” and “agriculture.”  
This either/or dichotomy can be seen clearly in the many national-, biome-, 
and state-scale maps produced to show the advancing agricultural frontier replacing 
forest pixel by pixel.  There are at least two problems with this approach, though: 1) 
the spatial and temporal resolutions at which these maps are produced are often 
incongruent with the scale at which most activities in the Amazon are taking place;
548
 
and 2) the binary opposition of nature/agriculture is misleading, incomplete, and 
unnecessarily essentialist in nature. In fact, complex, individual-level decision 
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making based on cultural, historical, economic, and other values create what, when 
aggregated and viewed through certain lenses, appears to be a battle between 
“agriculture” and the “environment.” Leaders of Lucas Legal recognized this and 
successfully threw out the implied opposition between these two landscape types, 
framed deforestation avoidance and environmental licensing as agricultural issues, 
and did so at the property level where individual decision making takes place.  
For example, even before Lucas Legal began farmers in Lucas were as 
concerned about the way some environmental issues, especially the weather/climate 
(15.96 percent of respondents mentioned this as a problem) can affect their 
livelihoods as they were about other issues like the exchange rate, financing issues, 
and the general lack of dedicated agricultural politics and policy (See Table 6). This 
is unsurprising given the excessive rains that had hit the region in January 2005 not 
long before the survey was conducted (Figure 22), and the resultant near total loss of 
the corn harvest that year. These survey results are also consistent with my field 
observations in 2011, especially with regard to weather and climate changes. It was 
not uncommon for me to hear farmers allude directly or indirectly to changes in the 
local climate and weather systems. Farmers reported shorter rainy seasons, more 
powerful rainstorms, stronger cold fronts, and rains coming from “all directions” 
when previously they mainly came from the north.
549
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Figure 22. Tractors sink in a flooded field during the corn harvest, January 2005, Source: Municipal 
archive, Lucas do Rio Verde 
 
 
 
Striking in this regard, however, is the apparent low concern with 
more land-based environmental problems, including erosion (mentioned by 
only 2 respondents), and the absence of any mention of the importance of 
protecting streams and springs in 2006. By the time of my fieldwork in 2011, 
after Lucas Legal had been active for about 5 years, all of the farmers with 
whom I conducted interviews mentioned how important it is to protect 
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waterways and riparian zones, suggesting that Lucas Legal successfully raised 
awareness of this issue among farmers.
550
 
Returning to the issue of the expressed lack of a política agrícola (agricultural 
policy/politics), it is worth discussing the documented but little discussed persistence 
of generally weak governance in the Amazon/Cerrado. Settlers and farmers in the 
Lucas region have consistently attempted to call attention to the lack of resources 
made available to them and the extraordinarily high costs they incurred to settle in 
Mato Grosso. As more fully discussed in Chapter 3, the first decade or so of 
settlement in Lucas was one of considerable hardship, isolation, and even violence, 
even for the more affluent settlers. It is for this reason that those who managed to 
survive in Lucas from the beginning are now extraordinarily proud of their success in 
building a successful agricultural sector and a growing economy in Lucas, and they 
credit little of this achievement to the federal and state governments. In the 2006 
survey (Table 6), 13.62 percent of respondents cited a lack of agricultural policy as a 
major problem, noting, for example, the “few resources” available for farmers, the 
need for subsidized agricultural insurance, the charge that national economic plans 
are “unfavorable” for the agricultural sector, that there is a “lack of representation and 
political will,” and, more simply, blaming then President “Lula” for it all.
551
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Table 6. Sources of dissatisfaction among agricultural producers in Lucas do Rio Verde, Mato Grosso, 
2006 (N = 213) 
Problems/Demands 
Number of 
Respondents 
Percentage (number of 
respondents/total 
surveyed (n=213) 
Political 
Lack of agricultural 
policy/politics or simply “the 
government” 
29 13.62% 
General lack of incentives for 
producers 
4 1.88% 
Financial/ 
Economic 
Taxes are too high 10 4.69% 
Commodity prices are too low 40 18.78% 
Exchange rate is poor or 
fluctuating 
15 7.04% 
High cost of production 
(including inputs) 
77 36.15% 
Issues related to financing (high 
interest rates, short repayment 
periods, unjustness in creating 
payment plans) 
27 13.68% 
Logistics 
Poor condition or a lack of roads 
and highways 
61 28.64% 
Lack of adequate silos or other 
infrastructure 
7 3.29% 
Difficulty security property title 1 0.47% 
Lack of (reliable) electricity in 
rural areas 
8 3.76% 
General difficulty with logistics or 
a lack of technical assistance 
25 11.74% 
Environmental 
Weather/climate* 34 15.96% 
Environmental problems 
including erosion 
2 0.94% 
Disease and other plagues on 
crops 
28 13.15% 
Presence of jaguars 1 0.47% 
The lack of a “green seal” 1 0.47% 
Other “everything” 1 0.47% 
Source: From a survey conducted by TNC and municipal staff in approx. 2006, data from survey 
compiled by the author, 2011, 2012Note: This survey was conducted in anticipation of Lucas Legal 
and was intended to be a type of baseline data source, but to the knowledge of the author, nothing was 
ever done with these data. They were reportedly entered into an electronic spreadsheet at some point, 
but the computer holding the spreadsheet was stolen. The open ended questions “What are your 
problems in agriculture?” and “What are your main demands?” provided the answers to these 
questions, to which some producers responded with many answers, some with a few, and some with no 
answers. *The author would see these as different kinds of complaints, but the words for ‘weather’ and 
‘climate’ are the same word (clima) in Portuguese, so it is unclear from the survey documents about 
which each farmer was referring, thus, they were grouped together.  
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 This point is particularly salient when compared with the (much shorter) 
catalogue of positive aspects of farming in Lucas documented by the same 2006 
survey (see Table 7). There were overall many fewer responses to the question asking 
“what are the strong (positive) points about agriculture here?”, and of these, only two 
of the responses were about politics or governance. The overwhelming majority of 
positive responses were related to the scale, quality, or efficiency of production in the 
region (29.11 percent of respondents mentioned this), or the technology available 
(15.49 percent mentioned this). Nearly 10 percent of respondents mentioned that the 
natural characteristics (climate or topography) of the area were a positive aspect, 
including some who had also mentioned clima as a problem. For 17 respondents, 
there were no positive aspects to agriculture in Lucas at the time of the survey, though 
this apparent pessimism should be regarded cautiously; a snapshot of agriculture in 
Lucas in 2006 likely captures a disproportionate amount of pessimism given the acute 
confluence of challenges to the industry in 2005 (See chapter 5). 
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Table 7. Sources of Satisfaction among Agricultural Producers in Lucas do Rio Verde, Mato  Grosso, 
2006  (N = 213) 
Positive Aspects 
Number of 
Respondent
s 
Percentage (number of 
respondents/total 
surveyed (n=213) 
Political/ 
Governance 
The power of producers 1 0.47% 
Producers’ “good attitudes” 1 0.47% 
Financial/ 
Economic 
Scale, quality or efficiency of 
production 
62 29.11% 
Rapid return on 
investments/ready market for 
products 
2 0.94% 
Stability 2 0.94% 
Commodity prices 1 0.47% 
Good bundles from 
companies 
1 0.47% 
Logistics 
Technology 33 15.49% 
Farm management system, 
including proximity of Sadia 
and other industry 
3 1.41% 
Availability of energy 1 0.47% 
Environmental 
Natural characteristics of the 
area (climate or topography) 
20 9.39% 
Other “Right now there are none” 17 7.98% 
Source: Survey conducted by TNC and municipal staff in approx. 2006, data from survey 
compiled by the author, 2011, 2012 
Note: This survey was conducted in anticipation of Lucas Legal and was intended to be a 
type of baseline data source, but to the knowledge of the author, nothing was ever done with 
these data. They were reportedly entered into an electronic spreadsheet at some point, but the 
computer holding the spreadsheet was stolen. The open ended question “What are the strong 
points of agriculture in Lucas?” provided the answers to these questions, to which some 
producers responded with many answers, some with a few, and some with no answers.  
 
 
   
Attention to the motivations of individual actors may improve environmental 
outcomes at the local level, but such binaries of nature/agriculture continue to exist 
further up the governance scale. Elites and upper-level state officials have grappled 
with strong pressures to create policies that promote economic development in the 
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Amazon, and more recently, to also create policies that promote conservation of the 
Amazonian environment. Through their positions of power, these elite actors have 
created institutions, including monitoring systems based on satellite-based remote 
sensing and GIS, that, when referenced uncritically as they usually are, reflect this 
compartmentalization of reality into agriculture/economic development in necessary 
opposition to the environment.  
However, since the 1970s, state-instigated decentralization processes and the 
strengthening of interest-based networks outside of the state have greatly diversified 
both positions and process.
552
 The government has long promoted “contradictory” 
policies simultaneously (most notoriously, the Forest Code and the Land Statute); and 
has, accordingly, been accused of being both ineffective and too effective in 
promoting both pro-development and pro-environmental policies. For example, 
environmentalists and others concerned about the rate of deforestation in the Amazon 
have long pointed to laws and policies, like tax exemptions and land allocation 
policies and procedures that favor development and agricultural activities in the 
Amazon at the expense of forests.
553
 Emily Boyd clearly states this position: 
 
Government failure to protect Amazonia has at the core been its 
development policy over the past 40 years. The primary policy 
objective has been to integrate Amazonia into the national economy. 
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This has led to widespread and intensive logging, large-scale 
mechanized soya bean production, credit subsidies for large and small 
farmers (although the former is in decline), transportation investments 
and rapidly growing urban areas.
554
 
 
Indeed, from even before the March to the West to the present and as the government 
pushes to pave the Cuiabá-Santarém Highway, Brazil’s federal (and state) 
governments have unquestionably promoted environmentally transformative 
economic activities.
555
 
 And yet, farmers in the Amazon also complain that their needs are not being 
met. While there is no question that the agricultural activities of farmers have 
changed the natural environment in the Amazon/Cerrado region, this does not mean 
that the transition has been efficient or accompanied by good governance, or that the 
environmental problems in the region are simply the result of greed on the part of the 
farmers. Of particular import are the poor quality and scarcity of social and rural 
services in the region, the complex land-titling system, and the high level of land 
concentration/uneven land distribution and the correspondingly uneven rural 
policies.
556
 Corporate tax incentives have supported very large landholdings (typically 
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considered 2,500ha or more),
557
 and small-holder policies have supported small 
farms, usually under 200ha in most of the Amazon.
558
 These policies simply do not 
reflect the reality of much of Amazonian agriculture; for example, the average 
landholding size in Lucas is around 750ha, and over half of the properties in the 
municipality are between 200 and 2,500ha.   
Indeed, just as policies of environmental protection have been notoriously 
decoupled from on-the-ground situations in the Amazon, so too have been policies of 
economic development. Roads have been built, sufficient to promote and accelerate 
deforestation but insufficient to safely and economically transport residents and 
commodities. Environmental licensing has been legislated, but fails to either 
comprehensively address environmental issues on farms or be accessible to the many 
farmers in the region with title irregularities on their land. One reason for this 
decoupling with regard to economic and agricultural policies is the diversity of the 
needs they must address due to the very heterogeneity of “producers” as a group as 
referenced above. Table 6 and Table 7 clearly illustrate this heterogeneity further, as 
well as the wide variety of issues that concern producers, even within one 
municipality (Lucas). Sources of dissatisfaction for farmers in Lucas include political, 
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financial and economic, logistical and environmental issues (or in the case of one 
respondent, “everything”).  
As illustrated in Chapter 3,the settlement and development of the region for 
agriculture was less fully- and well-managed by the state than previously thought.
559
 
Settlers were enticed to the region and, for those who actually stayed on the land to 
farm instead of clearing the land for tax breaks and other such rent-seeking behaviors, 
they were offered very little assistance from the government after the first year or 
two, if at all.  In other words, many of the farmers living and working in agriculture in 
the Amazon/Cerrado today are neither the highly impoverished formerly landless 
settlers exemplified by members of the well-known MST (Moviemento dos 
trabalhadores Sem Terra /Landless Workers’ Movement) nor are they exceedingly 
wealthy landowners who inefficiently clear large tracts of land for tax and speculative 
purposes. Instead, they are businessmen for who washed out roads and fluctuations in 
the exchange rate can make the difference between making it and breaking it in a 
given year.  
It is against this backdrop that the first of the successes of Lucas Legal can be 
seen – the reframing of local agri-environmental issues as both agricultural and 
environmental, leading to a shift in how lower-level decision makers relate to 
constituents (Table 5). Scholars have pointed to the ways in which “the environment” 
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is socially constructed
560
 and context specific, and have questioned the voices 
commonly deemed legitimate in defining and defending it and the binary oppositions 
often created by dominant voices.
561
 The above outline of debates surrounding agri-
environmental issues is a clear example of the false dichotomy between, for example, 
conservation of nature and resource extraction (agriculture) that is often perpetuated, 
if not set up, by environmentalists.
562
 Thus, in the cooperation between TNC and 
various agricultural actor groups and the rejection of discourses that separated the 
agricultural from the environmental in the storylines produced by the project and 
project leaders, Lucas Legal proved to be highly innovative, as well as effective, in 
better matching the framing of environmental issues to the experiences of local 
farmers.  In doing so, farmers and local environmental managers were given the 
discursive tools to play on the same team in resolving licensing and forest restoration 
issues: now local environmental officials could help farmers protect their lands and 
get the licensing they deserved rather than enforcing restrictions dictated by outsiders 
on their land use.   
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Evolving views of the environment :Subjects made? 
 
Another key outcome when an environmental project has “worked” is that 
individuals who previously did not consider the environment in their decision 
making, or did not consider it much, begin to consider it (Table 5).
563
 This concept, 
which Agrawal treats more fully in his book Environmentality, is careful in defining 
the concept of  “the making of environmental subjects” that takes place alongside the 
decentralization of environmental rule and the necessary redefinition of state-society 
relations.
564
   
Projects like Lucas Legal are easy to dismiss as greenwashing, as 
environmentalists and other outsiders may find it difficult to believe that individuals 
who so recently participated in massive deforestation events and who continue to 
apply copious amounts of agrochemicals to their fields each season could care about 
the environment or even take the environment into account in decision making as 
environmental subjects. Additionally, it is easy to be skeptical of the motives of 
corporations like many of the partners in Lucas Legal, and to imagine that because 
environmental protection is generally seen to be diametrically opposed to their profit-
making activities, that their participation in the project is some form of passing off of 
environmental responsibility to farmers or a devious attempt to influence regulatory 
processes so as to minimize their responsibilities.
565
 Furthermore, skepticism about 
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cooperation among ENGOs and corporations extends to ENGOs, who may be seen as 
abandoning their ideals and succumbing to money grabbing instead. 
566
 
While these concerns are certainly not unfounded, data from Lucas suggest a 
different reality, consistent with Agrawal’s findings in India. In his meticulous 
detailing of the transformation among the Kumaon people after forest governance 
was decentralized and local forest councils were granted real (not just nominal) power 
over local forests, Agrawal comes to the conclusion that a real change had occurred in 
the viewpoints and subjectivities of some local people.
567
  This change in subjectivity 
to include the environment is significant, even if it is not universal and even if it does 
not bring the individuals concerned exactly in line with the dominant global 
environmental movement. In Agrawal’s words: 
 
I use the term environmental subjects to nominate those who thus care 
about the environment. More precisely, the environment for them 
constitutes a conceptual category that organizes some of their thinking; 
it is also a domain in conscious relation to which they perform some of 
their actions. The practices and thoughts of environmental subjects, as 
I define the term, may not always lead to environmental conservation. 
But they are often undertaken in relation to the environment. I draw on 
evidence related to forests as an example of an environmental 
resource. Further, in considering an actor as an environmental subject I 
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do not demand a purist’s version of the environment: something 
necessarily separate from and independent of concerns about material 
interests and everyday practices. A desire to protect commonly owned 
or managed trees and forests, even with the recognition that such 
protection could enhance one’s material self-interest, subscribes to 
environmental subjectivities.
568
 
 
In other words, for Agrawal, interest in the environment because you believe it will 
benefit you in some way does not in any way diminish your environmental 
subjectivity.  This consequentialist view of environmentalism opens the door for 
individuals to participate in environmental governance without questioning their 
motives, a perfectly rational position given that the environment, unlike an individual, 
is not concerned with why you protected it.
569
  
 Was there a change in the environmental subjectivity among farmers in Lucas 
from before the implementation of Lucas Legal to five years afterward? The evidence 
tentatively suggests that there was, though more research is needed in this regard. 
Prior to the implementation of Lucas Legal, responses to the few questions directly 
related to environmental behaviors showed that in practice far fewer farmers were 
taking on environment-positive activities such as reforesting and obtaining licenses 
than were not (Table 8). These data should be taken with a grain of salt, though. 
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Responses regarding reforesting or letting forest grow back were not accompanied by 
data about forest reserve deficits (or excesses), as survey data from TNC’s project 
were still forthcoming. Thus, it is impossible to determine the relative amount of 
harm in each case of a farmer not undertaking any recent reforestation projects, 
though based on more recent figures related to land use in the municipality, these data 
are plausible.
570
 The question about the LAU is also incomplete because it does not 
capture who may have applied for a LAU at the time of the survey but had not 
received it yet due, for example, to delays in emitting licenses on the part of SEMA. 
These data are further corroborated by relatively low levels of concern (both positive 
– 9.39 percent, Table 7 and negative – maximum 15.96 percent, Table 6) with 
environmental issues in the open-ended questions of the survey. 
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Table 8. Farmer environment-positive activities, 2006 
Responses in 
2006 survey (N 
= 212) 
Have you reforested in 
the last 5 years? 
 
Have you let forest 
come back in the last 
5 years? 
 
Do you have a 
LAU? 
 
 
Count 
 
 
Percentage 
 
 
Count 
 
 
Percentage 
 
 
Count 
 
 
Percentage 
 
Yes 15 7.1% 44 20.8% 21 9.9% 
No 149 70.3% 121 57.1% 69 32.5% 
No Answer 48 22.6% 47 22.2% 122 57.5% 
Soruce: TNC/SAMA 2006 
 
 
 
At the time of my fieldwork in 2011, environmental issues were present at 
nearly every turn, even though there remained some disagreement about what 
priorities should be set, how issues should be addressed, and who had the right to 
address them. When asked about their environmental views, every farmer interviewed 
said it was important to protect the environment. Admittedly, these data must be 
interpreted with caution, as it is unlikely that a farmer in the Amazon who agreed to 
be interviewed by an American researcher would express ambivalence about 
environmental outcomes, even with the promise of confidentiality. And yet, taken 
together with other data, there is reason to believe that the majority of farmers in 
Lucas do consider the environment in some way. I received a typical response from 
KR:  
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In my view, production does not exist without conservation. To open 
up the land, we had to destroy [forest]. But I think that it was 
destroyed conscientiously and very little was destroyed without 
conscientiousness. But today, we understand that you have to conserve 
and have this harmony between the environment and production. But 
you have to conserve in practice, not just in theory. And also, I think 
that conservation of the environment is not just not deforesting. I think 
it is also the way you work and the way you deal with herbicides, 
fungicides, and how you work with your employees.
571
 
 
GR offers a similar, typical response to the question “What is your view of the 
environment of conservation?” 
 
Before, we didn’t think about it, but today you have to think about 
conservation and leaving [forest] close to water, you know? You have 
to leave forest, but before you didn’t. Before it was chop down 
everything – you could do it and you did. But not anymore.
572
 
 
With regard to how this consideration of the environment came to be, fewer 
people reported that they had always cared about protecting the environment; more 
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reported that their views had evolved to this point over time, though this evolution 
was not usually attributed specifically credited to Lucas Legal.
573
 Of respondents who 
said that their environmental views had changed, the catalysts for this change varied 
from observed changes in the local climate, personal maturity, increased awareness of 
national and international concern about the environment, a desire to have water 
available for agriculture in the future, and the fact that they had the opportunity to set 
aside reserves due to the size and newness of their farms.
574
  
When asked specifically about Lucas Legal, some farmers credited the 
program with giving them a “better vision” of the environment,
575
 and with 
improving market prospects for local products, whether in terms of a future “green 
seal” with price differentiation or in terms of reducing apprehension on the part of 
buyers or businesses looking to install crushers or make other investments in the 
municipality,
576
 though no such thing has been known yet to have occurred due to 
Lucas Legal. 
A common assumption is that farmers will only protect the environment if it is 
financially beneficial to them, because, after all, a typical farmer’s livelihood is in 
direct competition with the forest. Where there is forest there cannot be (most) crops. 
The data from Lucas suggest that potential financial benefit is insufficient in 
explaining farmer views on environmental protection. To date, no financial benefits 
in terms of price differentials or improved market access have actually accrued to 
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Lucas Legal participants or holders of LAU. Some farmers hold out hope that this 
may someday be the case, but most are circumspect in this regard, as in the words of 
BR: “It would be good if they paid us more.”
577
 Other farmers, like JS, responded 
with a flat “no” when asked if they thought they would ever see a financial benefit for 
their participation.
578
 Producer TU offers two possible explanations for the change, 
beyond expanding worldviews and deepening consciences: technology and scale. 
 
If someone has a thousand hectares, it doesn’t matter if he loses area. 
No way. Why fight over 10 by 20 hectares with regard to what you 
have to reforest or stop planting? What difference does it make if you 
have technology, if you plant a thousand hectares and lose 20? If you 
use more technology you will get about the same. And it’s that, and 
your conscience.
579
 
 
In other words, the farmers of Lucas are certainly in favor of receiving monetary 
remuneration for their efforts, like most people who reside and do business in modern 
economies. It should not be radical, though, to suggest that these individuals, like all 
individuals, may consider many factors in decision making, and that their calculus 
may change over time, or as technology improves. 
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CAR :Lucas Legal scales up 
  
An important test for Lucas Legal led to what are perhaps its most significant 
successes– CAR and MT Legal. Prior to Lucas Legal, the state of Mato Grosso was 
already responsible for issuing environmental licenses. The environmental license for 
rural properties in Mato Grosso, LAU, had existed since 1995, but with poor 
enforcement and considerable technical difficulties on the part of the state with regard 
to generating them. One of the main obstacles to effective implementation of a 
licensing and monitoring program in Mato Grosso has been the inadequate temporal 
and spatial resolutions of available satellite and GIS data and a lack of 
technologically capable staff in the state agency. These issues are explained in detail 
in Chapter 4.  Thus, for Lucas Legal to achieve 100 percent licensing of rural 
properties, this problem had to be rectified with a groundbreaking and detailed survey 
that would allow for accurate mapping of the municipality’s rural areas.  
 By 2007, only a year after the start of the project, the technical team for Lucas 
Legal had completed their work, generating mosaics of SPOT4 imagery for the 
municipality and the production of maps of each property (referred to in the project as 
the “GEO”), including property lines, a satellite image, and degraded APPs and 
deficiencies in RL noted. However, translating this information to licenses would 
prove to be challenging. Although SEMA was a partner in the project and although 
farmers were guaranteed temporary immunity as they pursued compliance on their 
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properties in Lucas, this immunity from prosecution could not, at first, be guaranteed 
at the state and federal level. The notification of 15 producers in Lucas for Forest 
Code violations in 2008 further underscored this issue. Thus, it became clear that the 
project could not continue on the local scale: it had to be scaled up. Institutional 
innovations are effective but they must correspond in scale with the level at which 
surveillance and monitoring of compliance take place. 
 Mato Grosso’s LAU is a comprehensive environmental license, designed to 
minimize the amount of paperwork required for licensing. In Brazil, notorious for its 
bureaucracy, this is not an insignificant feature. And yet, for farmers facing complex 
and time consuming alterations to their properties in order to comply with the law, the 
simplicity posed a different problem: most farmers could not or would not undertake 
all of the measures needed to make their properties fully compliant with the law 
before applying for the license. In fact, applying for the license was one of the only 
ways to know exactly what measures needed to be undertaken on one’s property to be 
compliant with the law, but in doing so, one was also declaring his or her 
environmental crimes directly to state officials and, in essence, asking to be fined.
580
  
TNC and the municipal government of Lucas had hoped that a partnership with 
SEMA would allow them to promise farmers that participation in Lucas Legal would 
come with temporary “amnesty” as they pursued compliance, but they found 1) that 
they could not provide farmers protection from prosecution by state and federal 
governments without institutionalizing the pre-license at the state level, and 2) that 
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some farmers were resistant to licensing for various reasons (lack of property title, a 
desire to make a political point about laws, a sense of being above the law), but that 
these resistances to licensing were not necessarily related to how the individual 
treated the environment.   
 Fortunately for project leaders, Otaviano Pivetta, the former mayor of Lucas 
and personal friend of the current mayor and Lucas Legal sponsor, Marino Franz, was 
a state legislator, who proposed and got passed a bill creating a state program 
modeled after Lucas Legal, to be called MT Legal.
581
 The state program created a 
state-level CAR prior to the application for the full LAU and created a period, at first 
a year, and later extended to two years, in which farmers could apply for CAR and 
receive the same kind of temporary amnesty that leaders in Lucas had attempted to 
promise under Lucas Legal. The creation of MT Legal was a major victory for the 
leaders of Lucas Legal in that it legitimized the promise of temporary amnesty under 
Lucas Legal at a more meaningful level – the state – which was ultimately 
responsible for granting licenses and making decisions regarding whether to 
prosecute for environmental violations or not. Secondly, this “scaling-up” of the 
project placed the “Legal program” concept in an even larger forum than it had been 
before, framing Lucas as an environmental leader among agriculture-oriented 
municipalities. The municipality began to attract positive, national attention for Lucas 
Legal and continued local economic growth,
582
 and the successes of CAR, Lucas 
                                                          
581
 Soraia Ferreira, "Otaviano apresenta MT Legal em Lucas do Rio Verde," Reporter News.com.br, 16 
June 2008. 
582
 Pimenta, "Crecimento Chinês e Ambientalismo Nórdico." 
298 
 
Legal, and MT Legal reportedly influenced the revisions to the Forest Code passed by 
the Brazilian Senate in 2011, which called for the creation of a federal CAR.
583
 
  
From project to program 
  
Yet another way in which the project succeeded was its evolution from being 
a project to being a more inclusive program in Lucas. As stated previously, the 
original and main objective of Lucas Legal was to achieve 100 percent licensing of 
rural properties in Lucas to enable satellite monitoring of the local agriculture 
industry. The project has had mixed success in this regard (discussed more fully 
below). However, the overall positive response to the project has acted as a catalyst 
for environmentalism and conservation-oriented activities in the municipality and off 
the farm, including in schools. As an example, agricultural companies now partner 
with the municipality, especially the school system, to plant trees along roads and 
along areas particularly vulnerable to erosion, under the banner of Lucas Legal 
(Figure 23). There is no indication that these projects are specifically sanctioned or 
sponsored by the Lucas Legal sponsors as a group, although the Secretary of 
Agriculture and Environment claims that they fall under the banner of Lucas Legal.
584
 
The notion, though, that ongoing environmental activities in the municipality could 
be considered under the umbrella of Lucas Legal is, in some ways, consistent with the 
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positions of TNC and sponsors. TNC’s David Cleary also refers to Lucas Legal as 
“not so much a project but a process” and points out that “it’s sort of accepted by 
people that this [FC compliance, environmental stuff] is a good thing. You have 
groups of kids touring the bosque, etc. It just seems like this cultural shift has really 
happened.”
585
  
 
 
  
 
Figure 23. John Deere employees in Lucas plant trees with school children as part of Lucas Legal, 
2011. Source Author. 
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And, in fact, there appears to be a substantial amount of what might be called 
mission creep in the municipal administration and even into organizations favored by 
local elites due to their considerable overlap in terms of leadership with the 
municipality. Take, for example, the municipality’s soccer team, Luverdense Esporte 
Club (LEC). Since 2011, LEC has dedicated itself to being the first “zero-emissions” 
soccer club and in pursuit of this goal, the club has vowed to plant (or to have school 
children plant, rather) 100 saplings for each game, based on calculations that an 
average of 2,500 fans attend each home game, generating a total of 35,000 kg of CO2 
per game (Figure 24).586 The LEC project, called Projeto Time Verde, or the Green 
Team Project, is in partnership with the current municipal Secretary of Agriculture 
and Environment, who is also a founder of the team and has been serving as the 
team’s secretary, as well. It should also be noted that a major sponsor of the team is 
Fiagril, the agricultural trading company, owned by Lucas’ mayor and his family, and 
which is also a sponsor of Lucas Legal. The LEC project is explicitly linked to Lucas 
Legal on the team’s website, where fans are informed that  
 
the planting of the saplings will be done by children from the 
municipal school system just like farmers in the recuperation of 
degraded areas of the Lucas do Rio Verde Legal project, which was 
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developed by the municipal government of Lucas do Rio Verde and is 
highlighted globally as a model for other countries.
587
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: LEC members plant saplings as part of the Time Verde project, Source: LEC website, 
http://www.luverdense.com.br/timeverde.html 
 
 
 
 Given the personal, business, and political relationships among the leaders of 
LEC/Time Verde, Lucas Legal, the municipal government, and Fiagril, for example, 
clearly, key commodities in environmental conservation efforts in Lucas are access to 
elite networks and personal contacts in influential local organizations. Not to diminish 
the efforts of these elites in improving both the behavior and the reputation of the 
municipality and its influential organizations and actors, but these efforts stand in 
contrast to the absence of organized pro-environment activities in Lucas that are not 
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linked to local elites. It is unclear if environmental awareness exists but remains 
unseen outside of the elite networks, or if the elite networks are indeed the principle 
drivers of environmentally-oriented activities in Lucas. 
In fact, the importance of elites, whether political, economic, or scientific, in 
successfully organizing environmental conservation efforts is well documented at 
global and national scales,
588
 and the situation in Lucas lends support to the notion 
that this tendency is both equally true and equally in need of fair but critical 
investigation at the local scale as well. Elites have the cultural, political, and 
economic capital to make conservation happen if, indeed, that is their wish, for 
economic reasons or due to personal conviction. Informed critiques of these efforts, 
though, are important. As Holmes points out, elites with the best of intentions and 
sufficient resources may ultimately fail to address problems at their roots, because 
they are typically uncritical of capitalist activities that often contribute directly to the 
very the environmental harms that they are trying to correct because they are, by 
definition, deeply enmeshed in the sectors that are the most problematic. Because of 
this, they tend to focus on convenient environmental issues that attract either big 
money or media attention, instead of the ones most in need of attention.
589
Lucas may 
well be a prime example of this. Convincing relatively wealthy farmers to plant a few 
trees may prove to be the easiest environmental challenge to overcome in the region. 
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It would likely be more difficult, for example, to place greater restrictions on the 
amount and type of pesticides farmers could use.  
For example, an argument can easily be made that in Lucas, where industrial 
agriculture is well entrenched and deforestation of most of the municipality has long 
passed, reducing the quantity of agricultural toxins applied to crops would be of even 
greater benefit to local people than replanting a certain amount of forest. According to 
a 2007 study, in 2005 8.5kg of agrotoxins (including herbicides, insecticides, 
fungicides, and others) were applied to each hectare of crops in the municipality, 
amounting to an annual exposure of 102kg per year per habitant, six times the state 
average.
590
 Unfortunately, in spite of efforts to improve handling of these chemicals 
and considerable success in achieving a near-100% recycling rate for agrotoxin 
containers in the municipality,
591
 these exposure rates are more than theoretical. In 
2006 in a widely reported “major rural accident,” a mistake by a crop duster led to the 
aerial spraying of the urban center of the municipality with agricultural pesticides.
592
 
In a study published in 2011, a researcher found 10 agrotoxins in the breast milk of 
100 percent of nursing mothers tested in Lucas (n = 62).
593
 The results of this study, 
in particular, were vehemently rejected by the municipal government, citing local 
efforts to reduce pesticide use and criticizing the study for not taking into account the 
                                                          
590
 Wanderlei Antonio Pignati, Jorge M.H. Machado, and James F. Cabral, "Acidente rural ampliado: o 
caso das "chuvas" de agrotóxicos sobre a cidades de Lucas do Rio Verde - MT," Ciencia & Saude 
Coletiva 12, no. 1 (2007): 109. 
591
 Interview with recycling center (CPE) manager, 26 October 2011.  
592
 Pignati, Machado, and Cabral, "Acidente rural ampliado: o caso das "chuvas" de agrotóxicos sobre 
a cidades de Lucas do Rio Verde - MT," 106. 
593
 Danielly Cristina de Andrade Palma, "Agrotóxicos em leite humano de mães residentes em Lucas 
do Rio Verde - MT" (Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso, 2011), 9. 
304 
 
sales of pesticides within the municipality that are applied in neighboring 
municipalities and the role of the three annual growing seasons in inflating figures for 
local pesticide use.
594
  
Another important criticism raised against elite-led and other non-democratic 
environmental programs is the lack of outside review of metrics for measuring the 
success of projects..
595
 In the case of the municipality’s flagship environmental 
project and the focus of this study, Lucas Legal, the problem of elites setting (and 
also being able to change) the metrics against which one’s project will be evaluated is 
present: the project’s main and oft-repeated goal of 100 percent licensing of rural 
properties has quietly shifted from meaning 100 percent of properties with LAU to 
100 percent of properties “licensed” by the project, i.e., 100 percent of properties 
mapped, which technically requires no affirmative action on the part of the landowner 
(more on this below). 
These shortcomings notwithstanding, project leaders have been highly 
motivated to promote the project as a model not just for Lucas but for other places, as 
well. Lucas Legal has scaled-up  via so-called spin-off projects in other municipalities 
in Mato Grosso (7 municipalities) and in Pará (5 municipalities), the state just to the 
north of Mato Grosso. The spin-offs are being run solely by TNC, without partnership 
with local government and business unlike in Lucas. For these projects, the funding 
comes mainly from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), via their Amazon 
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Fund. These projects, modeled after Lucas Legal, share with Lucas Legal the goal of 
creating a cartographic database of each municipality. Unlike Lucas Legal, these 
spin-off projects have so far only set licensing goals for each property at the CAR 
level – the first of the two levels included in Lucas Legal.
596
  
These projects began in 2010, when the Norwegian government donated $100 
million to the BNDES to be earmarked for environmental projects in order to offset 
emissions from Norwegian oil production activities.
597
 BNDES put out a call for 
proposals for this money, with no ceiling on the funding level, which, according to 
David Cleary, is “unheard of” in the conservation world and had TNC and other 
conservation organizations “salivating.”598 Their proposal to build on the success of 
Lucas Legal was approved, but there were conditions put on the money. The Amazon 
Fund provided $9,100,000 and TNC has contributed $3,200,000 to these 12 projects. 
Once the projects began, TNC had 36 months, or until the end of 2011 in Pará and 
mid-2012 in Mato Grosso to get at least 50 percent of the properties of each 
municipality in the project registered with a CAR, or else the money has to be 
returned to the Amazon Fund.
599
  
In practice, these spin-off projects are a lesson in the importance of the nature 
and source of institutions for the outcome of conservation projects and the difficulties 
inherent in “transferring” any project from one place to another. CAR in Mato Grosso 
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is based on the “pre-license” originally designed by TNC as an incentive to farmers in 
Lucas. It is based on the existence of a secure title to the property and a desire to 
ultimately undertake real conservation-oriented activities on the ground, including 
restoring forests, characteristics of Lucas Legal that built on the existing situation in 
Lucas. Nearly every property owner in Lucas already holds a legitimate title to his or 
her property, TNC and the other sponsors of Lucas Legal have demonstrated that they 
have a sincere interest in seeing at least some forest replanted, and farmers in Lucas 
are relatively wealthy enough, if not willing, to bear the cost of replanting and the 
loss of some of their crop land.  
Thus, obtaining a CAR in Mato Grosso, while less rigorous than LAU, 
remains a somewhat rigorous process that requires a property owner dedicate at least 
some resources to it, and assumes that, eventually, he or she will and will be able to 
do so. Because CAR, like LAU, is based on the application of the Forest Code to the 
property, the property must be accurately mapped and the applicant for the license 
must legally own the property for the licensing process to move forward. In many 
municipalities, though, secure title is the exception, not the rule. For example, in 
Juruena - MT, one of the municipalities with a Lucas Legal spin-off project, a recent 
INCRA project settled 1000 people, of which only 400 remain.
 600
 This is a common 
enough occurrence with settlement projects in the region, but it means that up to 600 
properties in the municipality are “irregular” and unable to be registered with CAR 
because the official owners are absent from the land. Furthermore, licensing and 
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restoration of APPs can be expensive, running easily into the thousands or even tens 
of thousands of reals,
601
 not to mention the cost of restoring the forest, which carries 
its own real (including purchasing saplings and building fences to keep animals out) 
costs and opportunity costs (lost farming area). These costs can be formidable for 
land owners in less affluent areas than Lucas, as well as being somewhat 
unpredictable. And once one begins the licensing process, there is no exit if, for 
instance, at some point in the process, the farmer cannot afford to move forward, 
which is another source of reticence to licensing.
602
 As such, CAR has proven to be 
less simple than originally imagined in much of Mato Grosso, where land titles are 
not as secure as in Lucas and where social, political, and economic situations may not 
predispose landowners to receptiveness to conservation measures in the same way 
and to the same degree as in Lucas.  
On the other side of the coin, CAR in Pará has perhaps been oversimplified. 
The acronym CAR stands for Rural Environmental Register in Portuguese and, in 
Pará, this is exactly what it is. Whereas obtaining CAR in Mato Grosso in fact means 
a legal commitment on the part of the property owner to replant APPs where they are 
lacking on his or her property, in Pará, the process requires no such legal and 
environmental commitment, and no environmental engineer has to prepare and sign 
off the on the application. It is simply a declaration of legal ownership of the property 
on the part of the registrant. TNC staffers can submit the application directly to the 
State of Pará on behalf of the landowner.  Thus, TNC has found it to be easier to meet 
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BNDES-mandated goals of 50% CAR registration in the project’s Pará municipalities 
than the project’s Mato Grosso municipalities, despite Pará comparatively worse 
environmental reputation.
603
 CAR in Pará, though, is considerably less meaningful 
than CAR in Mato Grosso, though they are treated as the same thing under the 
TNC/BNDES project. As one of the leaders of Lucas Legal from the beginning, 
Luciane Copetti, who now works for TNC on the spin-off projects in Mato Grosso, 
laments this:  
 
Once the registration is done, the government and the funding agencies 
feel their job is done, but because TNC is a conservation organization, 
they want to see trees planted and APPs recuperated.
604
 
 
Who (appears to) regulate and how this matter 
  
 It is commonly held that farmers in the Amazon prefer less environmental 
restrictions on their activities.
605
 The data from Lucas problematizes this notion, and 
the Lucas Legal project may have capitalized on this insight to achieve its successes. 
In the pre-Lucas Legal survey, it is striking that not a single respondent mentioned 
excessive regulations. Instead, common complaints alluded to the inadequacy of 
                                                          
603
 Márcio Sales and Carlos Souza Jr., "Risco de desmatamento, agosto de 2012 a julho de 2013," 
(Imazon, 2012), 1. 
604
 Interview with Luciane Copetti, 17 October 2011. 
605
 Sparovek et al., "Brazilian Agriculture and Environmental Legislation: Status and Future 
Challenges," 6047. 
309 
 
regulation in terms of meeting their needs. Frequent responses such as “lack of 
política agrícola” to questions about problems or demands in the sector indicate 
dissatisfaction with the type of policies and possibly regulations, but not necessarily 
the amount of regulation. Only one response was likely a complaint about 
overregulation, the respondent who answered simple “Lula” (this response was 
grouped with the “lack of political policy/politics” category in Table 6). Other 
complaints related to the type of economic policies being perused (again, not the 
amount) and some farmers even expressed concern about environmental degradation 
(erosion) and diseases, issues that have important impacts on their livelihoods and 
that are commonly addressed by more regulation.  
 The results of my fieldwork in 2011 offer even more compelling evidence that 
farmers are amenable to regulations on their behaviors when these regulations are 
accompanied by policies that address their immediate needs.  Only one farmer 
suggested that he thought agriculture was overregulated in terms of environmental 
obligations or otherwise (“This government demands a lot of farmers and ranchers, 
which is why revisions to the Forest Code are being discussed”
606
); instead, some 
claimed that their activities were underregulated or simply inadequately or 
inconsistently regulated (Figure 25).  
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Figure 25: Quotes from producers in Lucas calling for more regulation or greater or more consistent 
enforcement of existing regulation in agriculture 
“I see preserving a minimum area as of fundamental importance so that there is not 
[environmental] degradation [here] like everywhere else. In my properties, I have a larger 
reserve than required.” – PN 
 
“Our properties are compliant with regulations. Actually, we have more [reserves] than we 
need to. So there isn’t any way to attack us.” – RG 
 
“I think [the Forest Code] is just because, when I came to Mato Grosso years ago to visit, 
it was sad to see so many trucks with wood leaving and today, this is prohibited. If there 
weren’t a Forest Code like we have, they would have destroyed so much forest already. I 
am in favor of stopping the destruction of forest.” – KWM 
 
“I think the government could do better. Both the state government and the federal 
government, on average. If they could set aside their passions, both environmentalist and 
non-environmentalist, if the government would be a mediator, and the example is what 
happened with the local government in Lucas. It could be the mentor for the negotiation of 
all interests and bring everyone to the same table to discuss a realistic manner for how and 
where to work best.” – PN 
 
“I am a guy in favor of preserving water, preserving springs. We need to produce, but we 
can, and also do this legal part [comply with APP requirements], no problem” – JS 
 
“The vision the people have here about the environment was created in Lucas. This was 
the first place [to take the environment seriously]. I see this clearly, this is good for all 
generations, and today even children are learning about the environment, to not damage, to 
try to conserve, and I completely agree with this project of not deforesting along rivers, 
conserving springs – it’s something that should have been done years ago.” – TV 
 
“The government has to enforce and not sell itself, you know? Now if you go enforce the 
laws, whoever has enough money can pay you to be quiet, right? Now, I want whoever 
deforests, cuts, burns or ruins – I want them to be fined a lot.” – GR 
 
 “It’s the government’s responsibility [to enforce laws]. And, to tell you the truth, they are 
very lax in this regard, and now they are seeing the results of the environmental impact.” – 
HF 
 
“You have to preserve [forests along] the river, I think this is very important. And I think 
that you should have to preserve 20% at least, and not only along the river.” – BR 
 
Source: Field research, 2011 
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 Others simply wanted benefits to accompany the regulation in kind. This view 
harkens back to the demands of producers during the agricultural crisis of 2005, 
detailed further in chapter 5.  One producer, JS, compared his position on 
enforcement of environmental laws to the negotiations of the farmers with the state of 
Mato Grosso over the new FETAB tax:  
 
The state of Mato Grosso, some years back, the government created 
various taxes. We got a tax --FETAB – a tax on the farmer. You pay 
the tax on what you produce. The only place in Brazil that was 
affected was us. We argued against this at the time, because I was a 
city councilman at the time, and we had people go to the State, arguing 
because the tax was really high. And it did no good. The government 
instituted it, and advertised it, and the legislature approved it and it 
actually helped. Today, the state of Mato Grosso has quite a bit of 
pavement. Years back, Mato Grosso didn’t have any paved roads 
except for the federal highway. With the change in governors, my 
God, just for you to have an idea, just in the government of Blairo 
Maggi, he constructed Mato Grosso. 2650 KM of asphalt just on the 
state roads. This was huge, and the majority of the discussion was in 
cooperation with the state government and the farmers. When we 
wanted to construct highway 449 [a toll road connecting the federal 
highway with some of Lucas’ rural areas], it was the first state 
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highway done as a cooperation among the farmer and the state, right 
here in Lucas do Rio Verde. And, from then on, 2650km of pavement 
were spread out over the state, due to cooperation between the state 
and farmers. And the tax that we pay on our production? Thirty cents 
per sack of soy, we pay in taxes. This is a high tax. It’s just that, for us 
and for the state it was really good, because today, you can go to my 
farm and there are paved roads [along the way].
607
  
 
In other words, because the farmers got something they wanted in exchange for 
complying with an unwanted requirement, according to JS, they were able to see that 
the requirement was good for them in the long run. A tax is not the same thing as a 
new or more restrictive regulation on activities, of course, but JS’s comparison can be 
drawn because Lucas’ farmers consider any requirement from the state or federal 
government to be imposed on them, because, on the whole, they do not feel 
adequately represented by governments above the local level.  
 The events detailed in Chapters 3 and 5 help explain why Lucas’ farmers view 
their state and federal governments as so unrepresentative of their interests. As 
agriculture in the Amazon of the scale of that in Lucas is only about a generation old, 
only recently are appropriate policies and institutions emerging to address the needs 
for and costs of these activities. Moreover, political representation of farmers in the 
Amazon at state and federal levels has been a long time coming. At the state level, 
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politics was until the mid-2000s dominated by politicians and their concerns relevant 
primarily to Cuiabá and other longer-established areas in the south of the state. 
Producers reported that the state environmental agency, SEMA, has been plagued by 
corruption and, in any case, doing business with them is time consuming because 
SEMA employees are frequently on strike.
608
 Indeed, SEMA employees went on 
strike for several weeks during my fieldwork.  
 At the federal level, farmers in the Amazon have struggled to call attention to 
what they would like to be recognized as their unique experiences as farmers in 
Brazil. These include farming new lands, which are considerably larger and with 
more technologically advanced methods than those they left behind in the South, and 
in new ecosystems, being faced with considerable transport costs, and, the rapidly 
increasing (if inconsistent) scrutiny on their activities in terms of environmental 
outcomes. Producer RE put it this way: 
 
It’s no good if you have the state of Santa Catarina, for example – we 
here in Mato Grosso don’t know much about Santa Catarina. And 
Santa Catarina doesn’t have much familiarity with our region here. So 
you can’t have a rule at the federal level for everyone. We have to 
have the federal in the general sense, but then, leave some decisions to 
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each state, because Rio Grande do Sul is different than Mato Grosso, 
and Santa Catarina is different than Bahia – Santa Catarina is hilly!
609
  
 
KR was even more forceful: 
 
We have many problems [with governmental overreach]. The federal 
laws are so old, and now the reality is different. So you have the same 
thing, you go to apply the law because the law is federal, but why do 
the other states not have to apply the law? Because they deforested 
before APPs were required.
610
  
 
DD was brief, but blunt: 
 
Really, they don’t do anything. Who does it is the producers and 
everyone in agriculture.
611
 
 
And finally, NG: 
 
In reality, the municipalities observe a lot of corruption in the state 
government and the federal government is very distant. Brazil is very 
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large, and the federal government is far away…[In Brazil, there are] 
large municipalities, and sometimes the federal law doesn’t consider 
the situation of each municipality. This is normal, and it’s not always 
possible to discuss [each municipality]…but the biggest difficulty is 
that the federal government doesn’t come here and the state and 
municipal governments have to do everything.
612
  
 
 At first glance, this mild hostility to laws, policies, and enforcement of these 
on the part of state and federal government officials might seem to indicate that 
farmers are disagreeable to any type of constraint on their behavior. In juxtaposition 
with the commentary presented above regarding the importance of environmental 
regulations, though, it becomes clear that farmers are simply concerned about the 
source of regulations and the process by which they are implemented.  
 This insight seems to have been a key factor in the acceptance of Lucas Legal, 
as well as one of its main successes. It has long been established that the Brazilian 
state is highly fragmented, and scholars have struggled to reconcile the weak 
institutions of Brazil with its many (if insufficient and incomplete) successes in 
highly state-dependent economic development, with recent work pointing to the 
previously unappreciated importance of personal relationships among actors in 
different state agencies and among state actors and private actors
613
 This view is 
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consistent with the scenario in Lucas, in which there are few personal relationships 
between local actors and state and federal actors, and so state agencies and actors are 
viewed as corrupt or unavailable and federal agencies and actors are viewed as too 
distant to understand local issues. Local leaders and agency employees, on the other 
hand, are also community members; they understand local issues and also can more 
easily be held accountable for their failures.  
 Farmers are sometimes resistant to state and federal regulation and 
enforcement, but overall, voice support for Lucas Legal. Lucas Legal and other local 
efforts to “regularlize” properties by consistently enforcing environmental laws and 
encouraging licensing do not in any way let farmers off the hook on regulations that 
have always existed and have sometimes been enforced. And yet, farmers express a 
sense of pride in Lucas Legal and its influence in more effective monitoring and 
enforcement of environmental regulations. Producer JT put it this way:  
 
Look, it’s not a benefit, but when Lucas started with this MT 
Legal/Lucas Legal, people looked at us differently. Let’s do it because 
Lucas is doing it right. So the agencies, SEMA and such, also decided 
to have legislation like Lucas Legal. It’s because we took the lead that 
the state moved forward.
614
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Former Secretary of Agriculture and the Environment in Lucas, and current TNC 
employee, Luciane Copetti, confirmed this based on her work for TNC in 
implementing Lucas Legal spin-off projects throughout Mato Grosso – for her, the 
involvement of the local government is “crucial for licensing.”
615
 In fact, in Lucas, 
having local leaders like Copetti championing Lucas Legal was likely a crucial factor 
in its acceptance. In the words of producer KWM, “Lots of foreigners came to visit 
here and I went along with them. There was a speech with Lucaine, and she explained 
everything to us, and she was a huge proponent of the program.”
616
 
 A positive view of Lucas Legal and of the role of local leaders in promoting 
good environmental governance was not, however, universal among respondents. A 
couple of farmers were more cynical about the project, like OE, though even OE 
seems to have been ultimately pleased with the outcome:  
 
Everyone is doing this CAR, LAU to comply so they don’t get fined. 
If you say the producer wants to do the CAR, no one wants to do it. 
MT Legal was a pact that the state made. So I bring you my problem 
and you help me solve the problem without fining me. Because when 
you do CAR, you are opening your heart. You showed your crime and 
are being fined. So this pact that they made, to fix the mistakes, I think 
it was a really good idea. I’m happy that this idea came along. 
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Other producers pointed out the costs that came with the project. As producer KD put 
it, “to tell the truth, I think that at first, [Lucas Legal] didn’t have any benefit at all. 
We became targets for enforcement,” though he also eventually came around: 
“Actually, [now] there is an [environmental] consciousness that you don’t measure 
just with the financial question. It’s something you feel directly.”
617
  
 In fact, though, there were costs in terms of the reputation of the local 
industry, if not financial, at the beginning of the project. As mentioned in Chapter 6, 
in September 2008, just days before Lucas Legal was to be codified at the state level 
as MT Legal, federal environmental agency IBAMA “notified” 15 producers in 
Lucas.
618
 Copetti, then Secretary of Agriculture and Environment in Lucas, was 
furious that IBAMA would go over the head of the agreement between Lucas and the 
state and vowed to fight the charges. This incident was a sobering reminder to project 
leaders that no matter how much success they achieved locally, the project was only 
as good as its scale, so to speak.  
 But if local leadership was so important to the projects’ acceptance among 
farmers, how, then, can the unquestionable influence of the international NGO, TNC, 
be explained? First, it should be understood that local and national environmental 
organizations in Brazil have frequently formed alliances with foreign or international 
organizations since the beginning of the democratic period in the 1980s.
619
 In fact, 
cooperation among local actors and international organizations is so common that 
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Keck and Sikkink have named this pattern the “boomerang pattern,” in which local 
groups are frustrated in their attempts to change institutions at the state or federal 
level and reach further up scale, essentially going above the heads of the unmovable 
agencies, to enact change.
620
  The Lucas Legal case is something of a modified 
boomerang, in which, as opposed to farmers working through TNC to pressure the 
United States government to pressure Brazil to enforce its laws more fairly but 
effectively or some such scenario, farmers worked with TNC to “enforce” 
environmental laws more fairly but effectively themselves. Policy change at the state 
and federal levels came with positive public and media attention to the project. Still, 
the benefits for the local group (local politicians/municipality) and the international 
group (TNC) were consistent with the conventional boomerang: access to resources, 
leverage, and information for the local politicians and improved credibility in the 
locale for TNC (Figure 26).
621
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Figure 26. Modified boomerang pattern of influence of Lucas Legal, Source: Author, after Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998 
 
 
 
 ENGOs, including TNC, were already well accustomed to working with local 
groups to accomplish their goals;
622
 what was unusual about Lucas Legal was that the 
local nodes in the network that would develop and implement Lucas Legal were 
politicians and business owners in a highly-agricultural municipality. The decision to 
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take on this project and a precursor project which partnered TNC with Cargill in 
Santarém, Pará was not taken lightly by TNC leaders. Says David Cleary, 
 
At the time we were doing this [project] with Cargill, we were having 
internal conversations, with upper and middle level staff, about 
“should we be doing this? We will get a lot of flack for this.” I said, 
“this is something that needs to happen and if we stick our heads out 
over it this will make it easier for national NGOs.” And that has 
proven to be true.
623
 
  
Entering into the partnership that planned, funded and implemented Lucas Legal was 
not only risky for TNC, it was also risky for the politicians and other agricultural 
interests involved. After all, ENGOs and especially American ENGOs have a poor 
reputation in much of the Amazon due to their perceived overreach and impinging 
upon Brazilian sovereign rights to do what it wishes with its natural resources. And in 
fact, initial reactions to the involvement of TNC were mixed among farmers. Most 
came around to accept, even enthusiastically, the involvement of TNC: 
 
I wasn’t apprehensive about the involvement of TNC] because since 
the beginning of the discussion, TNC was pushing this discussion and 
assuring us that things would happen the way they did. We already 
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knew about TNC, and they seemed different, too. You know that there 
are those radical NGOs, extremists. And we already were familiar with 
the actions of TNC, always looking for an objective solution for 
problems and not seeking out media attention. Actually, it was a 
gamble, but I think one of the factors of the success was having TNC 
as the manager of the project…There wasn’t any resistance because it 
was the municipality that presented TNC to the producers. The mayor, 
in the name of the municipality, made the presentation and some other 
examples of projects that TNC had done. The municipality testified 
that it was a good project. This was important.
624
  
 
Look, at first I thought that TNC was here to mess things up. But, over 
time, we talked with them a lot, they respected us, and they really 
wanted to know the participants, and today we have an excellent 
coexistence and certainly I think TNC is good because they developed 
this project, and if it depended just on us here, it would have taken 
more time. Because they know how to work hard and organize. It’s not 
easy. Having just local people do it, there would be a lot of hidden 
agendas.
625
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Other producers, typically those who were less enthusiastic about Lucas Legal 
in general, like OE, maintained a poor opinion of ENGOs after Lucas Legal: “These 
NGOs being in our country is complicated, because we don’t know how they live in 
the country they came from.”
626
 Positive  views of TNC in Lucas are likely also 
related to the fact that locals, including the land-owning, former-secretary-of-SAMA 
Copetti, were hired by TNC after the start of Lucas Legal to help coordinate the 
project, which symbolically and literally helped TNC move “down” to the local scale. 
Also crucial, according to the mayor, was that the project relied completely on private 
funds from TNC and the sponsoring companies and the fact that it was passed into 
law so that all farmers were expected to participate.
627
  
 
Project shortcomings 
  
Conservation projects run by elite environmental NGOs have many 
advantages that can propel them to success, including access to technology, 
information, powerful individuals who can act as agents of change, and funding as a 
consequence of the involvement of these NGOs.
628
 These advantages, however, far 
from assure “success”, however it is defined. For one thing, what is considered 
“success” for these projects is usually determined by the NGOs, or their elite allies 
themselves, who are able to “set the terms of debate in a way that serves their own 
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interests and reinforces their status,” freeing them from answering uncomfortable 
questions about ways in which or parties for whom they were unsuccessful.
629
 In any 
case, ENGOs have a strong incentive to report only successes and to spin any partial 
success to look as positive as possible, as funding from big and small donors depends 
on continuous reports of success, whatever the situation on the ground.
630
  
 Lucas Legal has, as outline above, been quite a successful project in many 
ways, and is, apparently, contributing to improved environmental scenarios and 
outlooks on the environment. It has also capitalized heavily on frequent media 
attention, including from prestigious national and international outlets, to maintain 
high morale among leaders and participants as it pursues its objectives. But has it 
achieved its original goal of 100 percent mapping and licensing of the municipalities 
rural areas within its self-defined timeline? In a word, no. 
 As of November, 2011, TNCs self-reported goal of full CAR licensing for the 
municipality, only 23 out of 709 properties had the full LAU license and only 209 of 
709 had CAR, leaving over half of the properties in the municipality, or 477 
properties, unlicensed (Figure 27). One major obstacle the project has faced has been 
resistance or lack of cooperation from SEMA (in spite of its co-sponsorship of the 
project), and frequent striking on the part of the agency’s employees. All licenses 
must be issued by the central SEMA office in Cuiabá, but the paperwork is frequently 
delayed. One recent development in the Forest Code governance arena has been the 
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move toward requiring environmental licenses for loans to be issued for agricultural 
purposes, so many farmers have been doubly frustrated by delays in receiving their 
licenses. As a result, municipal staff, producers and environmental engineers 
contracted by producers often have to drive the 10 hour round trip to the SEMA 
office to pick up licenses. Reportedly, licenses will eventually be processed online 
and be printable from an online database. Yet another deterrent for farmers to seek 
licensing is a misinformation campaign by proponents of drastic relaxing of the 
Forest Code, which has some farmers convinced that if they begin the licensing 
process before the Forest Code is revised, they will be subject to more restrictive 
requirements than if they wait. Regardless of the reasons, though, failure to achieve 
100% licensing has not stopped project leaders and media from either blatantly but 
falsely declaring the project the “first Brazilian municipality with no environmental 
transgressions,”
631
 or cunningly modifying the discourse to say the project is “100% 
mapped”
632
 (not licensed) or that 100 percent of farmers “participated” or “were 
touched”
633
 by the project.  
Another complication for measuring the success of Lucas Legal has been a 
concurrent increase in enforcement of licensing requirements by the state and by 
banks and other agricultural service providers. Most farmers in Lucas rely on bank or 
company financing for their crops, and these organizations are increasingly requiring 
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proof of environmental licensing for their services.
634
 Indeed, some of the licensing 
success that has been achieved in Lucas may not even be due to Lucas Legal at all. In 
terms of achieving conservation objectives, this point is moot, but in terms of refining 
and promoting the Lucas Legal model, this point is particularly problematic.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Environmental licensing status of properties in Lucas, November 2011, Data Source: 
SAMA/TNC 
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These inconsistencies regarding how successful the project has been are, in 
fact, echoed throughout official communication about the project, such that it is easy 
to get the idea that, for whatever reason, the leaders of the project are seriously 
lacking in data on the project. For example, an official 2011 information sheet about 
the project includes discourse about how successful the project has been at mapping, 
identifying, and facilitating the replanting of APPs and other conservation areas, but 
gives the same land use figures, shown in Table 9, that were originally measured in 
the 2008 TNC survey. When asked about this, a SAMA staff member with agency 
responsibility for overseeing environmental licensing issues and who has worked 
closely with the Lucas Legal project explained that the project has looked more to 
numbers of properties licensed than the amount of area restored to native vegetation, 
and that progress for the project can be measured based on the fact that when it 
started, CAR did not exist and only one property in town had LAU.
635
  It is certainly 
not reasonable to expect complete message consistency in a long-term project with 
several lead organizations; it is, perhaps, curious the amount of emphasis that has 
been placed on using licenses issued as a metric for measuring success and not 
conducting ongoing surveys of the native vegetation recuperated in the municipality 
given the prominent role of TNC, a conservation organization, in the project. 
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Table 9. Land use in Lucas, 2008 
Land Use Category Area (ha) Percentage of Total 
Agriculture 239,269 65.88% 
Pasture 9,189 2.53% 
Regenerating Forest 109 0.03% 
Cerrado – savanna arborizada 9,733 2.68% 
Cerrado – savanna gramíneo 1,634 0.45% 
Cerrado – savanna floresta 46,161 12.71% 
Riparian Forest 54,842 15.18% 
Bodies of Water 545 0.15% 
Urban Areas 1,416 0.39% 
TOTAL 363,189 100% 
Data source: TNC/SAMA, compiled by author. 
 
 
 
Other challenges faced by project staff relate to the technical nature of the 
licensing and monitoring process compared with the technical capacity of the on-the-
ground staff. The state may monitor and enforce environmental laws and licenses, but 
most of this work on a day-to-day basis is done by local agencies at the municipal 
level. The municipal environmental secretariat in Lucas has a handful of well-
educated, well-embedded, trustworthy staff for this purpose. They currently rely on 
tip lines alone for monitoring, as they do not have a centralized and up-to-date geo-
database to allow them to methodically track deforestation or other transgressions of 
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the law. Indeed, getting access to frequently updated, high-resolution satellite images 
would likely be cost prohibitive anyway.  
The municipality and TNC have a few ArcGIS licenses in the office, but the 
staff does not really know how to operate the software or manage or analyze the data 
they do have. At the end of my stay in Lucas in 2011, a dedicated staff member 
created a database by downloading information about each property from the SEMA 
website (in PDF form) and cross-referencing it manually with the geo-database from 
the TNCs survey. However, the database is presumably already out of date because 
there is no system in place to automatically update it; SEMA does not privilege 
municipalities by giving them access to data beyond what is publicly available on the 
website (you cannot select multiple properties and download a spreadsheet), and the 
staff member who did this work left the secretariat for another job.  
 
Conclusion 
  
There is more than one way to assess the success of a conservation project, 
particularly a long-term project with various stakeholders. Ultimately, Lucas Legal 
has evolved to meet many of the challenges it has faced and, in doing so, has 
achieved some of its original objectives as well as other important outcomes. At the 
same time, it has failed to accomplish some of its most fundamental goals. What, 
then, do these complex outcomes teach us about conservation, environmental 
licensing, and multi-stakeholder projects in the Amazon? 
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Perhaps most importantly, Lucas Legal complicates assumptions that farmers 
are uninterested in complying with environmental regulations and highlights how 
historically and socially contextual attitudes about this are. The complexity, yet 
general receptiveness to conservation of farmer viewpoints about the environment 
evident in farmers’ discourse about regulations and the project, and the unproblematic 
nature of TNCs presence in Lucas. The Lucas Legal experience also suggests that 
positions and performances of agricultural actors are changeable, but that 
involvement in the process and the availability of multiple incentives may promote 
better licensing rates and conservation outcomes, and they need not be purely 
financial in nature. For example, for farmers in Lucas with secure land tenure, relief 
from the threat of punitive actions and access to credit might be a good incentive. For 
other actors, fast-tracking legalization of property might be an incentive, in other 
words (flipping the role of INCRA from the time of SLAPR on its head).  Overall, 
farmers’ opinions have changed over time about the importance of limits on their 
activities. This does not make them pure environmentalists, but it does show that they 
have come to consider their environment and have become, in every sense, 
environmental subjects. The question is open if this is a direct influence of Lucas 
Legal, but it is certainly related to the types of change that allow Lucas Legal to exist 
and thrive. Now every farmer in Lucas says he is in favor of some regulations.  
One lesson that might be taken home from the Lucas Legal experience is that 
the project is “successful” even though it has not had the licensing rates hoped for 
because it evolved to meet the needs of stakeholders and incorporate other 
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environmental-oriented projects; because its leaders capitalized on publicity as 
positive reinforcement for participation even while financial incentives have not been 
forthcoming; and because it created institutions that were flexible and multi-scalar.  
Another take-away is the potential for disappointment and loss of legitimacy 
if ambitious goals are not met. Project leaders have projected that they would have 
the municipality fully licensed with CAR by the end of 2011 and with LAU by the 
end of 2014, but this looks unlikely.  This is problematic for project leaders who have 
variously staked the reputation of local agriculture industry or continued funding for 
spin-off projects on the outcomes of the project; these project leaders have gone to 
great lengths to continue their media campaign for the project and obscure or de-
emphasize the goals that have not been met. This, in particular, is unfortunate, as this 
fear of failure makes it difficult for persons who do not have access to top-level 
discussions about the project to learn from the projects mistakes as well as its strong 
and innovative aspects, and it constrains the behavior of leaders primarily devoted to 
conservation results. It also speaks to the challenges for licensing prospects for 
municipalities that do not have any sort of focused effort on the part of local leaders.  
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CHAPTER VIII – CONCLUSIONS 
  
In the preceding chapters, a multi-stranded narrative has been woven, 
describing the settlement and subsequent economic development of Lucas and its 
agriculture industry, the creation and evolution of institutions fit for organizing and 
controlling various elements of the settlement and development, variable resistance to 
these institutions by different and emergent stakeholder groups. The most recent 
manifestation of these processes is the creation and outcomes of a multi-stakeholder 
environmental governance project called Lucas Legal and the incorporation of parts 
of it into state and federal laws. The relatively deep histories of projects and processes 
of settlement in the region, the evolution of environmental laws and policies, and the 
development of a highly profitable agriculture industry over the past approximately 
thirty years were presented in order to contextualize, in terms of institutional, 
political, and social milieu, the complex scenario out of which Lucas Legal emerged. 
This has been necessary in order to answer the questions guiding this project: How 
can Lucas Legal be best characterized? What were the specific conditions that led to 
the emergence of Lucas Legal? And, how has Lucas Legal been successful, or rather, 
what have been the key outcomes of Lucas Legal and how has the project evolved to 
better address its shortcomings and evolving objectives? The ultimate objective of 
such inquiry into the case of Lucas Legal is to be able to place it in the context of a 
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broader phenomenon of shifting patterns of governance in agri-environmental arenas 
in a rapidly globalizing environment, in which agricultural actors seem to be 
simultaneously more accountable to more and different observers for their actions 
than ever before, but also have more resources available to them to meet these 
obligations.  
 Earlier, I offered three “theoretical frameworks” through which to examine 
these questions. The first of the frameworks is the quite eclectic literature that falls 
under the umbrella term of “governance,” which, in general, asserts that non-
governmental actors are important social steerers and institutional crafters, and may 
work toward determined objectives in concert with the state, in the absence of the 
state, or even in defiance of the state. In any case, a rather monolithic view of the 
state is common (though not necessary) in this approach (i.e., state v. non-state). Its 
tendency to oversimplify its treatment of the state notwithstanding, the literature is 
valuable for its decidedly inclusionary approach to the field of rule-making actors in 
general. The governance literature is apt for this research because it considers the 
different contributions of state, market, and civil society actors to agenda setting and 
rule making.  
 The second framework presented is the governmentality/environmentality 
framework which explores the evolving technologies of the government, that is, the 
different ways in which the state extends and streamlines the reach of its power. This 
framework is built upon the writings of Foucault on the nature of power and, 
especially, his writings on the way in which his diffuse and non-material concept of 
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power changes the way that the efforts and outcomes of governing are to be viewed. 
Some writers, but most notably Arun Agrawal in his writings on the empowerment of 
forest councils in the Kumaon forests of India, have explored the different techniques 
and strategies, successfully and unsuccessfully deployed by governments to create 
subjects who internalize the goals of the state as their own, however imperfectly. This 
literature is apt for this project because of its attention to how rules are enforced or 
otherwise come to be followed in pursuit of certain goals.  
The final framework explores coalitions – discourse coalitions and advocacy 
coalitions – which would look at the emergence and nature of Lucas Legal in a more 
pragmatic way from the points of view of the various stakeholders – is the apparent 
cooperation of various diverse stakeholder groups in Lucas Legal an alliance of like-
minded actors or simply a discursive alliance based on mutual convenience? In this 
literature, changes in the essences of the actors and actor groups are not implied or 
explored, nor is the manner of rule enforcement or adoption; rather, the focus of the 
coalitions literatures is on the (development of) strategies – crafting of storylines or 
forging relationships – to achieve certain goals, which are assumed in the analysis to 
be relatively static. The governmentality/environmentality literature explores the 
crafting of societal behavior by exploring government-induced shifts in individual 
behavior through power networks that ultimately lead back to each person’s 
membership in a community ruled by some sovereign; aggregated, these individual 
shifts create societal change. In contrast, the coalitions literature looks at how groups 
(mainly outside of the government, and with no inherent authority), such as civil 
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society groups, can collaborate to affect certain changes based on messaging and 
framing of an issue, adopting, in fact, some of the same techniques used by modern 
governments.  
 Each of these frameworks offers useful tools for understanding the events in 
and around Lucas which have, in a sense, culminated in the creation and reception of 
Lucas Legal. Below, a summary of Lucas Legal and the context from which it 
emerged will be presented along with insights from each of these frameworks for the 
elements that each is best suited to explain. The discussion will refer back to the table 
of main ideas from each of these literatures, first presented in Chapter 2 and reprinted 
below (Table 10).   
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Table 10. Key literatures and their main ideas 
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 The analysis presented in this dissertation is guided by these three literatures, 
which speak to different elements of an emerging and broader phenomenon of 
farmers, NGOs, corporations, and governments working together to address certain 
issues, of which Lucas Legal is an example. Certainly, these groups also continue to 
work against each other and parallel to each other in certain arenas, but their present 
cooperation in Lucas is notable given the important environmental and social 
outcomes at stake.  
Perhaps their cooperation is unavoidable given the various new issues that 
have come to the forefront of the discussion and action surrounding the environment 
and agriculture interface in the last twenty years. One of these issues is growing 
concern about possible food and energy crises so far unseen in our modern age. Other 
issues relate to shifts in population and land tenure characteristics as global 
populations become more urban and farms become larger, technology and climate 
shifts lead to changes in the locations of the world’s most important bread-baskets, 
from Europe and the US to the Amazon and Africa. Still other issues are related to the 
very nature of modern agriculture and commodity markets – the global reach of these, 
the ever increasing genetic modifications to crops, and the ever increasing reliance on 
ever fewer species, for example – and the very material way in which these factors 
link us all together. Indeed, the world’s agriculture is more intimately linked from one 
location to another than ever before, so agricultural actors as diverse as governments, 
farmers, ENGOs working in highly agricultural areas, and agricultural corporations 
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are beginning to realize the extent to which they, too, are linked and to act 
accordingly. 
 In other words, important changes are afoot and the old approaches to 
managing agriculture and the environment are no longer sufficient. It is in this spirit 
of recognizing this that this dissertation sets out to ask and suggest answers to 
difficult questions about the way in which the rules in law and the rules in use are 
being set and challenged over time. The three literatures presented in this dissertation 
each offer important insights into the changes occurring in Lucas, which can also be 
applied to other cases and to understanding this phenomenon of cooperation more 
broadly. These literatures have not been developed to address Lucas Legal, projects 
like it, or the broader phenomenon of the increasing interdependence of different 
agricultural actors, but they deserve to be put into dialogue with one another to begin 
to create a framework for understanding the changes described above.  
 
The road to decentralization of rule in the Cerrado-Amazon 
 
Among the important questions that remain unsettled about accelerated 
globalization, the spread of neo-liberalism, and the changing role of the state is: will 
the cumulative effects of these processes lead to more or less effective governance of 
the environment and natural resources, whether in specific instances, at specific 
locations, or overall? The case of Lucas Legal, presented here, has offered a case 
study into one, fairly optimistic answer to this question. In this case, these processes 
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have combined to create a scenario in which a decentralized, but still strong, state 
operates in tandem with elements of civil society and the global marketplace to create 
a sense of order and accountability for the environmental outcomes of agricultural 
activities.  
The first aspect of this multifaceted situation that must be considered is that, 
perhaps unexpectedly, the decentralization of rule of environmental issues in the 
Amazon has led to the increasing of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state in 
the region. This, however, was only possible after failed efforts on the part of the state 
to rule the region from afar. These interventionist efforts on the part of the Brazilian 
state essentially took three forms, as discussed in greater detail in preceding chapters: 
the incentivizing of settlement of the region; the implementation of environmental 
laws and policies; and the promotion of development of an agricultural economy that 
exploits some of the region’s most valuable natural resources, i.e.: land or soil, water, 
and sunlight. Settlement of the region was attempted in many spurts, all with slightly 
differing goals, but all of the various efforts had in common the objective of 
extending the influence of the state and establishing control over the vast and 
unknown region via land titling, the establishment of settlements, and the naming of 
places and natural features. The punch line is that these transformative actions on the 
landscape from afar necessarily created a new set of stakeholders to the region. These 
stakeholders (such as the settlers) were initially charged with carrying out the efforts 
of the state, but by virtue of being present in the region (whereas the state, largely, 
was not), began to experience a shift in their allegiance and their identity. They 
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became not agents of the state, but instead, Luquenses, Matogrossenses, and Southern 
Amazonians, whose interests no longer aligned with the interests of the state, but 
instead, aligned with the interests of one other and they began to unexpectedly assert 
themselves in ways that were not necessarily in concert with the state’s objectives. In 
other words, people who were initially part of government efforts to settle the 
Amazon were installed upon the land, but soon developed new identities as residents 
of the region, which changed their goals and objectives as the landscape was being 
transformed and territorialized under them and by them. Moreover, there were people 
already on the frontier who resisted some of the state’s reterritorialization efforts from 
the beginning.  
At first, settlers like those who settled and persist in Lucas were essentially 
objects on which the government acted out its desire to exert control over the sparsely 
settled and, practically speaking –autonomous, regions of the southern Amazon. It 
was not long, though, before these individuals ceased to be settlers and became 
residents. Their relationship to the government necessarily changed and they became 
not simply extensions of state power or bodies on which the government could act, 
but they also began to act in accordance with their own needs and wants, which were 
not always the same as the government’s objectives. Farmers in Lucas sometimes 
explain this shift by citing the schizophrenic nature of the government’s objectives, 
for example: “now they want us to conserve [forests] but they used to make us chop it 
down.”
636
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The governmentality literature is particularly apt to provide an interpretation 
of this change in the settlers of Lucas.  An important innovation that Foucault made in 
the analysis of power was to view it as not just negative, but as productive as well. As 
the agencies of the Brazilian (and Mato Grossense) government discovered, power is 
more than just a limiting force that constrains the behavior of individuals and 
populations. Instead, Foucault posits, by placing certain limits on certain behaviors, 
power also opens up channels for other, acceptable conduct that give agency and 
freedom to individuals to behave in acceptable ways, or in other words, to become 
subjects who behave appropriately of their own accord – not just because of some 
perception of imminent punishment for any inappropriate behavior. The making of 
subjects has alternately been called a process of “quiescence” to what appears 
inevitable or a process that has led to considerable resistance to power by less 
powerful groups in different situations.
637
 Resistance to what are seen as unjust 
regulations or constraints on certain behaviors are also possible once individuals 
become subjects. Under a purely punitive regime, resistance must be harshly 
punished; under a more sophisticated power regime that includes leaders and their 
subjects, subjects possess a certain amount of agency and both subversion and 
negotiation become possible. 
This process is evident in Lucas, where different issues and different moments 
were seen by locals as opportunities for compliance or opportunities for resistance. 
For example, dramatic protests in 2005 were certainly an example of resistance to 
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various government policies and failures that were unpopular with farmers, but 
licensing and satellite monitoring of their farms has become an opportunity for them 
to authenticate their virtuous behavior and a safety net for their future livelihoods.
638
 
In both of these representative examples, Foucault’s point appears born out: the 
constraining efforts of the state sometimes resisted, but are also internalized and 
reflected back (in different ways) by individuals – subject formation, indeed. The 
government (itself represented by individuals with their own power and their own 
interpretations of regulations) used techniques of law, monitoring, and enforcement to 
attempt to constrain the behavior of individuals, but the constraining force of power is 
not uniform nor is it absolute. Individuals can always decide if they will take on the 
constraints or attempt to subvert them in some way.  
By the 1990s, it had become clear that centralized rule from afar was 
generally ineffective in terms of creating consistent or predictable environmental and 
developmental outcomes in the Amazon. Moreover, the Brazilian government was 
beginning to understand the extent of the problem of deforestation in the Amazon, 
and eventually, the costs of this in terms of international pressure and threats to 
natural resources due to the very real effects of policies on landscapes. The upper 
levels of government tried to double down on enforcement, but found that it was 
ineffective and alienated landowners. At the same time, the technologies of 
government began to evolve – the Amazon was no longer viewed as inexhaustible. 
Study of the region using satellite imagery, soil typology, and an interest in 
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environmental licensing took on renewed importance in state interventions in the 
Amazon. This created further space between the state and the denizens of the 
southern Amazon, creating a tension that needed to be resolved due to the costs to 
both sides to continued opposition.  
Environmental regulation in Brazil has slowly become more decentralized, but 
not evenly so. Monitoring and licensing still occur at the state, national, biome levels, 
but greater responsibility is being granted at the local level, especially to those 
municipalities that show a willingness to participate. Whereas for Agrawal’s 
Kumaon, decentralization led to a diffusing of power away from the central authority 
over the forests that had been originally set up by the British,
639
 for farmers in Lucas, 
the effect was quite the opposite. Previously, the distance to the nearest physical 
location of government agencies and Brazil’s notoriously byzantine bureaucracy 
made compliance with environmental laws and recourse for unjust applications of the 
law difficult, if not impossible; decentralization has, in some ways, had the effect of 
simplifying the “sequential logic of control,”
640
decreasing the physical distance 
between the monitored and the monitors, and, consequentially, increasing the state’s 
control of environmental matters in the Amazon. If, on the other hand, in some 
instances environmental management and enforcement was actually made more 
complex, this was in the eventual legitimization of certain “outside” groups like TNC, 
and, to an extent, the tradings and corporations who supported Lucas Legal. Indeed, 
the lack of obligation of groups like this to maintain transparency in their operations 
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is a common critique of the increased involvement of these types of groups in 
environmental governance. 
 
Community regulation in Lucas  
 
This dissertation has asked  how best to explain a shift from ineffective and 
uneven, but centralized, government-rule to an apparently more effective regime that 
features both the highly legitimate authority of the local government, which in turn 
leads legitimately to higher scales of government, and, at least indirectly, an 
international ENGO and corporations operating at various scales. Ultimately, was 
there a shift in power away from the central government to other entities (state or 
non-state), or was there merely a shift in the way in which the state operationalizes its 
power in the agri-environmental arena in Lucas? Here, both the governmentality and 
the governance literatures can provide insight.  
A conventional reading, from the governance perspective, would be that the 
influence of the centralized government of Brazil has waned as NGOs like TNC and 
economic actors like the various corporations that bankrolled Lucas Legal has 
increased. In other words, the success of a project like Lucas Legal is proof that the 
power of the state over such matters as environmental licensing and monitoring has 
decreased, while the power of these extra-state actors has increased. Here, the 
governmentality literature offers a contrasting view. In this view, the state, for its 
part, has not “lost” any power (and indeed, power is not even something one can 
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possess, as such, to begin with); instead, the tactics of the government changed to 
incorporate civil society in the governing process.
641
 Which view, then, best describes 
what happened in Lucas?  
Lucas Legal is a case where local elites (political and economic), and non-
state actors with varying degrees of local ties collaborated to, in a sense, step in for 
the federal and state governments in promoting better compliance with environmental 
laws. This was possible, in part, because of the space left at the local level by the 
higher levels of the state for such maneuvers. There had long been a physical scarcity 
of (non-local) state presence in Lucas and surrounding area. Since the 1990s, the 
space has been transformed from a both defacto and physical space to a dejure space, 
even as the physical isolation of the region from state office became lessened. 
 The history of Lucas is the history of settlers trying to eke out a living in an 
unfamiliar location, enduring conflict with their neighbors and with the government, 
eventually becoming a community and developing shared identity, and struggling 
with federal and state officials to recognize this shift. At some point, settlers ceased to 
be simply agents of settlement and exploitation of a strange landscape and its natural 
resources. They began to sometimes clash with the government over issues like the 
lack of resources and public services, and also began to forge their own way, creating 
their own local government, earning their own municipal designation, and sometimes 
jumping scale over the state and federal governments and asserting their 
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independence by teaming up with multinational corporations and NGOs, as in the 
case of Lucas Legal.  
At the same time, government technologies and goals continued to evolve. 
International attention and advances in science and technology, such as for 
monitoring changes in ecosystems, combined to define a new landscape in the 
Amazon – one of environmental destruction, resource depletion, and scarcity. This 
roughly coincided with the increasing demands being placed on the government by 
farmers in the Amazon who became the perfect scapegoats for the destruction of the 
environment. Tensions between farmers and state and federal governments grew, and 
the 1990s and 2000s saw major changes in the socio-political context of the region. 
The Grito de Ipiranga protests, the election of Mato Grosso’s first soybean-farming 
governor, and the advances in environmental licensing and monitoring programs, 
discussed in greater detail in earlier chapters, were all outcomes of confrontations 
between the new citizenry of Mato Grosso’s north and the state and federal 
governments, but this did not drastically change the directionality of rule; it continued 
to ultimately move from the top down.  
In a sense, though, the central government did relinquish some of its power 
over the time period leading up to the creation of Lucas Legal. Decentralization prior 
to Lucas Legal was effected because the state was unable to effectively govern the 
region from afar. The ungovernability of the region, though, was not due to the strong 
influence in the region of corporations, organized civil society groups, or global 
market pressures – at least, not at first, because these did not become influential in 
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Lucas until the late 1990s. Decentralization, though, does not necessarily, or even 
usually, mean the weakening of the central government; in fact, the diffuse nature of a 
decentralized government can require greater management from the central 
government than prior to decentralization.
642
 Thus, decentralization of government is 
often an effective way to extend and better entrench state power in further-flung 
regions, creating opportunities for self-regulation on the part of the community but 
according to standards set by the sovereign state, a pattern that I argue played out in 
Lucas. Locals’ lack of confidence in and respect for distant government agencies and 
their projects undermined their effectiveness in the region, historically. Passing 
responsibility “down” to more local authorities (from mainly the federal, down to the 
state and the municipal levels) represented effective deployment of a governing 
technique that strengthened, not weakened, state presence in these municipalities.  
As the influence of global, non-state actors, such as corporations consolidated 
in Lucas from the mid- to late-1990s and onward, culminating, ultimately, with the 
founding and implementation of Lucas Legal, the pathways of power became more 
difficult to trace. Certain of these non-government actors were able to foresee and 
begin to resolve a potential conflict between the local agriculture industry and the 
global market over environmental standards, because they had the technical and 
financial resources as well as the flexibility and the perspective, to do so. Literature 
on environmental governance is often critical of such situations, because, as 
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troublesome as states can be in terms of producing desirable socio-environmental 
outcomes, the involvement of non-state actors can be even worse. The lack of 
commitment to transparency and the established commitment of these groups, even 
NGOs, to profit-making or fundraising often precludes these groups from having any 
interest in making true improvements to the environment.
643
 The voluntary nature of 
most activities by these types of groups, furthermore, often makes it difficult to place 
any great reliance on the projects of these groups.  
The case of Lucas Legal, though, offers a challenge to these critical 
reservations. Unlike similar, contemporary projects to reduce the environmental 
impacts of industrial agriculture in the Amazon, the non-state stakeholders in Lucas 
Legal worked with the government (eventually at all levels) to codify and make 
legally enforceable the improvements they made to environmental regulations and 
enforcement processes. The involvement of non-state actors in the governance of 
agri-environmental issues in Lucas, in fact, led to a strengthening of government 
legitimacy and authority in the arena, in Lucas and at broader scales. Of utmost 
importance in this process were the close personal relationships among individuals in 
stakeholder groups, which transcended the government/non-government divide, a 
scenario more common than frequently noted.
644
 The importance of personal 
relationships among, for example, scientists and environmentalists has been 
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documented before.
645
 There is still ample room in both the governance and the 
governmentality literatures to better address how the remarkable amount of overlap 
among local state and political actors, economic elites, and other members of civil 
society affects decentralization and shifts toward the strengthening of local 
government. 
 
Authority, expertise, and surveillance  
 
The context in Lucas out of which Lucas Legal emerged was marked by an 
increase in the authority of local, community-member regulators and other 
representatives of civil society, but not completely at the expense of more centralized 
rule, particularly of the permanent regulatory gaze variety. Conventional strategies of 
the central government for environmental management in the Amazon and the 
Cerrado have been punitive in nature, yet also highly erratic. These command-and-
control strategies for enforcing compliance with environmental laws, which were 
characterized by periodic and conflicting directives from a central government and 
interspersed with long periods of relative inattention to the southern Amazon region 
in which Lucas is located, seemed to have more or less been sufficient for the various 
actors affected until around the 1990s.  
Even before Lucas Legal emerged, it was clear that a strict command-and-
control approach to environmental regulation in the Amazon was not working, as 
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deforestation was still rampant and farmer resentment about the unpredictability of 
regulations and sanctions was growing. By the 1990s, settlers in the region began to 
form communities that were better equipped to demand more from the government 
than highly uneven enforcement of regulations that were poorly understood and 
viewed by most farmers to be at least a nuisance, if not unjust. Wealthy landowners, 
in particular, were undeterred by the fines, which they viewed as the cost of doing 
business,
646
 and less capitalized farmers felt persecuted and misled by changing and 
ever-more unattainable set-aside requirements. Brazil needed to reign in destruction 
of the Amazon but also needs its farmers to produce and produce well. The 
government began to decentralize (further) and reassess its strategy in the region. In 
this reshuffle, other groups (corporations and TNC, for example) saw space to 
influence the creation of new institutions, policy, and practice, or implementation. 
Strangely, one of the most important outcomes of this process is that surveillance – in 
the form of satellite monitoring, principally – by central government agencies became 
even more important and accepted in the region, as did influence of powerful non-
local and non-democratic actors as experts and authorities. Satellite monitoring is 
done so now with the open support of local actors who have steered regulation in a 
way that “touch[es] the lives of their targets far more lightly, regularly, intimately, 
and in proportion to their activities.”
647
 What led to these fundamental changes in the 
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reputation of the surveillance regime and the legitimacy of outside experts in the 
region?  
Long faced with the  ineffectiveness of the command-and-control enforcement 
regime because of its week legitimacy among farmers in the Amazon, the federal 
government began to comply with pressure to decentralize enforcement of 
environmental regulations in 1995, when Mato Grosso instituted the first state-level 
(as opposed to federal-level) environmental license. State-level management of 
environmental issues has continued to complement federal regulations and the work 
of federal agencies in Mato Grosso since that time, though the state has been plagued 
by many of the same deficiencies often complained about regarding the federal level - 
namely, corruption and inefficiency (see chapter 4). More local (municipal) level 
environmental regulation has always had the possibility to exist, if the municipality 
takes an interest in it, but this could only supplement, not diminish the jurisdiction for 
monitoring and sanctioning by the state and federal bodies.  
Today, in Lucas, ground-level environmental monitoring, regulation, and 
enforcement are handled almost exclusively by local authorities and staff, all of 
whom are community members and many of whom have family ties to the agriculture 
industry. The institutional bridges formed by the Lucas Legal project and the 
reputation of the municipality for effective management, including of the 
environment, that emerged from undertaking the project did not win the municipality 
any official autonomy in the environmental regulation of its territory, but it did win 
the municipality some unofficial, de facto autonomy. Licensing of rural properties 
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remains under the purview of the state agency, SEMA-MT. State and federal 
authorities continue to monitor properties for deforestation using satellite images and 
they have the authority to intervene and sanction rule-breakers if they choose to do 
so. In practice, they defer to the local authorities, issuing directives through the local 
SAMA.
648
 In other words, decentralization appears to have taken place, but how has 
the nature of rule and regulation changed and not changed from before Lucas Legal 
was instituted to afterwards? 
Lucas is geographically, politically, and, to a certain extent, economically 
isolated from the main population centers of Brazil, and even of Mato Grosso. Lucas 
is located over 300 km from the state capital of Cuiabá, over 1,200km from Brasília, 
and nearly 1,900km from São Paulo. There is an overwhelming view among residents 
in Lucas that their interests are not adequately represented in the federal-, and to a 
lesser extent, state governments (see chapter 5), and that they alone are responsible 
for their successes, given their abandonment by the state and federal governments. 
The local economy based on industrial agriculture is arguably as tied to international 
markets as it is to domestic ones.  
Lucas Legal began, in part, because of all of these factors. Local farmers and 
leaders were increasingly frustrated by the unpredictability of environmental 
regulation, but they recognized a growing demand from international markets for 
guarantees that their product was environmentally defensible.
649
 Personal ties within 
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the business community were directly responsible for most of the partnerships that 
formed to plan, implement, and finance Lucas Legal, though this would not have been 
possible without the appropriate political and institutional context. These local-
international ties exist in part because of the geographic isolation of the municipality: 
highly-capitalized firms, often international firms, were best equipped to operate in 
the region in the absence of much public infrastructure and quickly became 
influential, especially in the relative absence of the state and federal government. 
Thus, a combination of international business standards for good governance, a strong 
sense of local accountability, and international pressure from environmentalists 
created both a sense of imperativeness and empowerment about improving regulation 
of the environment at the local level through the Lucas Legal program.  
One of the most important elements of Lucas Legal its role in the seeming 
embrace of local farmers of the increased monitoring the project has prescribed; this 
alone signals an important shift. Farmers know that they are being watched and have 
been for quite some time – but most of them, particularly the ones who believe they 
are doing the right thing, welcome the monitoring to prove their compliance and help 
discipline the deviants. The increase in power of local authorities improves the 
likelihood of violations being reported, the appropriateness and productiveness of 
punishment (to remedy the problem, not just to extract a fine) and the sense that this 
is an issue that matters to the community – not just to some authority far away that 
only show up in Lucas periodically in helicopters.  
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The primary benefits to local leaders who agree to take on the burden of 
enforcement and licensing is local-level discretion based on intimate knowledge, 
autonomy. The primary benefits of cooperating with private international 
organizations, like TNC and Syngenta, for these local leaders are possible 
market/material advantages, and personal gains (the mayor and various officials have 
received awards and been invited to the United States, the former Secretary of SAMA 
was hired by TNC), and more symmetrical local knowledge access. Access to state 
records is notoriously difficult, though it is supposed to be improving – TNC mapping 
local properties provides local governments with something they never had before – 
easy access to spatial data. It remains to be seen, though, if the scenario in Lucas will 
lead to any improved environmental outcomes.   
In Agrawal’s study of the Kumaon, the “coercive institution” and the 
“punitive city,” both manifestations of Foucault’s disciplinary power, were found to 
be irrelevant to the community environmental governance in the Kumaon forests. 
Instead, community-based monitoring and regulating were much more effective, such 
that more conventional and punitive regulation from a more centralized authority was 
largely unnecessary.
650
 Agrawal, drawing on Foucault, suggests that there is an 
evolution in the nature of power relations as they mature and as technologies of 
government improve, all of which ultimately leads to a form of efficient 
governmental extension to the far reaches of a territory based on the illusion of local 
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regulatory autonomy.
651
 The more oppressive forms of rule, such as the punitive city 
and the panopticon, are rendered less necessary and can be left behind. The 
experience of Lucas, though, calls into question the teleological nature of this theory. 
Even as local leaders take on a greater role in environmental regulation, satellite 
monitoring (the ultimate modern panopticon) is increasing in importance in Brazil. A 
move to community based rule, as epitomized in Lucas, then, does not diminish the 
importance of satellite monitoring but encourages it. If anything, local community 
leaders just wish they had access to the satellite data as well. It is only the punitive 
city model that is being rendered obsolete in this case.   
Of course, all of this depends on having a legitimate and willing local 
authority to conduct such monitoring and enforcement of laws – which in Lucas 
seems to have emerged based on international standards of good business governance 
and is closely related to the strong ties of this ‘remote’ place to the international 
business community and markets. Lucas Legal did not create good governance in 
Lucas, but built upon it by playing up the empowerment of locals and local 
authorities to improve the local situation without waiting for punishment to be meted 
out and reducing the knowledge barrier between the local and the higher up levels of 
government.  
The widely-recognized responsible nature of local government officials can, 
and often is, attributed to some intrinsic honesty of the particular individuals leading 
Lucas for the past 30 years. Indeed, there is a strong sense of moral exceptionalism 
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among much of the leading class in Lucas, at least some of which can be attributed to 
self-righteousness after feeling ignored by higher authorities for so long, and at least 
some of which can be attributed to the influence of the Catholic faith among local 
elites. Without discounting the importance of these factors to the quality of leadership 
among local political elites, it must also be observed that the reduction in the isolation 
of the region, physical and otherwise, has greatly increased the degree to which the 
activities taking place in the municipality are being observed. The panopticon is real 
for leaders in Lucas, and they are aware of this because they played an active role in 
building it. This panopticon, however, not only hosts the central government as its 
observant guards; it now also hosts global market actors, the media, and TNC as 
observers as well.  
Indeed, the federal and state governments have not ceased surveillance and 
data gathering of the region, but are increasing them in concert with some 
decentralization of monitoring and licensing and increasing coordination with and 
responsiveness to local demands. What with satellite monitoring continuing and 
improving, the panopticon-type gaze is certainly present but it remains insufficient in 
terms of all types of deforestation, timeliness, and the ability of the government to 
actually reach the places where deforestation is detected, not to mention this issues of 
errors related to the technique and the cost of capturing and processing images at a 
spatial and temporal scale sufficient to see what happens on a 200 hectare plot over 
the course of three months, for example. Increasing reliance on local authorities may 
increase the effectiveness of conservation regulations due to the fact that it is more 
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efficient, even given the imperfect gaze that an authority figure has from the ground. 
In other words, you can have all the satellites and helicopters in the world, but you 
will only catch some of the people some of the time. The municipality, though, is run 
by officials who have it in their own interests to run the town well and be accountable 
to constituents, because are part of the community, and to international investors.  
Thus, in Lucas and increasingly throughout Mato Grosso, techniques of 
environmental regulation are multiplying and appear to be undergoing some of the 
same transformations described by Agrawal. Agrawal found that the more 
conventional techniques described by Foucault as the “punitive city” that dissuades 
deviance by making known the highly distasteful punishments for certain acts for 
which one is guaranteed to be caught due to the totality of the government’s gaze 
over citizens;
 652
 and the panopticon,
653
 or guarantee of total surveillance of deviants 
once discovered, to be inadequate to describe community rule, which is instead based 
on only a probable discovery of deviance and continued, unproblematic community 
membership to ensure compliance with rules. “Regulatory rule” by members of the 
community, on the other hand, is marked by a gradually fostered personal investment 
in the rules, the sanctions, and the problem with violating them.
654
 It may even be 
rather unlikely that a single or small infraction would be punished or punished 
harshly, but people will tend to comply because compliance with the rules is seen to 
be good for the community and a condition of full membership in the community. 
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Thus, in terms of punitiveness, community-based regulation may seem less effective 
than so-called rule from the top, otherwise known as the command-and-control 
approach
655
 - but it is ultimately both more efficient and more “humane.”
656
 
Another important issue is that the important elements of environmental 
regulation in Mato Grosso - licensing and monitoring and enforcement - were able to 
be somewhat open to interpretation due to the fact that they did not take into account, 
for example, the gap between discovery and compliance that is necessary for any 
property licensing, the issue of compensação (compensation) of forest set-asides off 
property, and the fate of forest reserves as properties are bought and sold. This 
created space for the industrious leaders in Lucas, along with their partners in TNC, 
Syngenta, and Fiagril to make interpretations and decisions to inform the further 
evolution of those regulations even as they invited the gaze of the state in. The Lucas 
Legal project actually involved the private purchase of higher resolution images for 
licensing purposes than the state currently has available for monitoring. In any case, 
the temporal resolution of available satellite imagery is far from being sufficient for 
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stopping deforestation events before they get out of hand, and normally for even 
catching deforesters at all.  
Local, ground based monitoring based on what Agrawal refers to throughout 
his book as “intimate knowledge,” however, is highly effective – in Lucas everyone 
knows one another, there is a tip line set up for anonymous reporting of 
environmental infractions, and there is a very real sense among authorities one bad 
apple can spoil the whole bunch. There is considerable peer pressure to comply with 
environmental regulations – individually so as not to lose access to financing and to 
avoid fines, and as a group to maintain the good reputation of the municipality. At 
least one farmer did mention that his well-connected neighbor was getting away with 
something, but generally speaking, Lucas is regarded as relatively environmentally 
compliant and any assertions to the contrary are met with indignity by officials and 
most people associated with the local agriculture industry. Of course, agriculture in 
Lucas is well established and it is not clear that these observations would hold true in 
a more recently settled area.  
If there is an infraction, an individual may, in theory, be charged at all three 
levels of enforcement in the government – federal, state, and local. Typically, though, 
agencies avoid inflicting double or triple jeopardy. The local enforcement officers 
have some leeway concerning what punishment they assign – typically they are given 
a warning and a certain period of time to correct the problem. If they do not correct 
the problem within the time given, they are fined and still have to correct the 
problem, and so on, with the punishments escalating to losing their license, crop 
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confiscation, or even imprisonment for refusal to comply. These extreme cases are 
unheard of in Lucas.  
It is probably a fair assumption that things are not so rosy everywhere and 
local authorities would not always be so effective. Local authorities, who are 
understaffed, underfunded, or in municipalities with a highly stratified rural 
population (for instance, some place with an MST settlement and lots of large 
ranches) may not have such legitimacy and authority over landowners. The ability to 
work with higher level government officials is also key. In fact, clashes with 
government officials even when they are working with others from the same agency 
have been a major challenge for Lucas Legal. Yet, it is important to note that (even if 
they act as if it is so), local officials have not replaced SEMA and IBAMA – they 
work as extensions of them and in cooperation with them. Their techniques are 
different, and more precise,
657
 but their goals are the same. 
 
Environmental subject making in Lucas 
 
The previous section explored the effects of Lucas Legal on the local 
regulatory milieu. There are also important questions to ask, though, about the 
transformative effects of Lucas Legal on individuals. At a basic level, we can ask: 
Are environmental subject being made in Lucas, and if so, what are the main avenues 
for this transformation? Lucas Legal and the changes it has brought to environmental 
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regulation in Lucas have altered the fundamental way in which discipline and power 
works there. It has shifted the “object of regulation” from simply limiting farmers’ 
activities in an inconsistent attempt at forest protection to creating opportunities for 
farmers to prove they are compliant and even “green.” The project also plays a part in 
ensuring farmers’ subsistence, as they have discovered (or have been taught) that 
riparian forests are important for their continued livelihoods. But are farmers more 
compliant and considerate of the environment in both discourse and practice because 
of the empowerment of local authority or because of the expansion of the panopticon 
to include both better equipped state agencies and non-state agencies like financial 
lenders?  While there is no way to know for certain, it appears likely that both of 
these technologies are responsible. 
Based on my fieldwork, it appears that behaviors and attitudes about the 
environment are changing in Lucas, if slowly and unevenly. It is difficult to tease out 
the reasons for these changes, though. In Chapter7, I provided evidence that the 
environment had moved to the forefront of peoples’ concerns, though not at the 
(significant) expense of profitability of the agriculture sector or development of the 
region. But is this newfound environmentalism on the part of farmers in Lucas simply 
an act, put on by them to appease the media, investors, or the government? Or is it a 
true change of heart? And does this even matter?  
Environmentalist and anti-agriculture groups want to say that this 
environmental subjectivity on the part of farmers is a cynical and profit-driven ploy, 
and not a true shift toward caring about the environment. Scarcities, negative media 
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accounts, and “processes related to the governmentalization of the environment” have 
much to do with the way people frame their interests and act.
658
 It is impossible to 
know a person’s true intentions, but for the purposes of Lucas Legal, this probably 
does not matter. The project, like most successful environmental conservation stories 
in the Amazon, takes an instrumentalist view of the environment. So-called true belief 
in environmental causes is not necessary for more sustainable outcomes to be 
generated. Further, performance of an environmental activity may actually lead to 
belief or partial belief in the importance of conservation. Whereas it is typically 
assumed that beliefs must inspire action, action may inspire belief.  
Moreover, a person may be simultaneously interested in protecting his 
reputation and his bottom line, and also interested in environmental conservation. For 
example, as viewed through a lens of environmentality, farmers may care about the 
environment, but with qualifications, and still be environmental subjects. It is 
inescapable that the type of livelihood of the farmers and the type of environmental 
protection advocated for by those generally nominated “environmentalists” are to a 
large extent mutually incompatible. However, the making of farmers into 
environmental subjects lessens the gap just a bit, because “depending on the degree to 
which individuals care about the environment, the ease with which they will agree to 
contribute to environmental protection may be greater and the costs of enforcing new 
environmental regulations may be lower.”
659
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 In his work, Agrawal suggests that “beliefs and thoughts are formulated in 
response to experiences and outcomes over many of which consciously formulated 
strategies by a single agent have little control.”660 Put differently, “people often first 
come to act in response to what they see as compulsion or in their short-term interest 
and only later develop beliefs that defend short-term actions on other grounds as 
well.”661 It is clear in the discourse and ground-up governance projects emerging from 
the Amazon today that the representational regime of scientific and ecological data 
being generated by the government with regard to the Amazon forest, Cerrado, and 
agricultural landscapes are becoming internalized, even if not uniformly, by farmers. 
In fact, two of the most resounding themes to my fieldwork were description of the 
supposed wasteland of the Cerrado that settlers first encountered when they arrived in 
Lucas and of the beauty, vitality, and importance of their forest reserves today.   
How can this discrepancy in the local view of the natural vegetation over time 
be explained? Certainly, there had been a transformation of the landscape in the 
approximately thirty years that had passed between settlement and 2011, but the 
primary markers of this transformation are the vast fields of soybeans and corn, not in 
the remnant forests left in on the landscape. It is possible, though unconfirmed by 
scholarship, that the installation of industrialized agriculture on nearly 80 percent of 
the municipality’s land area has contributed to the suppression of fires in the 
remaining vegetation, leading to a more forest-like (and conventionally attractive) 
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appearance in these remnants, though fires remain common enough on the landscape 
that it is unlikely that this physical explanation could be sufficient on its own. The 
most likely explanation based on the available information is tied to the evolving 
characteristics and nature of environmental regulation and the formation of Lucas’ 
farmers into environmental subjects in the intervening years. Agrawal suggests that 
peoples’ beliefs tend to align with their practices;
662
 as compliance with 
environmental laws has increased, so too has the positive regard of local people for 
their nature reserves.  
The discursive power of ecological classifications and narratives about 
environmental issues more generally should not go without comment. The Cerrado 
has long been shorthand among farmers for “wasteland” or “not important 
vegetation,” as conservation of the humid forest receives considerably more popular, 
media, and scientific attention.
663
 Moreover, frequent changes in the classification of 
the vegetation in Lucas has led to very real confusion about forest reserve 
requirements as these change with the floral classification, which is in turn cited by 
political and business leaders as proof that their activities in the municipality are not 
damaging any vegetation of value; in other words, “If they cannot even decide what 
this is, how much can it really be worth?”
664
  
Perhaps one of the most important legacies of Lucas Legal will be the way in 
which it fundamentally changed the discourse in Lucas about the environment. Lucas 
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is a place where almost all economic activity is related to the agriculture industry. 
Prior to Lucas Legal, the majority of the environment-positive discourse that filtered 
into Lucas took direct aim at agriculture, painting as a villain the only source of many 
local people’s livelihoods. Given the prevalence of this black-and-white, either-or 
environmental discourse, it was taken for granted locally that because they were 
farmers, there was no way that locals could care for the environment. This changed 
with Lucas Legal, particularly because of the involvement of TNC, a famous 
international ENGO, with the project. Moreover, all of the project sponsors, including 
industrial agriculture firms like Sadia and Syngenta, publicly began to “talk the talk” 
as well as “walking the walk,” so to speak, and requested that their customers and 
suppliers – the farmers – join them in creating forest reserves, appropriately cleaning 
and recycling agro-chemical containers, and other activities.  What cynics may call 
artifacts of corporate greenwashing – the shiny pamphlets proclaiming the 
environmental virtues of agro-chemical companies and of the farmers who buy their 
projects, for example – may deserve a more serious look due to the transformative 
power of the discourses they present.  
According to Maarten Hajer, discourse is not simply a passive tool, but 
instead, is an active one in the advancement of an actor or a group of actors’ 
positions. In other words, shared belief in a position need not precede the use of 
discourse proclaiming that position; instead, discourse proclaiming a position may be 
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used to produce a shared belief!
665
 This helps explain the key, but so far 
unappreciated, importance of Lucas Legal as an environmental project. It produced a 
simultaneously pro-environment and pro-agriculture discourse that farmers, 
agricultural firms, and local government officials could employ, as well as visually 
striking artifacts such as pamphlets and websites containing this discourse.  
With this in mind, the switch in everyday discourse about nature reserves on 
farms in Lucas from Cerrado to forest belies a very real, if intermittent, shift in 
thinking among farmers about the natural landscape. Calling their reserves ‘forests,’ 
as all local farmers do today, whatever the vegetation actually in them, implies that 
they have accepted the importance and value of native vegetation. Farmers now show 
off their reserves to visitors and echo the same rhetoric used by municipal and project 
leaders in media interviews when discussing them.  
 
Assessing Lucas Legal: Environmental and human outcomes 
  
This dissertation has sought to explore the changing nature of human relations 
to the environment in Lucas, with special attention being paid to the changing nature 
of institutions of government and of governance. These explorations have led up to an 
examination of the emergence a project of environmental governance supported by 
stakeholders from private, government, and civil society arenas. The project has been 
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characterized based on existing literature of environmental governance and of 
governmenality, or technologies of changing and expanding government.  The 
outcomes of the project and the associated processes of change in the structure of 
environmental regulation and management in Lucas have been examined through the 
lenses of governmentality and Hajer’s work on the power of discourse. The remaining 
questions that must be resolved are – why would these diverse stakeholder groups 
cooperate in this project? and, Has the project been successful? I will explore the 
answers to these questions together.  
Agriculture in Lucas is highly emblematic of the contradictions at the heart of 
both concepts of neoliberal capitalism and sustainable development. It is highly 
dependent on what has been determined to be “natural resources” – in particular, 
land, soil, and water. It at once relies on and also destroys these resources. A typical 
response by proponents of capitalist development to critiques based on these issues is 
an appeal to the “reform-oriented inclusionary discourse” of sustainable 
development,
666
 which insists that development will become (or even must become) 
sustainable in time, perhaps after certain obstacles related to the early phases of 
growth are overcome.   
While certainly a comforting view of the future, scholars and other interested 
parties have raised many important questions about the truthfulness of these claims 
and the self-serving and self-perpetuating nature of this discourse.  In this regard, 
Hajer and Fischer have pointed out that “the dominant discourse that shaped up 
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around the notion of sustainable development was one that suggested that the major 
institutions could learn, had learned and would be able to reinvent themselves so as to 
become co-producers of a new sort of development that would be more 
environmentally sustainable.”
667
 The popularity of discourse is related to its 
inclusionary nature, but, Hajer and Jamison argue, instead of inciting true 
environmentally sound reforms, it has simply ‘greenstamped’ or legitimized business-
as-usual and hindered or constrained the calls for radical change and “more 
temporally and spatially focused attempts to reconstruct institutional routines and 
socio-natural relationships.”
668
 
This literature predicts that groups initially ally with palatable global 
sustainability or environmental discourses so as to not stand out  (as an environmental 
villain, for example) and to more integrate with mainstream “progress.” In the case of 
a discourse coalition like this, if the narrative of the coalition is challenged, the 
coalition may or may not break up. According to Hajer, “diverse political actors, 
characterized by different interests and belief in different sets of ‘facts’ related to 
public matters, can come together in discourse coalitions to influence decision 
making around policy.”
669
 This is a key way that a discourse coalition is distinct from 
an advocacy coalition. In an advocacy coalition, such as the more active sectors of the 
environmentalist movement, collaboration based on truly shared common objectives 
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goes beyond a shared storyline to some kind of binding exchanges among members, 
such as information, for example.  
From the outside, it appears unlikely that the key stakeholders in Lucas Legal 
– TNC, Syngenta, Fiagril, the municipal government of Lucas, SEMA-MT, and the 
farmers – share in any substantial way common objectives outside of those of Lucas 
Legal, which would seem to preclude them forming an advocacy coalition, though at 
the same time, would not guarantee their membership in a discourse coalition, either. 
The municipal government of Lucas and SEMA-MT have in common a directive and 
obligation to protect natural resources, but in Lucas these directives are very clearly 
balanced and intertwined with similar obligations to protecting agriculture. Indeed, 
the environmental organ in Lucas – the Secretary of Agriculture and the Environment 
- is also in charge of managing agricultural issues. This balancing act is particularly 
delicate because frequently what is good for one is bad for the other. TNC, for its 
part, has pledged to work more closely with corporations to address environmental 
threats,
670
 though its principal mission to protect the environment frequently puts it at 
odds with the Brazilian government and corporations and international funding 
agencies.
671
 Syngenta and Fiagril have pledged to support socio-environmental 
programs, but their main business continues to be one with irrefutable negative 
effects on the environment.  
Above and in other chapters, I have explained how the context in which Lucas 
Legal was born developed over time as various government technologies evolved 
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along with local acceptance and resistance to these technologies. Each of the 
stakeholder groups involved in the project came into the project with a shared goal – 
seeking to prove that licensing was possible and to improve the licensing process – 
but there is no evidence that they drastically changed their main missions in pursuit of 
this goal. A shared discourse around a shared project seems to have united the 
project’s sponsors. Moreover, a sharing of individuals (in terms of changes of 
employment from one group to another, in terms of spouses or other close family 
members working in different of these groups, and in terms of individuals who are 
simultaneously invested in, say, a business and serving as a local official) must 
certainly have strengthened these stakeholders’ cooperation. Did this discourse bring 
these groups together? Or did close working relationships among the groups involved 
in the project allow them to craft and employ a shared discourse? Because these 
groups generally enjoyed considerable overlap even before Lucas Legal, it appears 
that the actual, if informal, linkages among the groups likely facilitated their quick 
adoption of the narrative crafted for Lucas Legal, but that the mutual interest in the 
symbolic power of Lucas Legal to improve outcomes of diverse projects was the 
main outcome. The true transformation in practice occurred among the farmers, who 
had to reforest to pursue compliance with the law to receive their licenses.   
What, then, of the outcomes of the project? Chapter7 illustrated that the stated 
objectives of 100 percent licensing of rural properties in Lucas had not been met, 
though nearly half of the properties had been licensed. Thus, in one important way, 
the project is not yet a success. There have, however, been real and unexpected 
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achievements associated with the project. One real success for the project appears to 
be the change in the perception of environmental licensing and conservation among 
farmers. As described in Chapter 7, a major shift appears to have occurred in the 
attitudes of Lucas’ farmers from just before Lucas Legal to 2011, after the project had 
been running for about five years. Today, most farmers admit that environmental 
protection is something they consider to be important. Another important outcome 
has been the influence of the project on policy and implementation of policy at state 
and federal levels, where the project’s main innovation – the CAR proto-license – has 
been adopted into law. 
 In terms of translating this concern for the environment to action on the 
ground, things are more complex. Local environmental authorities in Lucas, as well 
as farmers, continue to occupy a middle ground between being part of state efforts to 
license their properties and better monitor the protection of forest reserves, and 
resisting it. They continue to decry SEMA-MT and IBAMA as being inefficient, 
unfair, and draconian, and at the same time they dutifully undertake the very tasks 
that these higher level government agencies would have them undertake, even going 
beyond what is required at times. There is even talk that local environmental 
regulations will remain more stringent than those at the national and state levels when 
changes to these laws are eventually settled.
672
 The alliance of the municipal 
government with TNC, Syngenta, and Fiagril bolsters the image of local authority of 
sticking it to the state – by working to achieve the simple task of licensing – while in 
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fact the municipal government is acting as an extension of the state and doing exactly 
what they are expected to do by higher levels of government – licensing and 
monitoring activities on rural properties. 
It should also be noted that the relationship between licensing of rural 
properties and reforestation and avoided deforestation is still unclear. Also unknown 
is whether recent licensing in Lucas can be contributed to the efforts of the Lucas 
Legal project. As this project was scaled up it also trickled down, so even if the 
Secretary of Agriculture and the Environment in Lucas was personally signing people 
up for project, it is not clear if it was Lucas Legal, Mato Grosso Legal, changes in the 
law at the national level, or something else entirely that convinced them to 
participate. Respondents in my interviews nearly universally reported an 
“improvement” in their environmental outlook; though they do not attribute this to a 
specific even or program, they do note that the positive attention being paid to Lucas 
Legal by the media and the public is also positive for them. It is easy to see that the 
project corresponds to shifts in environmental outlook on the part of farmers, but it is 
difficult to make definite causal connections – only correlations.  
 
Conclusion and directions for future research 
  
 A significant finding of this dissertation is that, contrary to conventional 
understandings of regional issues as defined by such dualisms as agriculture/nature 
and development/environment, agricultural actors in the Amazon are in fact 
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motivated by environmental concerns and consider the environment in their decision 
making, and that this consideration of the environment has evolved over time. 
Through interviews with farmers who had arrived in the region at the beginning of 
local settlement, some thirty years ago, coupled with archival research, I was able to 
show that the understanding and consideration of the environment by farmer-
landowners has changed over time in both thought and practice; that this complex 
environmental subjectivity has not been adequately addressed in policy debates and 
decisions; that agricultural actors’ decisions are influenced by economic 
considerations but not solely so; and that environmental considerations vary 
considerably among the farmer-landowner population. My research also contributes 
to the ongoing discussion about the importance of scalar fit, or creating institutions at 
the most appropriate scales, for creating effective agri-environmental institutions. 
Finally, my research has also contributed to ongoing efforts to create a framework for 
cross-case comparisons of “soft governance.”
673
  
 The grounded, ethnographic approach of my dissertation research helps fill an 
important gap in research on this topic; few other studies of environmental 
governance in the Amazon have been in-depth enough to explore the settlement 
history of the region, the importance of inter-personal relationships, and local politics 
to environmental and developmental outcomes, and link these issues to outcomes of 
projects of environmental governance or local perceptions of environmental 
conservation. Understanding the diverse motivations of agricultural and non-
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agricultural actors in the Amazon is crucial to ensuring sustainable environmental 
outcomes as well as sustainable economic development. 
 Questions raised but unresolved by this dissertation include: what factors most 
influence farmer decision making with regard to the environment? In what ways does 
farmer decision making vary in time and in space, or in other words, are changes 
rapid or slow, and are they more likely in regions with certain physical, social, or 
cultural characteristics than others? The findings of this project also point to the 
importance of further research on the nature and outcomes on conservation of public-
private partnerships with stakeholders form multiple sectors. Does farmer regard for 
the environment truly correlate with more conservation-oriented practices?   
 Lucas Legal is an innovative project that has achieved many successes, while 
illuminating the considerable amount of work that remains to be done to achieve 
environmental licensing of all properties, even in a municipality highly equipped to 
promote such a thing. Basic questions about the goals of Lucas Legal and its spin-off 
projects remain, including: Does licensing really translate to improved environmental 
outcomes like reforestation or avoided deforestation? Also unclear is the importance 
of the involvement of sponsoring corporations in the project, as well as their 
motivations. It seems clear that TNC has played a large role in securing funding for 
the project, organizing farmer outreach, and lending credibility to the project. In fact, 
the Lucas Legal spin-off projects do not involve corporate sponsorship, but instead, 
earned funding from multi-national sources through a development bank. This raises 
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important questions about the effects of sources of funding for environmental 
outcomes of projects.  
 Based on my conversations with one Lucas Legal project leader, there is 
reason to predict that projects with corporate funding from businesses with a presence 
in the location of the project might lead to better sustainability outcomes than the 
projects funded by the development bank, which is an “outsider” with no presence in 
Lucas. Recent research in the area of Corporate Social Responsibility appears to 
support this conclusion, as employees increasingly take an interest in the impacts of 
their employers on their communities and environments.
674
 Also unresolved is the 
importance of project participation leading to true changes in the missions of private 
companies. Does it matter if the company only sponsors an environmental project to 
improve its reputation, especially if the project ends up having a positive impact on 
environmental conservation? Is engagement with discourses of sustainability enough 
to make a company a “good environmental citizen” if its storylines incite real action 
on the part of others? Further investigations into the motivations and roles of private 
companies in environmental conservation could inform the organization of future 
projects to ensure better environmental outcomes.  
 Another set of questions this project has raised, but which require further 
investigation is the role of scale in environmental governance. Lucas Legal as 
originally conceived of was faced with the challenge of attempting to instigate 
compliance with state and federal laws, but at the municipal scale, with municipal-
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level legal protections, and without the full commitment of state officials. This scalar 
mismatch between objective and institutions apparently would have doomed the 
project had project leaders not leveraged their reputations and personal relationships 
to increase the commitment of state officials and repair the scalar mismatch by 
successfully promoting a similar two-license, temporary amnesty project at the state 
level. Murkier yet is what, if any, effect the various scales at which the sponsoring 
stakeholder groups operate had on the project outcomes. TNC and Syngenta are 
multinational, Sadia is national, SEMA-MT is state, and Fiagril and the municipal 
government are local. How did the scale at which each stakeholder operates affect its 
participation in the project? The specific discursive devices and action employed by 
each stakeholder deserve further attention. 
 Finally, all of these questions need to be asked in the context of multi-site 
comparisons among the Lucas Legal spin-off projects, other projects in Brazil, and 
other projects in other countries, particularly countries with large and expanding 
economies of industrial agriculture. More in-depth studies of farmer attitudes and 
behaviors with regard to the environment and in the context of licensing or other 
types of conservation projects are needed. The findings of this dissertation could also 
be used to design a large-n, multi-site survey of farmer attitudes and behaviors with 
respect to the environment and observed changes in land use and vegetative cover.  
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APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT 
Levantamento 
 
Entrevista #_________________ 
 
 
Dados pessoais: 
Nome: 
Idade: 
Tamanho da sua propriedade (ha): 
Período de tempo em agricultura em Lucas: 
Fora de Lucas: 
Outras ocupações?: 
 
 
Posso gravar a entrevista? (Seu nome não será associada com os resultados de jeito 
nenhum)    S  /   N 
 
 
 
 
  
378 
 
Perguntas: 
Papel da conservação ambiental na agricultura 
 
Qual é a relação do Senhor com o meio ambiente/visão do conservação? 
 
 
 
 
Teve uma evolução nisto al longo dos tempos/desde chegou aqui? 
 
 
 
Qual é a obrigação da indústria agrícola com o meio ambiente? Por exemplo, 
incentivar os produtores conservar? 
 
 
 
 
 
Qual é a obrigação do governo com o meio ambiente? Deveria fiscalizar mais? 
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Qual é sua principal fonte de informação para leis e regras ambientais? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Visões sobre as capacidade e confiabilidade dos governos municipais, estaduais e federais 
para administrar questões ambientais no Mato Grosso 
 
Em sua opinião, o Código Florestal é justo? 
 
 
--APPs 
 
 
 
--Reservas Legais 
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O Senhor tem conhecimento de algum conflito ou sobreposição entre os governos 
muncipal, estadual e federal na fiscalização das leis ambientais? 
 
 
 
 
 
Esse conflito causa insegurança ao Senhor? Como? 
 
A propriedade do Senhor é enquadrada como cerrado ou floresta?  
 
 
 
 
 
O Senhor acha essa classificação justa? 
 
 
 
 
 
Eficácia do Lucas Legal na promoção das práticas agroecológicas 
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O Senhor conhece o projeto Lucas Legal? 
 
 
 
Como é que soube do programa Lucas Legal? 
 
 
 
 
 
Como foi o processo de participar no Lucas Legal? Pelo seu entendimento, que mais 
tem que fazer como participante no projeto? 
 
 
 
 
 
Foi uma palestra? Os funcionários foram? 
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O processo de participar pareceu justo ao Senhor? 
 
 
 
 
Já fez licenciamento CAR? 
 
 
 
O projeto Lucas Legal motivou o programa MT Legal e quando o Senhor vai fazer 
licenciamento voluntariamente, o Senhor não será multado pelo passivo ambiental. 
Isso facilitou que o Senhor participe no programa? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descreva-me como o Lucas Legal beneficia o Senhor e os produtores em geral? (ou o 
município se não for agricultor) 
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Qual o seu entendimento sobre a eficácia do programa Lucas Legal em realizar seus 
objetivos? 
 
 
 
--em termos de objetivos para desenvolvimento económico 
 
 
 
 
 
 
--em termos de objetivos ambientais 
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